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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis proposes temporal conceptions that stem from philosophical inquiry, such as 
linear time, cyclical time and branching time, to then find a connection with the way 
music is structured and with musical meaning. I consider ontological and 
phenomenological approaches to the problem of time and music in order to demonstrate 
this.   
      The central aim of this investigation is to build bridges and dissolve the opposition 
between time ‘taken’ (clock time) vs. time ‘evoked’ (conceptual time) in studies on time 
and music. Lewis Rowell, Jonathan Kramer, Jos Kunst and Alan Marsden’s 
contributions are going to be taken as the main references. I consider the ontological 
approach as extremely literal since linearity, circularity and branching time are not 
explored there as concepts defining the meaning of music, but as abstract orders in time 
for music being processed, viewed from an exclusively technical point of view. In turn, 
the phenomenological approach does not generally link music to philosophical 
developments, it just describes general cultural conceptions of time. This thesis 
interprets the temporal modes of the phenomenological approach as highly coincident 
with the temporal ontologies in the ontological approach, as seen through developments 
in temporal logic.  
      Temporal logic, a branch of the classical logic, is used as a methodological trigger. 
Here the work of Arthur Prior is going to be taken as reference. Temporal logic first 
formalises, then clarifies, and finally validates assertions expressing temporal beliefs. 
The hypothesis of this thesis, that temporal conceptions are expressed through music, 
having in this case the power to explain at least its primary meaning, uses temporal 
logic as a bridging symbolism. In this sense, a comparison between music and language 
within a broader analysis is undertaken, before developing ideas of logic and temporal 
logic within musical practice. 
      In particular, in my study of some works by the Argentinian composer Alberto 
Ginastera (1916–1983), I illustrate the idea of a multi-temporality, i.e. the same 
composer works with several time structures already available by a cumulative process 
in the history of ideas. 
      The thesis finds there is a special type of time in music─neither an exclusive 
‘musical time’ as a totally separate time species; nor ‘Time’ in music, in an abstract de-
subjectified view. Thus, a cooperative, synthetic position is defended. Secondly, music 
represents by means of its distinct elements something inherent to itself, which links 
with concepts of time (ideas), and by using these elements in certain conventional ways, 
displays culturally conditioned temporal meanings. Thirdly, music displays a kind of 
temporal logic, although an extended view comparing it with the exclusively linear 
logic of music as conceived by the formalist tradition in musicology. It is also an 
aesthetically oriented approach different from the temporal logic as applied in literal 
representations of music in computing areas. Finally, I argue for a new musical 
temporal mode, the actual branched time in music (in the sense of parallel times), 
through the addition of a theoretical background for this mode in musicological studies. 
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To Sergio 
 
 
 
Let each listener just open his ears and think of 
anything. If everything goes well, the music will then 
capture his thinking, and at least give form, even if not 
substance, to it. And it might very well be that 
producing frames of thought within which important 
ideas may take root, flourish and breed is, in the long 
run, even more effective than just putting forward 
important ideas. Maybe music is good for something, 
after all. 
Jos Kunst 
 
 
Each child spends endless days in curious ways; we call 
this play. A child stacks and packs all kinds of blocks 
and boxes, lines them up, and knocks them down. What 
is that all about? Clearly, the child is learning about 
space! But how on earth does one learn about time? Can 
one time fit inside another? Can two of them go side by 
side? In music, we find out! 
 
Marvin Minsky 
 
 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
 
As I was submerged in the practice of music and meanwhile studying time as a 
philosophical problem, some questions started to arise. I wondered if any relation could 
be demonstrated between the subjective and objective poles of time in the music I was 
interpreting.  In this context, the score appeared as the objective data that I had to 
reproduce, but within my internal (subjective) experience of time. If the alchemy 
between one and the other (internal and external) time was wrong, the result of my 
musical interpretation as a whole was going to be poor. Moreover, to what degree did I 
have to bend this objective data to transform it into a correct interpretation of time in the 
music at hand? Why, for example, did I have to control this subjective way of 
experiencing time in music in works of the Classical period, while I had to free myself 
of an objective time whenever I chose to study music from another period from the 
history of the music, e.g. Romanticism? 
      The questions never ended. From very early age I was especially delighted by music 
from remote lands. I began to suspect that what I was hearing had a completely different 
structure from the usual forms and ways of narration compared to the music familiar to 
my culture. What happened with recurrence in Hindustani music? Did it share any 
common denominators with the harmonic statism of Gregorian chant, for example? 
How one could reproduce, using common, universal structures of time in music, so 
many practices in different cultural contexts and periods? 
      I became almost delirious with the prospect of musical gardens with endlessly 
forking paths. Open works and paths to be taken. I suddenly realized that the whole 
musical enterprise was this indeed: chosen paths. However something more concrete 
appeared inside this perspective: the possibility that many musical lines were 
functioning at the same time, diverse times proliferating and sounding together as a new 
coherent time structure for music. I discovered Charles Ives’ Three Places in New 
England (1908–1914), Witold Lutoslawski's’ String Quartet (1964), Elliot Carter’s 
Third String Quartet (1973) and last but not least, a powerful work by Ginastera. I 
finally found my musical garden made true, not particularly in the improvisatory 
characteristic of his Pampeana N°1 but in a major work that portrays the reality of a 
Latin American time, his Cantata para América Mágica (1960).  
 
 In the following pages you will find an attempt to answer philosophically these and 
other connected, open questions of a young interpreter. This thesis is dedicated to 
musicians who wanted to make explicit some assumptions not always well formulated 
in their task of interpreting and of managing the time in music. Also, this work intends 
to shed light on composers devoted to understanding different structures of time in order 
to later explore its expressive capacity. Finally, this thesis is dedicated to philosophers 
in their search for the peculiar nature of the time of music and to all that would be 
interested in the topic, and who want to cross disciplines and become aware of some 
theoretical findings. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to integrate the discussion on musical time to time in 
philosophy, to consider ontological and phenomenological approaches available in 
addition to their advantages and disadvantages, and to define a clear vocabulary for 
describing the various temporal structures in music in order to give an answer to 
questions about music signification and coherence. 
       
and musicological studies in general, has been acknowledged only recently. Jonathan 
Kramer remarked on its absence from musical dictionaries in 1985,1 reflecting the 
unclear status it has as a separate topic of study in relation to traditional theorising 
dedicated to the strict temporal values of rhythm, meter and tempo in music.  
      The relationship between music and time is manifold. Human beings express their 
inner temporal tensions metaphorically through music. On the other hand, music 
intrinsically involves time as an ontological condition for being perceived and finally, 
musical elements can be described as representing time conceptions forged in culture 
and philosophy. This situates the topic in a broader context of the interrelation of music 
and philosophical ideas, which is not to ignore the musical technical issues concerning 
rhythm and meter. 
      A number of problems related to the concept of temporality in music were already 
enumerated by musicologist Lewis Rowell:2 
hav 3 
4 
al 
                                                 
1 Studies of  Music Theory Spectrum, 1985, pp. 
72  London, Justin, 
Grove Music Online. 
2 Rowell, Lewis, Thinking about Music - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music, 1983, pp. 29 31. 
3 Rowell amply treats this sub- The Subcon  Music Theory 
Spectrum, 1979, pp. 96 106. 
4 Rowell dedicates a separ What and H  in 
Les Universaux en musique, 1998, pp. 385 397. 
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      Rowell gives an overview of new temporalities in contemporary music already in 
1983. He mentioned linear, multiple, static and moment time and finished by observing 
the importance of the study of musical time in future musicological research:  
The changes observed in the temporal organization of music suggest not only new avenues for 
future exploration but also a possible framework of ideas with which we may interpret the recent 
past: just as the various stages in the evolution of tonality have provided a basis for identifying 
and interpreting long-range trends in the history of music, so may the evolving temporal 
structure of music provide a conceptual basis for assessing the succession and accelerating 
proliferation of styles since 1800. The stylistic course of music in the last two centuries may be 
described not only as the weakening and rejection of tonality as the main principle of 
organization, but also as the genesis and development of a new set of temporal modes, which 
may  in  time  prove  as  influential  a  set  of  matrices  for  music  as  the  modes,  scales,  and  keys  of  
traditional tonality.5 
      To contextualise the study of time in a determined corpus of music, Rowell has 
pointed out a comprehensive, multi-layered method of research. The issue of time in 
music deserves an inquiry into the history of time conceptions, the analysis of music 
itself, philosophies of music in its eventual relationship with philosophies of time, time 
in theories of music and time in the aesthetics of music.6 All these levels combined 
would give an exact picture of the time of the music in question.  
      In this general overview, Rowell does not mention a question that could come 
before: that of the ontological status of time and hence, of the time of music. The 
problem of time in music indeed is subsumed under the same crucial question which is 
about the topic of time in general: Can the time of music be explained thoroughly just as 
an external process or is it also a phenomenon dependent on consciousness? 
      Since music cannot escape this matter, these two positions must be examined 
whenever arguing for an idea of musical time. Music, as granted by musicologists, is 
said to be the art of time,7 however, there is no agreement among philosophers about the 
benefits of both views: agreeing to a philosophical realistic conception of time in 
                                                 
5 Rowell, 1983, p. 248. 
6 This  multiple  perspective  for  the  study  of  time  in  musi El tiempo en las 
filosofías románticas de la música  Anuario Filosófico, 1996, pp. 125 168. 
7 See  as  a  first  antecedent  Hegel,  George  F.  W.,  Aesthetics, Lectures on Fine Arts, in Katz-Dahlhaus, 
Contemplating Music, 1987, Vol. 1, pp. 337
 in Music Theory Spectrum, 1985, pp. 181 184, and Kramer, Jonathan D., The Time 
of Music. New meanings, New Temporalities, New listening Strategies, 1988. Chapter 1 revisits the long 
tradition behind this current phrase. 
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general and recognising a clear description of it with the help of temporal logic, it will 
concentrate however on the specific temporal phenomena we find in music. So, in 
view, comparing their respective explanatory advantages. 
      The ontological approach defends the idea of an abstract time in which music 
participates, notes the beginning-to-end direction of the arrow of time and calculates 
time objectively. Still, it offers different shapes of time which are crucial for describing 
the various temporal modes, although they prove meagre for musical analysis. The 
phenomenological approach conceives musical time as a species of its own separated 
from the rest of things in time. It believes music creates diverse modes of temporality 
- -
time and concentrates on time as subjectively perceived. However, this musical time is 
inexorably related to ordinary time and time theories in general. 
      A coincident earlier thesis, which is presented as a kind of digression here, is found 
in Christian Norberg-Schulz in his philosophy of architecture, who proposes a similar 
methodological insight than the present here but about the idea of space.8 He establishes 
an analogy between both the real i.e. euclidean and einstenian and 
phenomenological in terms of place, trajectory, and zones interpretations of the 
spatial dimension, and an architecture exhibiting these ideas. He rewrites the history of 
the architectural forms in relation to the Egyptian idea of orthogonal space, through the 
extreme dematerialisation of the walls in the Gothic, and reaching the pluralism of 
contemporary architecture. Norberg-Schulz analyses the templum in Greek architecture, 
for example, neither simply as sculptural masses without interior space, nor just as a by-
product of mathematical calculus. A more profound analogy reveals the analysis of the 
lived space behind, which is heterogeneous . In this more 
comprehensive notion of space, different orders must be taken into account: geometric, 
sculptoric, orthogonal of the city in general, but also topologic and pluralist, in the sense 
of being fusioned to the natural scenery in which it is set and configured around the 
functions that wanted to serve.  
      This hybrid point of view presents advantages both for the musical case and for the 
architectural forms. Applied to music here, it advances an idea for the formalist 
tradition; in architecture, for the merely funcionalist interpretations. In both areas the 
purpose is to provide much profound sense and signification to the forms, together with 
a practical or technical functioning. 
                                                 
8 Norberg-Schulz, Christian, Arquitectura occidental. La arquitectura como historia de las formas 
significativas, 1983. 
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      The position developed here could be inscribed to a phenomenological realism. 
According to Edmund (1859 1938) ideas on the objective experience and the 
scientific ideal of philosophy, objectivity, i.e., knowledge is explained as cogito  
cogitatum (qua cogitatum).9 This signifies: consciousness is always given something as 
counterpart (intentionality), and this counterpart is given according to a parcel of 
knowledge, a perspective from which I can draw something. For the listener, time in 
music is this counterpart which at the same time is meant in its particular way according 
to his/her perspective. On the other hand, a realist account apart from its transcendental 
constitution in Husserlian terms is strongly considered by this thesis, since it brought a 
substantial apparatus of knowledge which cannot be disregarded. 
      The thesis proposes a study of time conceptions, searching mainly in philosophical 
approaches, but sliding into physical, anthropological and literary developments, in 
order to then explain their relationship with musical meaning. Temporal conceptions, as 
stemming mainly from philosophy, can be taken as paradigms when explaining 
primary level of signification. Aristotle, Kant, and Arthur Prior, among other 
philosophies of time are considered, having taken different time shapes as points of 
departure in their conception of time. 
      Musical time is here considered an integral notion, including all musical parameters 
that define, though not exclusively rhythm, meter and tempo; ambivalent, in that there is 
a distinction made between subjective timing and objective measurement; and working 
in a layered way, i.e. several modes of time can be working together in one work, 
although some are emphatically perceived and considered defining for a piece of music.  
       artistic and traditional music. 
 
branching structures. Also the Hebrew, the Greek, the Hindu, the Andean, and the Latin 
American conceptions of time are going to be addressed as cultural perspectives.   
      
represents -
events  in  time with  which  music  interacts  are  of  a  fictional  nature.  At  the  same time,  
music works with the purest events. In this context, the significations of music will not 
be explored, for example, by the emotions it arises but rather its representation of 
temporal situations and orders. Complimentary to this, the representation of temporal 
shapes will be studied from a pragmatic perspective, considering these ideas as 
                                                 
9 Cartesian Meditations, An Introduction to Phenomenology, 1999, 74 and 75, pp. 35 36. 
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5 
expressed in a musical context. This thesis thus argues both for the ontological base of 
the internal temporal form and the different cultural conceptions of time expressed in 
music. 
      Temporal logic works as a methodological framework. The classical formulation 
made by Prior,10 but also later critical sources will be considered. Temporal logic 
formalises, clarifies, and finally validates assertions expressing temporal beliefs as 
manifested through language via tenses and temporal adverbs. Beliefs concerning the 
shape of time specifically, which clarify analogue, temporal conceptions in philosophy, 
will have the main attention here.  
      The decision to adopt a philosophico-logical approach as declared in the title, has 
various levels of meaning, that is to say it illuminates four important criteria of the 
thesis, all equally displayed through the work. Firstly, it is related to the use of a 
philosophical logic as it is temporal logic, as the principal methodological tool. 
Philosophical logic is seen as a continuation of the traditional discipline of logic, before 
it was supplanted by modern mathematical logic. Philosophical logic continues to 
debate the connection between natural language and logic: 
Philosophical logic is philosophy that is logic, and logic that is philosophy. 
 logic supports philosophy, and philosophy feeds logic. 
Philosophical logic develops formal systems and structures to be applied to the analysis of 
concepts and arguments that are central to philosophical inquiry. So, for example, such traditional 
philosophical concepts as necessity, knowledge, obligation, time and existence, not to mention 
reasoning itself, are usefully investigated through modal logic, epistemic logic, deontic logic, 
temporal logic, free logic, probability logic, nonmonotonic logic, etc.11 
      Although this thesis emphasises the philosophical aspect of this logic, it touches also 
its applied side. A delimitation between computing-technical and philosophical-
theoretical approaches to music, time and logic are going to be thematised in Chapter 4. 
Philosophical logic is easily seen as logic for philosophy. It is important, however, also to 
recognize that it has other applications in other disciplines as well. Today, much of the most 
flourishing research in philosophical logic is being done by computer scientists, working, for 
example, on aspects of knowledge representation, system verification, or AI.12  
      This thesis takes advantage of temporal logic as it can be fruitful for philosophical 
theorising, in this case related to questions in the area of the philosophy of music. This 
                                                 
10 Prior, Arthur N., Past, Present and Future, 1967.  
11 Goble, Lou, The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, 2001, p. 1. 
12 Ibid., p. 2. 
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means that the final purpose is not in direct connection with representation and 
modelling, as for example is found in Marsden.13 
      A second meaning suggested by a philosophico-logical view is that this thesis uses 
both philosophical and logical tools, i.e. philosophies of time and temporal logic. They 
are the core material from which all arguments are developed.  
      Thirdly, philosophy and logic are used in the quest for a balanced discussion. In an 
imprecise way, philosophy is equated with phenomenological views and logic with 
ontological views when evaluating phenomenological vs. ontological views on musical 
time. As a consequence, a by-product can be obtained from the application of both 
approaches to musical time. While the ontological view provides us with technically 
neat language and concepts, the phenomenological views give us the opportunity to 
encounter the analyses of real musical examples, the matter of its perception, and the 
aesthetic dimension of the time of music. 
      A fourth reading of the subtitle, the most general and explanatory of the whole 
trajectory offered by the thesis is: Philosophical, as including the question of 
signification, and logical, that of rationality, in the sense that it deals with the question 
of coherence or unity in musical structure. The subtitle underlies then the two principal 
questions made by the thesis: Is time, ontologically speaking, a necessary condition or 
even a sufficient condition in terms of musical internal significance? Following this, in 
what sense are the structures established by music in time logical?  
      To sum up, all music is approachable via this above-mentioned perspective. Since 
music is interpreted as the art of time and no culture lacks a conception of time. 
Something to remark is the profuse previous research on this subject has not resulted in 
examination of the most important approaches to the topic in a single synthetic study, 
which is a goal for this thesis. Finally, the music of Alberto Ginastera, despite the 
attention it has received through musical and cultural analyses, it has not been yet 
subject to any philosophical analysis.  
      The thesis begins in Chapter 1 with a study of the background research. Previous 
research in this area will be divided into early, late and recent backgrounds. I will cover 
philosophies of time and music Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Bergson as the most 
influential followed by modern composers and aestheticians unified under musical 
Formalism,  such  as  Eduard Hanslick, Igor Stravinsky, Gisèle Brelet, and Susanne 
Langer. Finally, I will deal with the most recent theoretical perspectives. I will divide 
this last group into phenomenological approaches as in works by Jonathan Kramer 
                                                 
13 Marsden, Alan, Representing Musical Time- A Temporal-Logic Approach, 2000. 
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and Erik Christensen, musicological approaches with a historical perspective Carl 
Dahlhaus, Lewis Rowell, Edward Lippman, Alfonso Padilla, and Karol Berger , 
philosophies of music Roman Ingarden and Roger Scruton , musical semiotic 
approaches  Raymond Monelle, Eero Tarasti, and Thomas Reiner , and as an 
exclusively logical approach, linked ultimately to computer analysis developments, 
Alan Marsden.  
      All these previous studies have been helpful for configuring a comprehensive and 
plural position about the topic that is inscribed 
school. Those authors that have been studied in order to draw possible conclusions 
about the topics of the ontology of the musical work, musical language and musical 
logic are considered here as secondary sources. Their theses feed the ultimate goal of 
this study, which is focused on ideas about time and its relation to music signification 
and coherence. 
      Chapter 2 discusses the Ontology of Music. There, I display the analysis of the 
nature of time in music, the substance of musical time, i.e. a discussion on points
instants , periods intervals or events things that happen as the alternative 
elements for ontology of musical time. I include a final selection for events as the main 
individuals configuring this time in the sense of harmonic, melodic, rhythmical, etc. 
events. I analyse Roger 
time, supported through a new p
supratemporality in musical works, is going to acquire relevance in contrast with 
 
      The chapter begins with related questions concerning the much more developed 
ontology of the musical work. A definition of musical work is given as an intentional 
object having unless tacit a creator or various creators, an eventual performer and a 
possible score, whose cultural creation is historically situated. A definition for music is 
offered as well, as an art which involves the play of sounds coherently arranged in time 
either for pure enjoyment or engaged with some human activity, whose meaning resides 
primarily although in many cases not sufficiently in the connection with certain pre-
conceptions of time stemming from ordinary experience, and with philosophies of time. 
      Chapter 3 develops philosophies of language in relation to musical language. It 
searches into the kind of language music is. As a first step, it compares traditional 
theories of verbal language and theories of musical meaning. Then, it develops the 
syntactic vision for natural language and its idea of correction, i.e. of correct rules as 
defining what an understandable language is. This is correlative in musical studies to, 
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is always possible to break the laws of music. Formalist approaches to music in general 
can also be included in this first division because they concentrate exclusively on the 
text or syntactic meaning. 
A semantist vision of verbal language belongs to the logical tradition. At this 
appropriate for 
not recognising in music a sense of truth that corresponds with real facts/objects. Its 
parallel in musical studies is the search for external meanings through referentialist 
theories of musical signification i.e. imitative and expressive theories as well as the 
recent theory of topoi
expression also can have its place at this point in the chapter, since they constitute 
univoque ideas of signification in music. 
The pragmatist conception of language, as thought by Wittgenstein, finally 
allows a more comprehensive idea of musical meaning. It deals with concepts such as 
d 
according to contexts of use i.e. minor mode for funeral music does not work as a 
specifically from his examples on music.  
      The final purpose of this chapter is to justify a semiotic study of the temporal 
study of time within musical syntagma; semantist approaches relate music with general 
abstract ideas of time; pragmatist positions bring down temporal conceptions to 
particular interpretations within a period or the work of a composer.  
      Chapter 4, on Music and Logic, explores the connection between logic and music. 
The argument for a temporal logic in music demands a careful interdisciplinary 
analysis. The chapter refutes a first consideration of music from the point of view of 
formal logic born from language in a strict sense, for it is only a metaphorical 
approach music is unable to meet the condition of consistency. For example, what is 
negation in music? Although some analogies could be found, the comparison seems not 
to be reliable. 
      A second matter I consider is the study of logic applied to music in connection with 
technicalities of making music available to a computer for its processing, tends to 
develop a fruitful comparison between a strict application of logic to music and the idea 
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linearity associated with tonal music, as it is found in Dahlhaus.14 The thesis reinterprets 
this idea by adding circular and branching perspectives inspired by the philosophical 
temporal logic. This extension of the concept of musical logic finds new senses of 
coherence in the structure of artistic and traditional music. 
      Chapter 5 introduces musical analyses. The case studies chosen could have been 
varied and of a widespread nature in principle, all music could be interpreted 
according to the ideas mentioned above. However, this research will focus briefly into 
the repertory of Alberto Ginastera (1916 1983).  
     The temporalities his music displays are not only those ultimately related to 
European philosophies of time, due to the particular mixture proper of Latin American 
culture. Instead, to understand temporal me
Native American views, as for example the peculiar ideas about cyclical time and 
permanence in Andean cosmology. Parallel times, which appear frequently in Latin 
American literature Borges, Cortázar, and Carpentier are also going to be tested. 
The purpose is to amplify existing studies on time in music, in connection with these 
cultural notions of time.  
      Temporal modes will be classified as linear, cyclical, and branching. Linear time 
defined as music that unfolds as some parts of the work anticipate what will happen 
later on, creating a sense of consequence. The idea of circular time applies to music 
mostly based on repetition same and similar patterns. Branching time can have two 
practice, in which we have alternative events and only one must be chosen. Branching 
non-synchronized, layers of time working simultaneously in a single work. 
Furthermore, these general shapes in reality reveal complex interactions and cases of 
superposition of temporalities or mixtures are common. The cumulative process of 
incorporating time experiences by contemporaries is mirrored in the work of this 
composer, which exhibits the three shapes analysed. 
      To illustrate these temporal modes I have chosen three works by Alberto Ginastera.  
For linear time, Sonata para piano op. 22 No. 1/I, 1952; for cyclical time, Norteña from 
Tres piezas para piano op. 6, 1940; and for branching time, Cantata para América 
Mágica op. 27, 1960, particularly movements I and VI. 
                                                 
14 Dahlhaus, Carl, La idea de la música absoluta, 1999, pp. 103 115.  
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      The approaches combined in this work are considered traditionally rival, competing 
perspectives that do not cross each other. The purpose is however to present a 
comprehensive, panoramic, actual review of the topic, bridging time studies in 
philosophy with those in music, joining them in a critical overview. Finally, the thesis 
provides elements for aesthetics of time in music, it combines efficiently with 
pedagogically oriented purposes in the field of composition,15 and it promotes non-
standard readings on music. Aspects of this eclectic view that can appear vulnerable are 
its strength. Its hybrid nature shows a picture open to major philosophical questions and 
further musical research. 
 
                                                 
15 -garde revolution: A new approach to composition 
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1. Time and Music. The Problem and the Approaches 
1.1. Historical Background and Antecedents 
      Western philosophers through the ages have been developing their conceptions of 
time and meanwhile writing about music. Both topics found answers in the works of 
Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Bergson, among others.16 
The interrelation of ideas of time and the practice of music is far from being a topic of 
circumscribed, historical research. The task here is to pinpoint the moment at which 
ideas about time and about time in music were explicitly showed to interact, defining a 
particular moment of reflection inside the aesthetics of music, and the themes that 
carried the study of musical time up to this date. 
      The possible connection between ideas of time and ideas of music developed by 
Western philosophers17 Timaeus as an 
18 together with his opinions on music as mathematical harmony19 in 
the same dialogue, for example, do not offer a clear association between them. 
Moreover, the extent to which ideas of time would serve to interpret the time of the 
actual music that was listened to n , seems less clear. Even 
Physics as 
20 to his ideas on music in Politics 21 
(354 430 A.C.) exposition on internal time in 
Confessions22 and his definition of music in De Musica 23 
(implying theoretical music) seem again deprived of any explicit relationship.  
      All the previous philosophers, however, situate music as a kind of mirror of the 
 corrupt harmonies and rhythms ethos 
                                                 
16 In Calleja, Marianela, Tiempo y música: un problema lógico-filosófico, 1995 2001, Aristotle, 
of the time of music in general. 
17 A general introduction to these topics found in Fubini, Enrico, La estética musical desde la Antigüedad 
hasta el siglo XX, 1990, pp. 55 97. 
18 Timaeus, 37e.  
19 Ibid., 47e. 
20 Physics, III, 11, 219b. 
21 Politics, VIII, 3, 1338a. 
22 Confessions, XI, 27.  
23 De Musica, I. 
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theory. However, the association of the movement of the soul with movement in music, 
especially as found in Plato, Republic,24 prepared the field for what was to come.  
      The German tradition appears as one of the most prominently developed in this brief 
1804) philosophy of 
time implies a change of paradigm, between the prefiguration of his Inaugural 
Dissertation (1770) and his Critique of Pure Reason 
consisted of explaining time as the way in which humans perceived the world (an a 
priori form of our inner sensibility).25 The philosopher however did not associate his 
idea of time with his exposition in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) where 
the sensations of hearing 26 He  was  ready  to  
change his position from an objective time either seen till this moment as a product of 
innatism (Descartes) or as the result of empirical change (Hume) to a subjective time, 
which is how human beings experience the world.27 He speaks about series, order, 
content, and extension of time the time that allows humans to have coherent 
experiences. Kant, however, did not ever remotely connect his idea on time as a 
condition of sensible experience i.e. here, of music to the problem of musical time 
as a subcase embodying it.28   
      On the other hand, Kant is considered a precursor of musical formalism and the 
asemanticity of music.29 The connection of his time and music ideas was made by the 
critique that followed, which situated his philosophy at the beginning of a discussion 
about time as a primary signification for music, obviating any other referential content.  
expressive mirror of human time itself was no longer hidden from the mind of 
philosophers. 
      A first thematisation of musical time is found in G. W. F. Hegel (1770 1831). Hegel 
in opposition to the Newtonian idea of an 
absolute, external time , but as a collective mind, as a dialectic change of oppositions 
                                                 
24 Republic, III, 399a.  
25 Critique of Pure Reason, I, 1st Part, 2nd sec. § 5, 6, 7 and 8.  
26 Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 51 and § 53. 
27 
cosmological experience.  
See Rowell, 1996. This article constitutes the only one development focused on philosophies of time and 
music. 
28 For an interpretation 
ón kantiana del tiempo y la anterioridad de lo tonal en la teoría de Heinrich 
Schenker  Música e Investigación, 2000, pp. 127 134. 
29 For critical comments see Fubini, 1990, pp. 216 217 and 326. 
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in a never ending process.30 Time and history unfold in a dynamic way. Rowell31 
suggested that Hegel was the first to associate time in general and musical temporality, 
by noting the spiritual aspect of music, despite situating it still under poetry in his 
classification of arts32 in Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts (1820): 
Now, since time, and not space as such, provides the essential element in which sound gains 
existence in respect of its musical value, and since the time of the sound is that of the subject too, 
sound on this principle penetrates the self, grips it in its simplest being, and by means of the 
temporal movement and its rhythm sets the self in motion [...]33 
      The relevance of the internal time of performance is another important idea of 
Hegel. The reproduction of music makes it necessarily a performing art but more 
importantly it carries over the internal temporal movement of the subject.  
For music takes as its subject-matter the subjective inner life itself, with the aim of presenting 
itself, not as an external shape or as an objectively existing work, but as that inner life; 
consequently its expression must be the direct communication of a living individual who has put 
into it the entirety of his own inner life.34 
      In turn Arthur Schopenhauer (1788 1860), contrary to Hegel, noted the absolute 
supremacy of music over other arts. Music is reserved a supreme place in the 
framework of his ideas in The World as Will and Representation (1818). He conceived 
of general time there als
35 In contrast with Hegel also, he did not give any primacy to time 
as the latter had given primacy to the time of music. Time for Schopenhauer was part of 
the phenomenal world; music, as mirror of the Will could not be associated with it, but 
was to be considered apart from time. The Will has internal contradictions, as music has 
dissonance/consonance, which is equal to how Will alternates between effort and 
satisfaction.  
Now the constant discord and reconciliation of its two elements which occurs here is, 
metaphysically considered, the copy of the origination of new desires, and then of their 
satisfaction. Precisely in this way, the music penetrates our hearts by flattery, so that it always 
holds out to us the complete satisfaction of our desires.36  
                                                 
30 Hegel, The Philosophy of Nature, 1817, sec. 1, part A, § 258.   
31 Rowell, 1996, p. 133. 
32  
33 See Katz-Dahlhaus, 1987, p. 356. 
34 Ibid., p. 357. 
35 Schopenhauer, Arthur, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 2, pp. 48 51. 
36 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 455. 
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      From the point of view of a search into musical signification, Schopenhauer thought 
that music did not reproduce particular feelings of love or anger but the pure essences of 
those feelings: Music does not express this or that particular joy, but anxiety, pain, 
horror, jubilation, happiness, contentment in themselves, to a certain extent in the 
abstract, unaccompanied by any incidentals and thus by any self-interest. 37 
      As a consequence of this thinking, philosophers who coincide with the first musical 
Romanticism (approximately 1780 1850), like Friederich Schelling (1775 1854) and 
Søren Kierkegaard (1813
as an abstract, pure category, which situated music at the highest levels of the spiritual 
arts. From a semiotic point of view, these speculative approaches to music would offer 
an idea of musical signification that is transcendent.38 Any signification of music that 
could be obtained from these views is situated metaphysically, idealistically out of this 
world and cannot be put into words, i.e. it is ineffable. At this point, this thesis is at the 
philosophical antipodes, developing a realistic way of interpreting time in music. This 
thesis is interested in the way we actually organise time and why we preferred certain 
ways of doing so, without engaging in a discussion about whether one goes beyond real 
at these moments. Realistic 
visions on time try to understand how ideas about it have influenced music inside the 
practice, but it does not enter into how music makes us experiencing something 
transcendent as a result. 
      Richard Wagner (1813 1883) added an important view to the current conceptions of 
time and music in philosophy that must be remembered. He intuited aesthetic concepts 
of his time but recreated them under the prism of a composer. Thus, much of his 
concerns were practical, technical, but remarkable for later understandings of musical 
time.  
Time in music has become a social construct, open to anthropological investigation. The musical 
rhythmical element he attributed partly to the inheritance of folkloric dance as it is expressed by 
the dis
. Rhythm has become a social science.39 
      These concerns are going to be addressed in this thesis also, for they would imply, 
although here still in a seminal way i.e. circumscribed to the temporal parameters, the 
concrete interpretations of general time conceptions, as reflected by a music tradition or 
by a certain author in a certain moment.  
                                                 
37 See Katz-Dahlhaus, 1987, p. 153. 
38 Ibid., p. 9. 
39 Rowell, 1996, p. 157. . 
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      Henri Bergson (1859 1941) is a major figure to remember when speaking about 
time and music.40 Against the mechanics and physics of that moment, he defended the 
on musical a
spatialised time of physics. The impact of his philosophy to later aestheticians who were 
pioneers on the topic of musical time has been enormous. 
      Musical formalism of the 20th century emphasised form, internal structure, and a 
negation of personal expression, expanding the idea of time-as-becoming in music. In 
his Poetics (1952), Igor Stravinsky (1882 1971) noted the importance of the temporal 
dimension in music. He was inspired by Pierre 
Revue Musicale in 1939, which in turn was 
inspired by Hegel. According to the composer, music is a certain organization of time. 
Music could be constituted by a temporal arc in which the poles of attraction exist.             
      Gisèle Brelet (1915 1973), French aesthetician, continued the reflection initiated by 
Stravinsky, receiving inspiration from French spiritualism, Bergson, and Lavelle. Brelet 
wrote Aesthetics and Musical Creation in 1947. The concept of musical time was 
central to her aesthetics in Le temps musical (1949). She followed formalism in her 
ideas on art as related with pure forms, distinct from the psychological personalities of 
their creators. She pointed out that temporal form was at the essence of music and had a 
deep relation with the temporality of consciousness. Duration is pure form for Brelet, 
different from Bergson who had thought of amorphous becoming. Again, music is the 
expression of the lived duration of the consciousness, as for Hegel.  
     According to Brelet, dynamism characterises time in music, i.e. the idea of time-as-
becoming against that of time-as-being. In Aesthetics and Musical Creation (1947), she 
divided form (classical) and structure, this latter being proper of avant-garde music. 
Structure for Brelet reflected the sense of becoming and pure duration in music.41  
      The works of philosopher Susanne Langer (1895 1985) constitute an important step 
for the topic of musical time. In Philosophy in a New Key (1942), she developed the 
idea that music is different from language. Music is, however, a symbolic but not 
immediate imitative expression of emotions.42 Langer was a disciple of Whitehead and 
reflected his influence in her comparison of the ways of signifying in language with 
                                                 
40 Ibid., pp. 141 145. 
41 See 
Sinfonía Virtual, 2006. 
42 Langer, Susanne, Philosophy in a New Key, 1942, p. 218. 
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those in music. Whitehead believed that the signification process was carried out by the 
constituents of experience both symbol and signification were elements of experience. 
In language, i.e., constituents are the audible phonetic word and the content meaning 
appointed. This idea, positivist in essence, was applied to music by Langer. Music has 
meaning although it cannot be expressed by words; still, both symbol and meaning are 
accessible. Music has signification, it is the logical expression of emotions. The 
ineffability of music, however, appears in her system of thoughts. Again, her idealist 
and transcendent signification for music are also distant from the approach followed 
here. 
      In Feeling and Form (1953) however, Langer writes one of the most significant 
Music makes time audible, and its form and continuity sensible 
[...]. It creates an image of time measured by the motion of forms that seem to give it 
substance, yet a substance that consists entirely of sound, so it is transitoriness itself. 43 
      It was Langer who firstly noticed that music made time effable in the sense of 
reproducing virtually its characteristic sense of transience translating this idea of 
virtuality to the whole of her philosophical work. Langer describes the passing of time 
through physical, emotional, or intellectual changes. She dedicated the analysis to the 
problem of the analogy between music and internal life. Music consists of the creation 
of a virtual time, as opposed to clock time; it is the appearance of the organic movement 
of our temporal essence. Langer finished by giving an intuitionist conclusion, saying 
that every work of art is intuited and that it does not communicate anything, contrary to 
the positivist plan presented in Philosophy in a New Key. Her thoughts will deserve 
special treatment along this thesis. 
      In addition to the studies of philosophers and aestheticians from different traditions, 
the 20th century brought a couple of them carried out by musicologists and composers. 
As we go from aestheticians to musicologists the topic becomes more and more 
circumscribed. While the former pay more attention to the problem of signification in 
music, the latter deal with the description of, for example, the various modes of musical 
temporality. At this last stage, the topic reached a status of its own in current 
musicological studies.  
      At first, they explored phenomenological and dynamic approaches. One of the few 
references to musical time as a separate topic, available in musical dictionaries, is 
                                                 
43 Langer, Susanne, Feeling and Form, 1953, p. 110.  
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entirely dedicated to this particular approach.44 According to the article among the most 
significant contributions is the work by 45 theory.  
      Specifically, to arrive at the main topic of this thesis, developments in the area of 
phenomenology and time as a general philosophical topic and later, ideas on 
phenomenology and musical time, constitute a subtopic to be considered here. 
      According to Beaudreau,46 
studies of musical time, either on the surface or hidden. Divergent tendencies can be 
found inside the phenomenological approach to musical time. In the case of Kramer he 
applies the phenomenological method t -
temporality.  
      In general, phenomenological research is opposed to axiomatic-constructive theory. 
what we see or hear, but without proposing a new theory. Phenomenology can 
succinctly be described as the following particular method: 1) Phenomenologists 
investigate phenomena presented directly by experience. 2) They interpret objective and 
subjective data as equally real and relevant. 3) They think that cognition is signed by 
(intellective act)  (object or content) are present for 
objective phenomenon that appears in immediate perception will be perceived in a 
certain way according to the subject's intentions. 4) They prefer description to 
explanation. 5) For phenomenologists any previous belief and theory must be 
systematic i
must present structural invariant features, which are explained through the application 
of the phenomenological reduction and variational method.47  
      Phenomenology applied to the topic of musical time emphasises the idea that the 
passing of time is perceived by changes and asserts that these changes, instead of 
referring to the outside world, refer to the psychological level. Bergson had already 
noticed that the temporal was explained by a psychological awareness of changes or 
fluctuations inside a subject. The psychological present, in turn, allows us to understand 
the apparent coherence perceived by successive, isolated events in time. William 
                                                 
44 London, Grove Music Online.  
45 Fraser,  Julius T.,  Refle  Kronoscope, Journal for the Study of Time, 
2004. 
46 Beaudreau, Pierre, Recent contributions to the phenomenology of musical time, 1989. 
47 Ibid., pp. 35 36.  
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48 explains how an individual note onset, continuation 
and conclusion  
      Thomas Clifton thought of the musical present as a nested organisation of temporal 
and awareness of past events by 
memory
the construction of our musical experience and knowledge. This thesis also studies 
distinctions between instants, moments, and events as the individuals of time, from the 
ontological approach to time in philosophy. However, the concern of ontological 
approaches is at the level of an external, objective time. 
            Jonathan  (1942 2004) investigation represents a chapter of 
phenomenological studies in relation to the topic of musical time. However, he uses the 
-as-being, which proliferates in new music, signalling the 
abandonment of an exclusively dynamic approach to time in music. In this context, an 
 
Thus, if in a normal piece each event forms part of a larger tissue of protentions and retentions, 
building up a complex horizon that encircles the time-world of the piece, in moment form each 
section or element occurs within a self-contained horizon, a boundary that is impermeable to 
events that precede or follow [...] While there may be a sense of passage within (but not between) 
moments, in the most extreme cases even this sense of passage is lost.49 
      Clifton reflected on pieces whose organisation is exclusively teleological. Pieces 
structured in circular time es on moment and vertical time
and branching time, as are both studied in this thesis, were not a primary concern for the 
former author. 
      Kramer defines linearity and non-linearity as central to his study. He considers that 
for three centuries western music has emphasised linearity, although non-linearity is 
present in all works. Linearity implies development and should not be confused with 
continuous time; continuity and discontinuity can be applied either to linear or non-
linear time. From linearity/non-linearity Kramer develops the following categories: 
directed linear time, non-directed linear time, multiple directed linear time, vertical 
time, and moment time.  
      a subcase departing from a 
phenomenological approach, in the following sense: 
(It) is interesting from a phenomenological point of view because it demonstrates the inextricable 
connection between the noetic and noematic poles of experience (intentionality) in creating the 
                                                 
48 London, Grove Music Online. 
49 Id. 
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perception of any particular type of time. The perception of goal directed motion in tonal music 
(linear time), for example, is not something we receive ready-made from the music itself. Rather, 
as listeners, we bring a mode of temporal processing to what we hear that enables us to perceive 
time in a certain way.50 
[...] 
phenomenological idea of intentionality in describing temporal experience. Kramer does not claim 
that the various types of musical -
that our experience of the temporal in music is largely the result of the interaction between our 
musical and cultural expectations and the sounding music. This interaction suggests that 
environmentally conditioning factors such as cultural attitudes and musical training are a necessary 
component of the way we perceive time in music.51 
      The idea of changing the usual modes of perception for example, applying modes 
of perception of moment or vertical time to a linear time piece could also function as 
 as a phenomenological work. Kramer 
possibilities for well-known music. 
      At this point we can contrast phenomenological studies with those coming from the 
side of the psychology of music. From a phenomenologist point of view, psychology 
has avoided holistic, real experiences of music in favour of isolated, laboratory 
experiences. It has developed simplistic answers to amply discussed and complex 
questions concerning the musical case as an artistic totality. In his chapter on 
Psychology, Kramer hopes phenomenology and psychology will work together towards 
a more precise picture of the topic at hand.52 
      Big questions put psychological and phenomenological approaches face to face:  
How can we reconcile analysis based on measurement of absolute time with experienced musical 
time that is influenced by the continually changing contexts of most compositions? How can we 
reconcil  with the idea that perceived duration depends on 
information context?53 
      The psychology of music has its role in studies of time perception embracing 
questions of the sort: 
                                                 
50 Beaudreau, 1989, pp. 156 157. 
51 Ibid., pp. 148 149. 
52 Kramer, 1988, pp. 322 324. 
53 Id.  
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In what ways [...] do we perceive, encode, remember, and retrieve information about duration and 
proportion? And, is music somehow special, or is information about timespans in music processed 
in the same manner as all durational information?54 
      Although same psychologists demonstrated that subjective time does not equal 
clock time, experimental psychology linked to music puts an emphasis on clock time.  
      The new cognitive approach to psychology however began studying the topic of 
time perception with a broader view. Moreover, their subject matter seems to reflect that 
of musical theorists. Cognitive psychologists search for he potential correspondence 
between the syntactic structures of music, which are organised to communicate musical 
meanings, and the cognitive structures in the listening mind, which extract and 
understand those meanings 55 
      At the moment of publication of his book on 
that 
Despite their rapprochement, psychology and theory remain distinct. A crucial difference is that 
music analysts postulate an ideal listener, who hears all levels and numerous complex relationships 
simultaneously, while psychologists are interested in the capacities of real listeners.56 
      This thesis, although recognising the important aspects on psychology linked to the 
perception of temporal parameters and production of musical temporal modes 
described, will not deal with this type of questions. The primary interest for this thesis is 
philosophical, i.e. the idea that there are connections between what Rowell called an 
57 on time and how these temporal ideologies connect with time in 
music as an aesthetic quest. This does not exclude the possibility of searching for the 
psychological principles of producing and perceiving the temporal modes studied here, 
but only as a second stage. 
      Finally, in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Music,58 Rowell states that 
temporality must be accounted for in a value judgement about music. The temporal 
values he enumerates are: 
- Motor rhythm: obtained by repetition and recurring accent. 
- Rate: fast/slow, tempo. The temporal scale of a musical work consists of a number 
of interlocking rates of pulsation, of accents, of patterns, and so on. Tempo is not an 
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 326.  
55 Ibid., p. 327. 
56 Ibid., p. 328. 
57 Rowell, 1996, p. 166. 
58 Rowell, 1983, pp. 167 173. 
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absolute judgement but a ratio between some arbitrarily selected rate in the music 
(beat) and our notion of fast, moderate, slow, and all the shadings along. Tempo can 
be steady or rubato.  
- Hierarchy: several levels of subdivisions, beat divisions, beats, measures, phrases, 
and phrase-groupings.  
- Lo - melody-
uneven, more constant in tempo, and flatter in hierarchy; whereas the time of music 
is more regular, has a variety of tempi, and has a steeper hierarchy. 
- Free/strict: Western tradition considers precise timing as normative and temporal 
freedom as a pleasantly expressive deviation. Passage from free to strict musical 
time has developed into an important formal archetype in music, in the form of a 
slow, loosely organized piece followed by a faster, more strictly organized piece 
 
- Motion/stasis: sonorous bodies vibrate, but the motion we perceive in music is a 
more complex concept. The simplest example of motion is locomotion, and this 
refers primarily to a spatial dimension. Musical motion however is a kind of 
vehicular motion that may be intermittent, at a steady or a variable rate. That is why 
we interpret the motion of music as either motion or stasis. We tend to interpret any 
departure from the traditional teleology of music as stasis.  
- Conflict and deviation: we experience the interference of the normative temporal 
patterns of our music as pleasant. It is customary to fix a time scale and then to 
deviate from it. Music may embody the conflict in extreme in recent compositions 
that have explored the possibilities of non-synchronized music or multiple time 
lines. 
      
will be interp  music  in this thesis. In sum, these remarks 
comprehend pedagogically the points that should be detailed and included in any 
temporal analysis of a musical work. 
      The topic of musical time had taken such a place in research that very soon the 
question of whether musical time as a special time species existed or not became a   
theme among philosophers. The debate involved phenomenologists and ontologists. The 
relatively recent ontological and logical approach to music and time of Alan Marsden, 
presents itself as an alternative to be contrasted with the previous phenomenological 
research reviewed above. Traditional questions on the ontology of time in philosophy
like the individuals, shape, extension, and texture of time are applied to time in music, 
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being a precise goal, with the help of the formal neat language as temporal logic. 
According to Marsden,59 the decision for a certain approach within temporal logic 
defines whether the analysis of temporality is going to be displayed for describing in-
time processes while listening or out-of-time processes once the process has 
ended, when one has the spatial organisation of it. In his out-of-time approach he 
searches for the best ways to decide among several modelling of temporal information 
to be implemented later in software designs. One result of his work is the preference for 
the use of linearity, for a practical, economic processing reason. The idea that works 
begin and finish tracing a line is one of the characteristics of the ontological approach to 
time in music.  
      Historically, temporal logic has its roots in the origin of logic itself, with Aristotle. 
In fact, it was Aristotle who first that recognised that time modified the true value of 
statements, in his discussion on the application of the law of the excluded middle in the 
-battle 
On Interpretation 9,60 is neither true, nor false, but possible. These thoughts strongly 
or false, from not being definitely either, is certainly a more radical view than that they 
might change from being true to being false and vice versa ... 61 This situation implied 
passing from a determinist conception of time to one allowing possibility and free will.  
      Another antecedent for temporal logic was Diodorus Cronus.62 The historical 
antecedent for the extension of a modal logic63 
64 The stoics continued the path inaugurated by Diodorus, 
                                                 
59 Marsden, 2000, p. 17. 
60 Aristotle, On Interpretation, Ch. 9: Of propositions referring to the future, as opposed to propositions 
referring to the present or to the past. 
61 Prior, 1967, p. 16. 
62 C. 300 B.C., he thought (contrary to Aristotle) that possibility did not exist, all that exist is real (actual). 
Thus, he introduced determinism. Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de Filosofía . 
63 Modal logic signifies the logic of modes, which means, the modes in what a statement can be true or 
false. A true statement can be necessary or contingent 
possible or impossible 
; they are distributed as 
, in Alchourrón, Carlos (ed.), Lógica, 1995, p. 290. 
64 There he defended the argument that from two mutually exclusive events, if one becomes real, the other 
is impossible, or from the possible we would be deriving the impossible. 
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which defined modalities with reference to present or future instants. This implied 
considering tenses as part of the proposition to be judged for its truth-value, a way 
developed by a branch of the modern temporal logic, i.e. tense logic. 
      Megarians, on the other hand, defined modalities with reference to undetermined 
t Tt (p)
t Tt (p)
on earlier-
developed in a second branch of temporal logic, i.e. chronological logic.65 
      Therefore, there are two big families inside temporal logic: the so-called tense or 
grammatical time logic and the date or chronological logic. These two paths had their 
historical origins in the temporal translation of the modalities either in the diodoran-
stoic or megarian styles. However, the first modern axiomatizations of temporal logic 
have been made by Arthur Norman Prior (1914 1969), the pioneer who developed tense 
logic in his Past, Present, and Future (1967). Nicholas Rescher (b. 1928) and Alasdair 
Urquhart (b. 1945) should also be mentioned, since they presented the first 
comprehensive introduction to temporal logic as a case of topological logic and 
developed chronological logic in Temporal Logic (1971). Rescher concludes: 
Central to all of these variant constructions of temporal modality is thus a conception of statements 
that will vary in truth-status over time, pointing towards a corresponding body of logical 
machinery to deal with the relations among such time-related propositions.66 
      According to Prior, the above mentioned split of temporal logic has contemporary 
roots in the famous controversy born in John (1866 1925) proof,67 which, 
by the way, demonstrated the unreality of time. Later, the abridged argument is 
 
      - present
- after). He noticed that the second series was the only 
permanent, whereas the first one was based on it. If an event (i) is earlier than an event 
(ii), then it is always earlier; but a present event was future and will be past, so it implies 
change. Mc Taggart argues that the judgement around the truth or falsity of a 
proposition in time (A series) is later than the fact that an event is either always false or 
always true (B series). 
                                                 
65 Gardies, Jean-Louis, Lógica del tiempo, 1979,  pp. 43 46.  
66 Rescher-Urquhart, Temporal Logic, 1971, p. 11. 
67 Mind The Unreality of Time  1908, pp. 457 74. 
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      To demonstrate his idea, Mc Taggart develops an argument in three steps showing 
that the A-series, and time itself, involves a contradiction. 1) Pastness, presentness, and 
futurity are mutually exclusive, and yet every event has them all. 2) It could be objected 
that an event never is past, present and future at the same time; rather: is present, will be 
past, and has been future. To this objection Mc Taggart answers that all these 
statements are based on a non- has been 
means asserting X to be Y at a moment of past time the same happens with the other 
two instances of time, present and future. 3) Finally, the moments of future time, are 
equally of past time and present time, and in this situation resides the contradiction; 
thus, time is unreal. 
      Prior concentrated his critique -
temporal is. Propositions dealing with the A-series, whose truth-value changes, cannot 
be non-temporal. Secondly, the assumption that past, present, and future are mutually 
exclusive and yet every event has them all, is wrong, since being past of something, 
once it has started, is a permanent state rather than a momentary one.68 
     -based philosophies of his 
time, especially those of Charlie Broad  (1887 1971) and George Moore (1873 1958).69 
Those philosophies affirmed that there were events that changed, and paradoxically they 
could not exist on their own but just as infinite orders over things carrying them. Their 
 70.  For  Prior  it  was  more  radical.  He  had  
learnt from John Findlay (1903 1987), who at the same time had learnt from 
Wittgenstein, 
calculus of tenses would yield something else. The real point is not that events are only 
-
predicates, and events only quasi-subjects.71 This way of thinking puts also to rest the 
spectre of an infinity of time-
72 Thus, Prior 
conceived that the formation-
 
      Contemporary developments that followed Prior concern either philosophical 
issues namely, the determinism versus indeterminism debate, the use of branching 
                                                 
68 Prior, 1967, p. 6. 
69 Ibid., pp. 7 and 18. 
70 Ibid., p. 10. 
71 Ibid., p. 18. 
72 19. 
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time in counterfactual reasoning, the logic of duration or application of temporal logic 
to other fields, especially computer science i.e. artificial intelligence, planning 
systems. It is also important to mention the use of temporal logic in quantum physics. 
Regarding the connection between temporal logic and computers, its founder, Prior, had 
already observed: 
The usefulness of systems of this sort on discrete time  does not depend on any serious 
metaphysical assumption that time is discrete; they are applicable in limited fields of discourse in 
which we are concerned only with what happens next in a sequence of discrete states, e.g. in the 
working of a digital computer.73 
      The principal motivations for developing the logic of time in connection with this 
musical inquiry are either those of philosophical or linguistic nature.74 By philosophical 
motivations we mean the aim of showing the difference between tensed and tenseless 
p p in the 
x, the dominant chord is earlier than the tonic chord in 
measure y xy x is earlier than y (Ex. 2) are different temporal 
expressions. The first is an indefinite statement, working with pseudo-dates, also seen as 
- ning a genuine date or 
historical moment in the case of music, pointing to an exact position in the score , an 
-of-
considering these expressions, either from an observer inside time, living his/her 
passage, or a position that does not need an observer and conceives time positions as 
expressions are again reflecting the temporalist and the atemporalist positions about the 
existence and non-existence of time, respectively. 
      A second philosophical motor for the logic of time is the aim of formalising 
metaphysical ideas on time. These ideas basically deal with decisions about substance
whether points, periods, or events are their main instances and structure linear, 
circular, and branching shapes of time; they also include the question of time 
extension and texture. All this, however, does not imply that the logic of time decides 
about the nature and structure of time in reality, something that would concern to 
physics, but simply that it works with the formalisation and assertion of our expressions 
involving hidden positions concerning different conceptions of time. These expressions 
                                                 
73 Ibid., p. 67. 
74 Other important motivations such as exegetical, mathematical or computational are well introduced in 
Basic Tense Logic  Gabbay D. and Guenthner F. (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical 
Logic, 2002, p. 2. More recent work applying temporal logic in the fields of computer science and 
linguistics pointed (ed.), 1995, 
pp. 215 216. 
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basically are articulated either by tenses or dates in our natural language, as shown by 
Examples 1 and 2 above. 
      Linguistic motivations for the application and development of temporal logic 
concern the problem by which tense has been omitted from traditional theories of 
meaning. Tensed expressions have been considered to add an important weight at the 
same time as expressing human behavior,75 while traditional logic has been blind to this 
for a long period until the recovery of time in logic by Arthur Prior and others.76 
Coincidently, time issues have been absent during a long first stage of theoretical 
studies of music. The question of time in music, i.e. important aspects such as motion, 
stasis, continuity, progression, pacing, proportion, duration, and tempo, were omitted in 
77 This search for a temporal 
understanding would have its parallel in natural language. In both realms, language and 
music, it is a quest for more expressive representations: in language, of truth that 
changes with time; in music, of its compositional arrangement in time.  
      In this text, those motivations are deepened to develop a philosophy of time in 
music. Thus, two ways of dealing with temporal logic, specifically in connection with 
the representation of musical time the tensed vs. the tenseless versions and the 
analogy established between linguistic expressions and musical expressions as 
containing both metaphysical assumptions about time, are explored.  
      Some main works are quoted -approach and 
-approach78 to temporal logic in relation with musical time representation 
are introduced. These works are invaluable for this thesis, since they are the only source 
of existing attempts to combine music and this philosophical logic. These authors, 
however, direct their attention to goals different from the present. The first author 
applies temporal logic to the assessment of musical time representations and its 
usefulness in connection with computation. The second author uses temporal-modal 
logic for formalising the listening process of music. 
                                                 
75 
having ended a consultation previous to the time expected, the second statement says that fortunately t1 is 
before t2 (!). Øhrstrøm, Peter and Hasle, Per F. V., Temporal Logic. From Ancient Ideas to Artificial 
Intelligence, 1995, p. 245. 
76 Tense and Time  Gabbay D. and Guenthner F. (eds.), Handbook of 
Philosophical Logic, 2002. Also Øhrstrøm - Hasle, 1995, pp. 118 231.  
77 Kramer, 1985, the first complete bibliography of time studies in music. 
78 Kunst, Making Sense in Music: an Enquiry into the Formal Pragmatics of Art, 1978. 
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      Composers work with time structures hidden in their works, as music cannot escape 
from the situation of being in time and expressing certain temporal ideas. One important 
result of this investigation is that it is in principle music itself which determines certain 
temporal conception, independent of a composer or community who consciously or 
unconsciously have a determined individual or social idea of time. This last 
hypothesis, that there is in fact a connection between musical and social times, is not 
thoroughly verified by empirical musicology, as shown by recent cognitive enquiries.79 
In this sense, the use of temporal logic as a method for testing musical temporal 
expressions, such as the analogy with linguistic ones, could constitute a step towards 
achieving a better tool for connecting individual-social time with music time in future 
investigations.  
            on and perception of temporality in music 
musical time in empirical musicology. Following the traces of all these previous works, 
this thesis develops a view by which the formalisation of musical time is collected from 
score analyses, principally as a method of recognising temporalities in music itself and 
interpreting its possible connection with individual social time. In this sense, analyses 
of scores, its division per musical parameter, decides the temporal predominant mode.  
      Our temporal beliefs are manifested through language. Temporal logic first 
translates i.e. formalises , then clarifies, and finally validates assertions expressing 
those beliefs. It is a hypothesis of this thesis that temporal beliefs are also critical in the 
decision about the structure of a musical work and, eventually, linked to its final 
perception. It is important then to detect the link between these beliefs and their effects 
in the musical work temporal logic bridging the connection. Øhrstrøm realised the 
importance of temporal logic in the context of time studies: 
A satisfactory understanding of time requires a careful study of temporal relations in human 
society. It must be admitted that this sociotemporality is very complex and that little has been done 
in order to reach a deeper understanding of it. But it is clear that language and communication are 
in general essential for an understanding of social time. 
 
If such studies of the different strands of science  are lead to a deeper understanding of time itself, 
various disciplines have to be brought together in the hope that their findings may form a new 
synthesis, even though we should not expect any ultimate answer regarding the question of the 
                                                 
79 The Perception and Cognition of Time in Balinese Music  Empirical 
Musicology Review, 2008. Also the critical review by Cross Ian, et al
Andrew Clay McGraw  Empirical Musicology Review, 
2008. 
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nature of time! If a synthesis is to succeed, a common language for the discussion of time has to be 
language.80 
      Here a further step is taken: this study on language and time is relevant for 
understanding socio-temporal beliefs in musical works. The straightforward connection 
of temporal perception, beliefs, verbal communication and musical communication is 
the path followed by this thesis. The power of the method here developed has to be 
judged against its analogical nature, and analogical methods vary in the way they 
convince.  
      McGraw, in his test for identifying time-in-general/time-in-music associations in 
Bali, failed to find any sustainable connection coming from the data. However, Mc 
Graw measured the latency of responses first between time in general and music 
concepts , and then between time in general and dance concepts and 
compared their respective response times. As a consequence, he based his Test of 
id cognition of words, not 
81 a scientific or empirical version of which Rowell had tried in his 
82 aiming to prove the opposite result. The first big problem 
of this method is that music is non-verbal, so the test, although promising, remains 
unsatisfactory. 
      The strength of Mc however resides in his cognitive approach to 
the question of emic and/or etic conceptions of time in music that is a novelty.83 An emic 
conception of the time of music must prove that the actors of a certain culture can be 
tested as implicitly or explicitly associating time beliefs with musical time. An etic 
conception of time is considered general, associating with particular contexts general 
understandings of time and time in music. 
      Notice that when the connection of time in music/time in general is studied, it is 
investigating, first, the general structures of time as belonging to certain cultures and 
understandings of time that connect with time structures in music not necessarily as a 
causal relation but as supporting an ideological field, and second, the effective 
                                                 
80 Øhrstrøm, 1995, pp. 3 4. 
81 McGraw, 2008, p. 42. 
82 Rowell, 1979, pp. 96 106. 
83 Ian Cross, et.al., 2008, p. 55. 
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experience of time itself that requires for example, measuring objective time perception 
vs. subjective time perception.84 Only the first option is considered by this thesis. 
 
As was seen, little by little musical time as a topic of research leads to inquiry into 
philosophical methods available i.e. phenomenology, temporal logics. This thesis is 
characterised by not following one method but partly both. Before going into this 
particularly hybrid point of view, some of the latest important writings, which continued 
opening the theoretical debate and expanded the terrain towards future, applied 
developments, deserve consideration. 
      The latest theorising on musical time is found principally in the field of aesthetic 
semiotics, philosophy of music, and musicological studies in general. Thomas Reiner, 
published a Semiotics of Musical Time,85 offering a division in poietic compositional, 
esthesic perceptual , and neutral textual levels in relation to the study of time in 
music. This view, applied to musical time studies, does not seem novel in its essence; 
Jonat he categories (temporal modes) apply 
variously to compositions, to listening modes, to performing modes, to philosophies of 
composition, and to time itself 86 
      The power and importance of detecting the collaboration between realist and 
phenomenological approaches to the topic is a line well delineated by semiotic analyses 
today, which is the bridge where this thesis is situated.  
The most evidently non-semiotic properties of musical time are the previously identified inherent 
temporal features of the physical occurrence of sound: duration, simultaneity, succession, 
frequency, and temporal order. They are non-semiotic in the sense that they exist as properties of 
the external world, independent of human observers and independent of human interpretation. 
Moreover, they are objectively verifiable properties of the physical universe in general.87 
      Reiner remembers that Husserl appropriately had thought that the real world did not 
have to be a phenomenon: 
                                                 
84 For an interesting application of studies concerning this phenomena in the computer field: Desain P., 
The Quantization of Musical Time: A Connectionist Approach  Computer Music Journal, 
1989.  
85 Reiner, Thomas, Semiotics of Musical Time, 2000.  
86 Kramer, 1988, p. 61. 
87 Reiner, 2000, p. 214. 
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(A) real thing or the real world is not a phenomenological datum, so also world-time, real time, the 
time of nature in the sense of natural science including psychology as the natural science of the 
psychical, is not such a datum.88  
      By this assumption then Reiner accepts, as it is accepted in this thesis, the 
possibility of an interpretation of musical time as non-semiotic but with restraints: 
semiotic thought can encourage arguments against it. 89 Afterwards, Reiner concentrates 
on enumerating ways musical time can be approached, which are still of a non-semiotic 
nature:  
1- [A] definition of musical time based exclusively on inherent temporal properties ignores the 
recognition of music as music. Unless one wish to propose that music is intrinsically musical, 
irrespective of whether 
of the human act of interpretation for the actualization of music. 
 
[S]emiotic thought [on the contrary] help one to understand that to equate inherent temporal 
properties and temporal relationships with musical time is an act of conception. That is to say, to 
subsume inherent temporal properties and relationships under musical time amounts to forming a 
concept: inherent temporal properties and relationships are combined to form a concept of musical 
time.90  
      research, 
for example as it   does not mean any doubt about the 
legitimacy or usefulness of it. This investigation follows the conceptions of musical 
time, instead of its exclusive inherent temporal relationships. Such a stance obliges the 
making of a qualitative jump between temporal relations and temporal relations in 
music.  
2- The physiological processing of temporal data associated with the perception of sound is 
another non-semiotic constituent of musical time.91  
      Alan Marsden later adopts temporal logic as a method for framing physiological 
factors in performance timing.92 
3- 
non-semiotic property of musical time.93 
                                                 
88 Husserl, Edmund, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 1928, §1, p. 23. 
89 Reiner, 2000, p. 215. 
90 Ibid., pp. 215 216. 
91 Ibid., p. 217. 
92 Marsden,  Journal of Mathematics and Music, 2007, pp. 
173 189. 
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      This case can be manifested when one assumes temporal relationships in music, but 
does not think they are qualitatively different from those relations external to music. 
4- [T]he recognition of temporal features is possible without semiosis, and thus regards 
recognizable features as well as their recognition as non-semiotic.94 
      
the possibility of an investigation that admits both neutral recognition and a neutral 
approach to musical temporal relationships. 
5- [T]here is still one more 
musical time with the experience of musical time.95 
      According to Reiner Karlheinz Stockhausen (1928 2007) had thought about an 
unreflective perception of time, as is clear from what fo
of a piece of music
been experiencing time most strongly. 96 
experience involves a conscious encounter with something that is being experienced, an 
unreflective experience of musical time is a contradiction in terms. 97 Stockhausen then 
is thinking musical time as a non-conceived or non-semiotic fact but because its 
experience itself is unreflective. 
      The risk here is that Reiner ends up defending a semiotic view as superlative in 
comparison to non-semiotic approaches to musical time. There are many sides to the 
same topic and any of them should be read as possible, but not exhaustive, ways of 
dealing with it. Moreover, other viewpoints non-semiotic seem to contribute 
together with semiotic perspectives to a more comprehensive and total overview of the 
topic at hand.  
      According to Reiner, the semiotic view is more convincing for the following 
reasons: 
[T]he narrowness of a non-semiotic view of musical time is brought out in a sharp relief when 
otational encoding of 
                                                                                                                                               
93 Reiner, 2000, p. 218. 
94 Ibid., p. 219. 
95 Ibid., 220. 
96 Die Reihe, 1959, p. 65. 
97 Reiner, 2000, p. 220. 
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awareness of musical time as a result of interpretative responses.98  
      Without doubt, the semiotic enterprise allows for more experiential, and directly 
linked to aesthetic, research around time in music. However, the non-semiotic view 
provides tools for clearly displaying a theory about general time and its relationship 
with particular time in music and helps to inform and decide in practical cases, not 
totally far away from musical practice and creation. 
      Another previous semiotic work had offered a view of temporality appealing to 
(1948) Theory of Musical Semiotics99 sketches an application of 
Norm and Action (1963), 
with the original purpose of systematising action having motivation in the field of 
jurisprudence. Tarasti noticed the weakness of old theories of music, which had 
transformed the durational time of music into spatial time. From his point of view, it 
was necessary to apply the logic of change or movement to give an account of the true 
nature of music. Given the procedural nature of music, the musical logic that will be 
developed cannot be based on any logic of a static world, but on a logic that takes into 
account the unfolding of music in time. Read under the later 
insights should be described as developing fundamentally the esthesic level  of  a  
semiotics of musical time. 
      
p to a state q. In this sense the kinetic aspect of music might be formalised with these 
tools: A motif or section p is followed by a motif or section q; but as the musical 
p, q is expected and q follows. Finally, sometimes 
somethi
p, q is expected, but x  
      According to Tarasti, the paradigm of constant becoming is an aspect; which brings 
s memory. It consists of all earlier choices and 
changes along the process of the composition. Here it is necessary to point out that the 
memory presupposed by a text varies from one composer to another. One factor that 
culation': If the first technical level is known, then 
the listener will be free to receive individual features of a work and composer.  
                                                 
98 Ibid., p. 230. 
99 Tarasti, 1994, pp. 20 22. 
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      The reference functions in the musical work form a contrary force against the 
dynamically moving nature of music. p one expects q, 
in absentia is as 
important as the elements in praesentia.  
      In the case of a teleological musical process, this should be presented with the 
q is a musical unit that is at the same time expected and refers 
the occurrence of a theme in its definitive form at the conclusion of a composition. Such 
musical process is predetermined but, of course, there is music that can also proceed 
without any determined direction, for example monodies not having an exact beginning 
or ending. There are also multileveled musical processes, where the determinism of the 
various levels has different degrees, illustrated for example by cadential sections in 
traditional solo concerts. 
      In addition to the logical representation of progressive and retrospective aspects of 
the musical process, then a third factor should be considered: the paradigm of all 
q, r, s
after p, q is expected but r occurs and after p: q, r or s 
preserves the energetic nature of music. 
      In an abridged form, this logic helps Tarasti to present the three following 
paradigms for a description of music as a process:   
- 
p is followed by a motif or section q p, q is 
expected and q p, q is expected, but x  
- p one expects q, which 
q is  a  
 
- q, r, s p, q is expected 
but r occurs and after p: q, r or s  
      Tarasti mentioned the possibility of a musical temporal logic. However his idea was 
not in delineating any modes of musical time, nor concerned with connecting them with 
philosophical ideas on time.  
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      Alfonso Padilla (b. 1949) worked with both the concepts of space and time in 
music.100 According to Padilla, there are four general issues to be considered with 
respect to time in music. These issues are well systematised: 
1) The matter of signification: Some authors identify time with the specific 
parameters of tempo, rhythm, and meter strict notion; whereas others include 
pulse, phrase, articulation, breath, and form: in brief, all parameters wide 
notion.  
2) From what point of view temporality has to be considered: the composer, the 
listener, or the analyst. The composer works with a spatialized notion of time; 
the listener perceives temporality as a subjective experience; the analyst works 
on the spatialized version of the score. 
3) The third matter is that we always speak in metaphorical terms. Music works 
with fictional times that are not consistent with the ontological and absolute 
point of view, which reduces all processes to a line.  
4) The fourth is that opposite categories should be treated as complementary. 
Tempo can be immutable while timbre can be changeable in extreme. There is 
no pure stasis or pure mobility in music.  
      poietic aspects of temporality in 
music. He presents the topic of time in music through a study of the Boulezian 
categories of time. musical space are identically applicable 
to musical time: homogeneous exclusively plain or segmented /heterogeneous mix, 
superposition, alternance of plain and segmented times. Plain times have neither 
ruptures nor modules; segmented times are pulsed/amorphous times. Homogeneous 
times can be divided into straight, bent, regular, and irregular. Boulez developed also 
distinctions for tempi. All these co
explains that Boulez was aware of the dialectic play of continuous/discontinuous, 
linear/non-linear, directional/non-directional. Thus, non-linearity occurs inside 
linearity, discontinuity inside continuity, and non-directionality inside directionality. 
Uni- or multilinearity, uni- or multidirectionality are also possible.101 
                                                 
100 Dialéctica y música- Espacio sonoro y tiempo musical en la obra de Pierre Boulez, 1995, pp. 105
122. 
101 Padilla, 1995, pp. 119. 
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His notion of sonorous space understood 
in a wide sense, includes time.102 
      Semiotic approaches to musical time continue to develop. Significant works are 
Raymond (1937 2010) chapters in Signs & Time103 and The Sense of Music.104 
And lastly, a predominantly historical book fundamental for this research, is Karol 
(b. 1947) 105 
      Berger, in his new book on music and temporal ideas, comments on the transition 
that took place around 1750, from an idea of cyclical time to time conceived in the form 
of an arrow, and consequently, how this had an impact on the music of the epoch. 
Monelle, in turn, worked with pairs of oppositions to reach his main thesis: Cyclical vs. 
historical time in anthropology, clock time vs. duration in the West, to arrive finally to 
the categories of lyric vs. progressive times in music. Berger mentions neither this 
previous also relatively recent study, nor another important and connected article by the 
 
     In sum, this topic is in a state of fresh, concrete, empirical, and historical ongoing 
research. In this spirit, this thesis attemps to add sketches of connections between time 
in general with time in Latin American music, specially the music of Alberto Ginastera. 
The difference with these approaches is the general theories and methods of departure. 
Instead of semiotics, cultural history, and anthropology, this thesis employs the 
philosophy of nature, theories of time, and temporal logic as the basis from which 
analogies and interpretations will be made. 
 
 
1.2. Musical Time or Time in Music?  
A Convergence of Phenomenological and Ontological Views 
 
Two main philosophical tendencies have developed that study the topic of time in 
species of time which relies heavily on a subjective perceiving, is scarcely connected 
with the external time that natural philosophy and physics have reasoned over. 
                                                 
102 This thesis will come back to a discussion on space and time as metaphors for music in Ch. 2. 
103 Monelle, Raymond, Real and Virtual  Signs & Time, Zeit & Zeichen, 
1998. 
104 Monelle, The Sense of Music, 2000, p. 93. 
105 Berger, Karol, . An Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity, 2007. 
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Temporal logical models based on external time are useful for philosophical reflection 
through their neat account of the different ontologies of time. Ultimately these models 
have been applied, for example, in music computing and computer music. 
Phenomenologists disregard time as an objective dimension applied to any entity, real 
or fictional. On the other hand, the ontological view, speaking about Time in abstract, 
emphasises the common linear passing, its objective measurement, diminishing the 
importance of music as an essentially fictional activity whose temporal forms do not 
coincide with ordinary time. Both tendencies were considered and progressed 
traditionally in opposition, and hardly new enriched views developed on the matter. 
This work examines a third position: a sense of the phenomenological specifically 
musical, subjectified, and historic aspects are included, and a sense of the ontological  
a clear treatment of the various conceptions of time is adopted without taking one as 
predominant, a plurality of times, considering that each position can offer some insights. 
Finally, a compatible and comprehensive picture of the time of music, neither just 
the dividing line, searching for a philosophical convergence or dialogue, and to show at 
a certain point that there is no conflict. 
      Generally, the topic of time in music involves two considerable problems: that of 
time, and that of music. Many theories of time have developed in philosophy and 
physics. What constitutes time was always a common problem. That is, of what sort of 
individual units time is made of, i.e. either points, defending the reality of instants, 
periods, considering instead, intervals or durable moments in time, or events, where 
time is a relative concept, depending on things that happen at that time. Another 
problem is its nature, whether time is an objective or subjective condition, an external or 
an internal dimension. Furthermore, certain cultures and certain periods tend to perceive 
time with determinate shape, for example linear, circular or branching.106 
      Regarding a definite idea of what music is the answer is also plural. It can have 
different meanings in various cultures, through the same culture, and eventually, within 
the work of the same composer. In this study, music is considered as a universal way of 
expressing through sounds, consciously or unconsciously, primarily an idea and 
experience of time. This universal, which implies very general notions of time, is 
nevertheless recognised as being concretised through different musical technical-
stylistic resources. 
                                                 
106 The seemingly strange cultural idea of time as branching off into different directions in relation to 
music is already encountered in Kramer, 1988. In his opinion, it is connected with our contemporary 
Western understanding of temporality, typically represented in computer-like thinking, where it is usual 
pp. 13 14. Philosophical and literary references about 
branching time will be offered later in Ch. 5. 
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      Temporal logic is a formal language that is used here to unveil temporal conceptions 
of time in music. This logic describes, formally, assumed metaphysical conceptions of 
time hidden in verbal expressions, such as linear, finite, continuous or discontinuous, 
etc. These notions of time were traditionally intuitively developed throughout the 
history of philosophy and it is in temporal logic where they meet the strictness proper of 
thus provides a neat language for theoretically 
dealing with time assumptions, not for discovering what time actually is, as physicists 
for example are concerned with, for validating temporal expressions, and nowadays, for 
using it in the design of computing automata. Here, concretely considered, it proves 
useful for analysing those conceptions of time assumed or hidden in musical 
rature, including jointly the circular and the 
branching as part of the temporal palette of contemporary music, contributing then to 
the modelling of different forms, in addition to the classical linear time form. 
      The study of temporal structures in music aims to offer a clear method that can later 
be used to observe the impact of diverse ideas of time in recent music. The 20th century 
has offered novel conceptions of form for example, what can be called the branching 
and multiple linear ones, whereas in earlier eras other forms dominated when dealing 
with musical time, i.e. the linear. Moreover, the connections established between 
cyclical music and diverse conceptions, on the one hand of religious time, and on the 
other with repetition up to the point of saturation and pointlessness in minimalist music, 
are abundant. 
      Alan Marsden (b. 1959), musicologist and computer engineer, used temporal logic 
as a means for evaluating systems of music representation through computers. In the 
first chapter of his book, which deals with theoretical issues concerning music, time, 
and logic and the ontology of musical time, he distinguishes his view from 
phenomenological approaches to musical time of the sort developed by Susanne Langer, 
Jonathan Kramer, and others. Marsden separates his logical vision from 
phenomenological visions of musical time right from the beginning. In this thesis 
instead, the first logical approach is used for developing a philosophical reflection about 
the second one: logic is the bridge for reasoning about the philosophical implications 
around these non-standard modes of musical time. 
      Marsden defines musical time in opposition to the phenomenological approaches. 
This becomes clear through the following quotation: 
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Musical time is that aspect of music which is impersonal, and which can be abstracted from the 
music and manifested in some domain other than sound, but which in any proper manifestation 
107  
      The delimitation of his view consists then of the following three key statements: 1. 
That musical time is considered objectively or taken axiomatically, as existing 
independently of human experience; 2. That the time to which music belongs defines 
abstract properties not exclusive to music; 3. That musical time participates in the 
 
      The abov
study. Here, however, the amendments are: musical time is that aspect of music that 
but which in the artistic domain is personally experienced and creatively explored. 
Musical time can be abstracted also, but it is not the concern here when the purpose is 
dealing with the special time that music creates. The time of music presupposes a kind 
of totally novel material: pitch, rhythm, harmony among other important 
parameters and seemingly, a characteristic multidimensionality, many temporal levels 
ic is a 
species inserted in ordinary time. Notwithstanding, the time of music evokes diverse 
modes, challenging our common perception of time.  
      This convergence of views implies: 1. That musical time is not considered as 
108 person, so also the context 
of its experience is taken into account; 2. That time in music is in fact manifested 
- 109; 
and 3. That this time is participant in the characteristics of real time and axiomatically 
portrayed times, but it is reinterpreted within its fictional goal, as an artistic time. In 
summary, the time of music is not impersonal, not abstract, and not real. This whole 
position assumed then, conceding its eclectic nature, considers the lines expressed as 
opposite by Marsden, i.e. phenomenology and ontology, to be complementary from the 
beginning.110  
                                                 
107 Marsden, 2000, p. 5. 
108 Id. 
109 This idea is developed by Scruton, Roger, in The Aesthetics of Music, 1997, pp. 11 12. It consists of 
thinking about musical events as pure events, not as those real events in the world, to which we can add 
certain properties. For example, in the event of a car crashing, one sees the car that crashed; this 
constitutes the one can add the properties.  
110 The proposal could be seen as a music Time Felt, Time Understood  
Kronoscope, 2003, pp. 15 26. Interestingly, music appears there as a manifestation that contains the 
conflict expressed in title of this subsection, between both approaches about time.  
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      Temporalist and atemporalist views on time influence the decision for a particular 
approach to the problem of musical time. Temporalists view time as something passing, 
flowing, and as a subjective condition, while atemporalists will instead tend to see time 
as permanent: the measure over things changing, an objective dimension. Both 
traditions come from Platonist and Aristotelian111 ways of seeing time respectively, 
although previously, from the old Hebraic and Greek112 views. The A/B series noted by 
Mc Taggart, namely in his past present future/before after distinctions, is a 
contemporary version of these approaches. In a distant analogy, these two versions of 
temporality reflect the time in which the performer/listener or the composer/analyst is 
inserted. Performers and listeners are positioned within a time whose reference points 
change constantly something was future, is present and then will be past while 
composers and analysts work with events that have been fixed for ever some are 
earlier, others are later in this sense dealing with unchanging points of reference.  
      Susanne Langer analysed the problem of the analogy between music and interior 
life.113 According to her view, music consists of the creation of a virtual time: an 
appearance of the organic movement of our temporal essence as human beings. Virtual 
on musical time linked with the above mentioned temporalist view. 
Musical duration is an image of what might be termed 'lived' or 'experienced' time ...  Such 
passage is measurable only in terms of sensibilities, tensions, and emotions; and it has not merely a 
different measure, but an altogether different structure from practical or scientific time. 114 
      Langer recognised the importance of physical studies (acoustics) for the analysis of 
music. However, she thought that they were unable to explain the substance of music, 
which is rather found in the illusion that music creates. This is revealed by two facts. 
One is that, although we perceive movement in music, nothing moves; musical motion 
is different from physical displacement, or it is only a semblance of it.115 Another 
element that has no parallel in physics is that of sustained rest. She demonstrates that 
                                                 
111 McGinnis, Jon, Kronoscope For Every Time there is a Season: John Philoponus on Plato and 
 2003, p. 83. 
112 Diccionario de Filosofía, 1994, pp. 3494 3509. 
113 Langer, 1953, pp. 104 119. 
114 Ibid., p. 109. Italics mine. Langer took this thesis from Basil de Selincourt, who wrot Music is one 
of the forms of duration; it suspends ordinary time, and offers itself as an ideal substitute and equivalent.  
pure duration is hidden here. Distinct from Bergson however, she thinks of 
musical time as symbolic, not as intuitive and given immediately; thus, having form and organisation, 
volume and distinguishable parts. This distinction is given in Fubini, 1990, p. 363. 
115 As Scruton shows, physical translation supposes the same object moving from A to B; in music, a tone 
C moves to a tone D creating the illusion that music moves; 1997, p. 51. 
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when a progression arrives at its point of rest, music continues moving even if there is a 
silence. Moreover, she thinks the elements of music are not the merely technical, i.e. 
pitch, chords, and keys, but the artistic ones, which are virtual and created for the sake 
of being perceived.  
      Music makes 
time audible, and its form and continuity sensible. 116 Musical time is different from real 
explanation of the characteristics of clock time as understood by Langer:  
C omposite presumably because we compose a sense of time from various observations of change 
in the environment, our memories and a rather 
because we have different senses of time in different circumstances; and fragmentary because we 
are not aware of the entire passage of time we sleep through some of it, for example.117 
      At this point, s distinctions between real and virtual time are considered here 
not at all convincing. These arguments do not preclude the possibility of having the 
presentation of her position is pursued. Another difference she acknowledges between 
-
118 The clock interprets time as pure sequence; it is a one-
dimensional continuum and its advantages for practical purposes kill many aspects of 
our perception of time that are particularly interesting. 
The underlying principle of clock time is change, which is measured by contrasting two states of 
an instrument. In clock time i t is the 'states', 'instants', ...  that are symbolised ...  'Change' is not 
itself something represented; it is implicitly given through the contrast of different 'states', 
themselves unchanging.119 
      Measured time is essentially different from what we know from our direct 
volume 120 a 
volume that is filled with its characteristic forms. And the forms filling time are 
tensions L ife is always a dense fabric of 
concurrent tensions, and as each of them is a measure of time, the measurements 
themselves do not coincide. 121 This means that the time of music cannot be reduced to a 
                                                 
116 Langer, 1953, p. 110.  
117 Marsden, 2000, p. 2. 
118 Langer, 1953, p. 111. 
119 Ibid., p. 112. 
120 Id. And Langer adds an explanatory slang- to have] a big time.  
121 Ibid.,  
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physical nature, and that in order to catch its true nature it must be understood as filtered 
 
      Different from Langer, for Kramer musical time is a mix of lived and measured 
interaction between musical and ab 122 he says, 
taking a pluralist point of view on the topic. Alan Marsden thinks similarly about the 
double nature of tempo, an aspect of musical time. He finds an interaction between the 
objective-notated, expressed in absolute time and the subjective-interpreted, relative 
time:  
Musicians commonly relate the two, referring to a tempo as so many crotchets (quarter notes) per 
minute. Furthermore, while, in a particular performance, the quantity of time in seconds occupied 
by the sound of one note o
seconds occupied by another crotchet, the difference is likely to be less than that between that 
crotchet and any quaver (eight notes) in the same tempo. The two kinds of time constitute two 
different levels for describing time, but they can be related. 123 
      The relationship between objective notated time and subjective-interpreted one is 
just one aspect of a whole position about time in music. Interestingly, Kramer and 
Marsden coincide regarding this topic but they are opposite in general terms, as was 
presented in the introduction: one is departing from phenomenology (appearances as 
constituted by a conscious subject); the other from ontology (objective reality 
independent of any perceiving subject).  
      
explanation:124 
 Tonal (goal directed) Linearity: the existence of certain implications that arise 
earlier in the piece and determine further characteristics (antecedent consequent 
relationships) in tonality.  
Predictable:  what one hears at the beginning announces what one is going to 
hear later on.  
Non-predictable: what one is hearing is interrupted by a surprising event, which 
nevertheless emphasises the linear sense of the whole. 
 Atonal (non-directed) Linearity: the existence of certain implications that arise 
earlier in the piece and determine further characteristics (antecedent consequent 
                                                 
122 Kramer, 1988, p. 3. 
123 Marsden, 2000, p. 3. This same problem was addressed under a philosophical perspective in Calleja, 
 
124  
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relationships) in atonalism, that work without the a priori goal definition of the 
tonal system.  
Predictable: when one can guess what is going to happen. In atonalism this 
situation is provoked by means of reiteration or emphasis.  
Non-predictable: when one does not know that a cadential harmony is going to 
happen until one arrives, where cadences are created by non-pitch parameters 
such as thinning texture, decreasing dynamics, slowing tempo, and so on. 
 Tonal Non-linearity: presents two variations 
a) Unchanging pattern exists, such as textural consistency.  
b) Formal proportions can be found in the piece. 
 Non-tonal Non-linearity: when discontinuities begin to prevail, destroying the 
linear progression by moments of pure sonority, appreciated more for 
themselves than for their role in linear progressions. 
 Multiply-directed Linearity: pieces in which the direction of motion is frequently 
interrupted by discontinuities. The music goes so often to unexpected places that 
linearity, though still a potent structural force seems reordered.  
Tonal: tonal music is susceptible to multiply-directed listening, processes are 
well defined, so the goal orientation can be understood even when the goal is not 
reached immediately. It contains gestural conventions such as beginnings, final 
cadences, transitions, climaxes, which can be recognised even when they occur 
in an unusual part of a piece.  
Non-tonal: although without a clear perceptible tonal linearity it is difficult to 
understand a reordering as such. Furthermore, in atonal music there are no 
conventionalised gestures as cadences, beginnings, and endings.  
 Moment time: presents two levels 
1. Moments are self-contained musical events. They are heard more for 
themselves than for their participation in the progression of the music, and 
defined more by stasis than process. 
2. The extreme of moment form in which the order of moments is arbitrary, is 
mobile form: the composer indicates that the sections of the piece may be put 
together in any of a number of possible orderings from one performance to 
the next, perhaps with certain restraints. 
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 Vertical time: Some works demonstrate that phrases are not necessary 
A vertical piece does not begin, it merely starts; it does not build to a climax, 
does not propose internal expectations, does not build or release tension, and 
does not end but simply ceases. No event depends on another event; the whole 
piece is like a large event. 
 Total Linearity and Total Non-linearity: In total linearity, the composer works in 
response to a fixed preceding section. On the contrary, in the case of total non-
linearity, each event is composed without any reference to preceding or 
subsequent events but for itself. 
      oblems arising 
from this type of approach to the time of music.125 Kramer first goes against the common 
vision of musical temporality as it is described by musicians in the technical terms of 
tion and even 
126 Musical time is for Kramer as well as here the overall structure in time 
created as a result of the craft made by all the intervening parameters in the music. This 
means that it is not exclusively related to the traditionally associated elements, having 
127 Rowell finds Kant and 
general sense. Explicitly, the 
former saw time as an a priori condition for the perceiving subject; the latter a relative 
concept depending on the referential point of observation; very generally both 
commented on a subjective condition, instead of an objective dimension, outside any 
observer. Third, there is the quandary question that music unfolds in time but no time 
conclusions could be negated by a more rigorous approach to music perception, based 
proposal,128 
 be thought of in the future as 
comparable with the modal/scalar or tonal system that we have today. The above 
mentioned critiques, specifically the second and third one, Rowell gives in relation to 
d in this thesis in search of a synthetic answer. 
                                                 
125 Rowell, Review of The Time of Music, by Jonathan D. Kramer , Journal of Music Theory, 1990, pp. 
348 359.  
126 Ibid., p. 357. 
127 Ibid., p. 354. 
128 Ibid., p. 359. 
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      2010) theory of time, from which Kramer took the above 
mentioned temporal modalities for music, deserves to be mentioned. According to 
 
indeed not a single thing, but a nested hierarchy of individual times with different 
properties, horizons and thresholds, we have not one, but an array of models available 
for musical representation. 129 book where 
 for 
music expressed in brackets, are: 
1. Atemporality: no past, no future, no earlier later relation but simultaneity 
prevails. (Vertical time). 
2. Prototemporality: given two events, any possibility of distinguishing which is 
earlier and which is later. No simultaneity. (Moment time).  
3. Eotemporality: succession but still no direction. (Multiply-directed Linearity). 
4. Biotemporality: events are ordered from past to future but not overall logic of 
progression exist. (Non-directed Linearity). 
5. Nootemporality: past and future have a large-scale sense of direction. 
(Linearity).130 
      Phenomenological can have various meanings in relation to musical time studies.131 
work, implying a virtual, symbolic of internal time. A second meaning of 
phenomenological can be taken from Kramer
deserve a completely separate experience of time, unlike other temporal experiences. 
Thus, either they tend to add characteristics to musical time that are shared by other 
-mentioned 
 
could provide this sensation, it is also an extremely personal association.   
                                                 
129 Ibid., p. 352.  
130 Fraser, 2004. 
Carballo, 1996. 
131 Other variation can be found in Christensen, Erik (b. 1945), The Musical Timespace: A Theory of 
Musical Listening, 1996. 
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      Van Benthem suggests however the advantages of approaching these topics with 
logical tools, i. e. the logic of time, a perspective that is going to be considered 
immediately afterwards: 
that, therefore, the present enterprise the logic of time  is a priori doomed to failure. Did not 
Heidegger show convincingly that the structure of Time can never be separated from that of our 
living experience? Quite the opposite is true. Logical studies of Time do manage to isolate and 
investigate formal structures and, in doing so, our experience of this phenomenon is enhanced 
rather than dulled.132 
      
temporal logic and especially of one particular sort, the chronological logic, inscribe 
-value is fixed for all 
n comparison, 
other approaches in temporal logic, namely, tense logic, work with assertions of the 
-value changes 
according to the point in time at which the assertion is made. This last assertion is made, 
133 
      
relations of temporal order, such as linear or circular, that will be introduced below. It is 
also useful to represen
as that inhabited by the user of that time. In-time logics are required for modelling the 
listening process in general (memory and anticipation in actual situations)134 and for 
questions of actual timing, i.e. in the design of automata, to perform music in real time, 
and ultimately, for providing a logical reflection about human cognition and timing.135  
       The use of temporal logic as a general means for a reflection on musical time is a 
novelty inside musicological literature. Marsden wrote on this perspective, however 
with a practical, technical aim. He uses temporal logic as a language that allows the 
comparison and evaluation of the different properties and expressive capacities of 
systems of representation for musical time. As he deals with computing problems, the 
use of temporal logic is associated with the detection of the best practice in terms of 
inferences and processing, and a maximum fidelity in terms of what has to be 
transmitted by a computer. 
                                                 
132 Van Benthem J. F. A. K., The Logic of Time, 1983, xi xii. 
133  
134 Antecedent study applying modal logics in Kunst, 1978. 
135 Marsden, 2007. 
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      For Langer, music requires an approach different from formal logic, although, at the 
...  
instead the application of logic can lead to new intuitions. 136 This last idea is promising 
for a reflection of the sort intended here. Logic serves not directly but indirectly in 
awakening new artistic possibilities, it does not create them. If a logico-philosophical 
view of musical time can provoke such awakening it is by providing an insight into 
temporal matters that may be fruitful indirectly, for performing and composing. 
      According to Kramer, musical time is not amenable to formal logic, because it is not 
associated with the law of contradiction g cannot be and not be at the same 
. This is shown in his opinion by the fact that actual and 
musical time intervene together in music, also by the fact that the same elements can 
behave simultaneously in different manners in a piece of music, e.g. high and loud. 
Finally, different levels of music can convey different qualities, e.g. something 
becoming louder in the microstructure, but appearing softer in the macrostructure. 
Kramer also refers to the contradiction of continuity/discontinuity, both present in a 
piece of music. Regarding this point, Marsden later replied to Kramer: 
Even if he were to demonstrate that we can experience something in music as having contradictory 
properties on the same level, this would not mean that formal logic is inapplicable to musical time, 
but rather that Kramer, and others like him, choose to use a system of reasoning which is different 
from formal logic.137 
      Marsden seems to consider this point here under a different focus than that 
addressed by Langer and Kramer above. This suggests the necessary division of the 
from propositional language can be demonstrated, and 3. If logic can be applied to the 
formalisation of music for specific determined purposes. Marsden has this last point in 
mind, whereas Langer and Kramer are associated with the second one which, by the 
way, presents merely distant analogies as result. Here, the first position is going to be 
developed and demonstrated as a middle position between the second and the third 
options. 
      The computer era brought the possibility of processing musical information and 
with it, new conceptual tools developed for tackling old questions in the study of music 
                                                 
136 Langer, 1953, pp. 378 379.  
137 Marsden, 2000, p. 12. 
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nowadays towards the definition of the best representations for being transmitted 
through a computer channel with the maximum possible fidelity. 
      Marsden focuses on the computer engineering field of inquiry, a problem which will 
properties of a real thing with the symbols of a language of representation. Within this 
context, if representations are highly complicated, inferences are of the same kind, 
losing its use for practical aims. This means that if all relations are represented then 
there will be an unlimited and unmanageable quantity of information. The results 
Marsden obtains at the end then are of the following sort:  
The most expressively powerful representations are shown to be computationally intractable, while 
those of least computational complexity are shown to be incapable of representing some types of 
music. A perfect system of representations is therefore impossible, and different representations 
are appropriate for different purposes.138 
      
Substance includes the kinds of things time consists of: points, periods, or events, and 
structure comprehends the shape: linear, circular, or branching of time. Furthermore, 
whether it is discrete, dense, or continuous. 
       Marsden introduces key developments around shape, extension, texture, and 
substance of time found in temporal logic literature. Once the material is displayed, 
through the logical analysis, he advances in choosing what the best representations are, 
i.e. which of them seem more useful than others. The proposal here is concentrated on 
the same material but a philosophical or conceptual interpretation of the time of music 
is pursued in the end. An excursus to arrive at this kind of interpretation, which at the 
same time introduces grounds from the ontology of music, philosophies of musical 
language and conceptions of musical logic, is offered in the following chapters. 
                                                 
138 Ibid., Conclusion. 
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As if they would be not sufficient promises from the 
beyond,  we  search  the  way  to  persist  in  our  land,  so  
vilified and so loved. Almost everyone shares the desire 
to survive at work, in children, anyway. We are 
definitely moved by an instinct and at that point we at 
least equate to two insects in intelligence, the ant and 
the bee, and a rodent, the beaver or castor fiber. 
Adolfo Bioy Casares139 
 
For music, mysterious form of time. 
Jorge Luis Borges140 
2. Ontology 
 
The ontology of music is the first issue to deal with for a philosophical reflection on 
musical time, i.e. the inquiry into the constitutive mode of being of music opens a direct 
access to the question of music as temporally conditioned. Traditionally, however, 
ontological questions in relation to music arises with the exclusive purpose of 
 
      The word 'ontology' is a scholastic product of the 17th century. Aristotle had called it 
'the first science' but after him it was called 'metaphysics' the science concerning 
things beyond physics. Metaphysics was tradit the study 
of being in general the study of the Supreme Being, the soul, and the 
world appeared from the necessity for an exclusive term, which 
distinguished one field from the other general from special and referred to 
metaphysics as a general, discipline of formal character. In the 20th century, the word 
acquired different meanings according to different philosophies.141 
      
ways of understanding the world, that is, the realities of this world. Ontology studies 
what is in general, the essence of objects and also the relations between things. 
Traditional topics in the field have been that of the existence of universals and how they 
                                                 
139 
y tan querida. Casi todo el mundo comparte el afán por sobrevivir en obras, en hijos, de cualquier modo. 
Sin duda nos mueve un instinto y en ese punto al menos igualamos en inteligencia a dos insectos, la 
hormiga y la abeja, y a un roedor, el castor o castor fiber Historias de amor
. 
140 , El otro, el mismo 1964, p. 270. 
 
141 Diccionario de Filosofía Ferrater Mora, 1994, pp. 2622 2628, K P; Hofweber, Thomas, 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
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relate to particular things, as it happens in the context of the debate over realism-
nominalism. Also, it deals with the matter of events and how they can be understood as 
a byproduct of particulars and the relations existing between them. 
      In direct application to music, Stephen Davies states:142 
manner, matter and form in which things exist; so the ontologist may ask: what kind of 
nature of music and musical works, and an inquiry concerning the most general ways of 
understanding their being, are the principal goals pursued by the ontology of music. 
      Many authors have written on this field, but only a few of them presented ontology 
of music as such. Instead of this, a lot has been written around the ontology of the 
musical work. The argumentation supports on the one hand, Roman 143 
analysis of the musical work as an intentional, supratemporal object, and on the other 
Lydia 144 consideration of the musical work as a historical object, already from a 
post-analytic perspective.  
      The most important however is the study into the ontology of music itself, through 
which the primacy of the temporal nature of music is defended, in comparison with the 
145. In this context, this study tackles the idea of a 
temporal continuum engendering all the parameters in music: intensity, timbre, space, 
pitch, pulse, and movement. Moreover, this last idea assumes already the perspective 
from which the temporal modes linear, circular, and branching are going to be studied, 
i.e. under the general and basic dimension of listening, independently of its dissection 
into the actions of composition, performance, or reception.  
      The organisation of topics inside the whole Chapter 2 suggests, firstly, the passing 
from a particular notion of the musical work to a more comprehensive concept of music, 
and secondly, the opposite movement: from time as a general frame to a conception of a 
particular experience, that of musical time. 
 
                                                 
142 Goehr, Lydia and Davies, Stephen, et al., Grove Music Online, Philosophy of Music  IV. 1. 
143 Ingarden, Roman, Ontology of the Work of Art, The Musical Work, The Picture, The Architectural 
Work, The Film, 1989. 
144 Goehr, Lydia, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 1992. 
145 Scruton, 1997, pp. 1 96. 
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2.1. From the Ontology of Musical Works to the Ontology of Music 
2.1.1. The Ontology of the Musical Work 
As stated, the ontology of the musical work was the most developed question inside the 
more general topic of the ontology of music. Davies summarizes some of the main 
trends of thought: Musical works were either conceived as a class of descriptions 
relative to a notational scheme , or, on the 
contrary, as types created for determined instrumentation means, whose identity 
depends on socio-historical matters lified R
Levinson, 1980. They have also been conceived as ideal sound-structures discovered by 
composers and at the same time, presented as portrayed 
sound patterns . Works were thought of as ideas 
in the mind of their creator and receptor Lascelles Abercrombie, 1922, 
Robin G. Collingwood, 1938 and others , and finally, as neither real nor ideal or 
mental entities but as purely intentional objects Roman Ingarden, 1928. Lately, works 
have been seen as cultural constructs emerging as late as 1800 
Goehr, 1992.146 
      To start with, and before entering into a detailed study of the main theories 
mentioned above, the general problems with which the ontology of the musical work 
Ficciones.147 This will serve as a useful 
analogical image to show the main questions without taking into account for the 
moment any names or philosophical movements.  
      This fascinating story begins with the complaint of a critic, due to the omission of 
catalogue of his production. Pierre Menard was a cryptic French writer recently 
deceased, a friend of the critic, whose main work had been writing in the 19th century, 
the ninth, the thirty-eighth, and a fragment of the twenty-secondth chapter of the classic 
Quixote. The chapters were identical word for word to the original written by Miguel de 
                                                 
146 Goehr, Lydia, et al., Grove Music Online, IV. Anglo-American philosophy of music, 1960 2000. 
Goodman, Nelson, Languages of Art, 1968; Levinson, Je  Journal of 
Philosophy, 1980, pp. 5 28; Kivy, Peter, The Fine Art of Repetition, 1993 and Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Music, 2002; The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns  1988, 
pp. 237 Conjectures and Refutations on the Ontological Status of the Work of 
 Mind, 1962, pp. 512 20. 
147 Borges, Jorge L., Ficciones, 1941. For c Riqueza de Pierre Menard, 
Autor del Quijote , in:  
<http://www.iacd.oas.org/Interamer/Interamerhtml/azarhtml/az_tacca.htm>       
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Cervantes. Borges affirms, Menard did not want to copy it would have been very 
childish; he did not want it to be an actual Quixote, either it would have been an 
anachronism; neither did he want it to be another Quixote it would have been a fake: 
he indeed wanted to situate his characters in another time and space, giving a new sense 
to the historic novel. In this context, the critic considered Menard's work far superior to 
Cervantes  
      Borges meditates here, as always in his works, about time and the obsession for the 
multiplication of repeated objects, as if it were a game of mirrors. He reflects about 
things that are the same as Cervantes' Quixote and Menard's one but by the work of 
time appear to be different. 
      This is not the first time that Borges is inspired by philosophical issues. In other 
parts of this thesis, the impact of some of his works on studies about time will be 
shown: here as a pioneer in literary critique, there, commenting traditional conceptions 
of time, even anticipating theories in contemporary physics. The present story has many 
allusions for literary theory and critique. In this sense, it anticipates the critical literary 
-modern reader
rejected the old view that emphasized the work itself, separating it from its reception 
and thus highlighted the work, treating it neutrally in merely formal terms. According to 
the new theory, readers make the literary event. It is not the aim here to enter into 
instead as an illustration for extracting the main questions on the ontology of the 
musical work. 
      Roger Scruton148 mentions also Pierre Menard's story for illustrating the particular 
case in which a composer departures so far from a work that creates not a version of it 
but a new work, as happens in the example mentioned of Anton Webern's orchestration 
of the six- Musical Offering. Here the author composes anew 
the same work from the modern sensibility of a serial composer, arriving at the very 
same notes that Bach had found. This puzzling case raises the ontological question of 
What are the conditions for A and B appearing in different 
moments of time to be the same work? The other, the same: a problem that keeps awake 
philosophers and which especially intrigued Borges too, now in musical version. 
      
allusions than that noted by Scruton, about what kind of identity is claimed by a musical 
work: numerical, or another kind? What is the limi
(version) and a new work (variation)? The ontology of musical works asks about the 
                                                 
148 Scruton, 1997, pp. 99 100.        
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re the work is: is it a mental subjective experience, can it be situated in the 
sole mind? Or is it an intentional object, neither real nor ideal, which supposes at the 
same time certain fisio-psychical activity in the creator, a material support and a 
community of receptors? Is the work present in its performances or better, a sound 
pattern extracted from concrete performances or interpretations? Is it defined by its 
score, or, on the contrary, do timbrical and cultural temporal factors carry a greater part 
of its meaning? And about its coming into existence: Is it disclosed by an act of 
reminiscence or is it created or formed ex nihilo? The main theories written for trying to 
answer these issues follow. 
 
Roman Ingarden (1893 1970) appears as one of the first names in the movement of 
investigations into ontology concerning music. Unfortunately, he was almost forgotten 
by the community of scholars; lately his work has been rediscovered. Ingarden wrote 
the original version of The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity in Polish in 
1928 1933, after his famous The Literary Work of Art (1931), his main work on 
aesthetics, and as an extension to it. The present analysis of his work is however based 
on the revisited version Ontology of the Work of Art, The Musical Work, The Picture, 
The Architectural Work, The Film.149 
      In order to understand the scope of the author's writings, a brief introduction to his 
more general philosophical ideas is necessary.150 Roman  Ingarden  was  a  
phenomenologist, ontologist, and aesthetician, whose main interest was to develop an 
alternative, moderate position between positivism and the transcendental idealism 
defended by his teacher, Edmund Husserl. Ingarden was a realist phenomenologist, in 
phenomenology, that of the Logical Investigations, 1900 1901, but disagreed with the 
writer's later  Ideas, 1913.  
      In phenomenology, t
describes the situation by which our mental acts are directed towards objects. 
Transcendental phenomenology, in turn, believes that what we know is not the object as 
it is in itself but the object as it is given in the intentional act. In order to acquire the 
ting in brackets all our 
assumptions about the external world. The consequence of the application of such 
                                                 
149 First version in German in 1962. 
150 ,  The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Ingarden  Diccionario de Filosofía Ferrater Mora, 1994, pp. 
1841 1843, E J. 
Ideas of Time in Music 
 
 
 
53 
method is the sole transcendental ego as residual. Transcendental phenomenology deals 
with essential structures in the pure consciousness. 
      The work of Ingarden was born precisely from the rejection of this later position. 
Realistic phenomenology, the position he defended inside phenomenology, studies the 
structure of consciousness and intentionality, assuming the existence of the external 
world independent of that consciousness, and it is interested in the search of the 
universal essences of various matters involving human action. According to Guido 
Küng: 
Ingarden was of the opinion that an analysis and evaluation of the constitutive processes involved in 
our knowledge of things presupposed as a 'guiding thread' the prior possession of a clarified notion 
of those things, while Husserl maintained that a clarified notion of the things could only be obtained 
on the basis of a prior understanding of the process of constitution.151 
      As mentioned, Ingarden was an ontologist. But here one has to differentiate what 
traditional sense mentioned in the first paragraphs of this chapter. eals with 
objects that not necessarily imply existence, being only subject of possible judgements. 
is dedicated to what factually exists.  
      In his The Controversy over the Existence of the World (1947 1948) he pursued a 
solution for the debate between realism and idealism. He preferred to move away from 
the epistemological question about whether to be known, the real world depends on our 
consciousness or not, which was circularly undecided. He soon realised, the world could 
not be thought of without a consciousness, but consciousness could not absorb all the 
proposed an ontological analysis of the possible ways the world and consciousness 
could interact. The Controversy is incomplete, however a portion of it led to important 
results. 
      Thus, previous to the metaphysical question whether the real world exists or not, is 
the ontologica 152 To this 
follows a study of the different beings: absolute, real, intentional, and ideal. He wanted 
to show that neither realism nor idealism were adequate and found a point of departure 
precisely in the objects of art, with its ontic foundation in something real copies of 
texts, scores, canvas but with its source in the consciousness of their creators. He 
                                                 
151 Küng, Guido: http://www.formal ontology.it/ingardenr.htm; in http://www.ontology.co/ 
152 Id. 
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demonstrated why the traditional categories of the real and the ideal were not anymore 
sufficient for classifying all objects. 
      Ingarden reached the study of the different modes of being through a detailed 
analysis on dependence and temporality. Regarding the first issue, he observed four 
pairs of dependency: 1) autonomous heterenomous, 2) original derivative, 3) separate
not separate, 4) absolute contingent. Concerning temporality, Ingarden distinguishes 
various aspects of concrete time or modes of existence of the temporal objects: 
processes, events, and objects enduring or persisting in time. Processes are defined as 
belonging to objects that begin at a certain moment, occur for a time, and finally 
conclude, such as a performance, a footrace, a war, the development of an organism, or 
153 
Finally, there are objects that persist in time, such as a material thing, a living creature, 
or even a work of art. 
      From these distinctions on different modes of dependence combined with temporal 
modes, he distingui atemporal, God; 
Ideal timeless, objects such as numbers conceived in a Platonistic way; Real spatio
temporal, entities such as real objects; and Purely Intentional supratemporal or quasi-
temporal, seemingly in time, entities which owe their existence to acts of consciousness 
such as fictional characters, having their ontic source in something real.154  
      Ingarden explores in Ontology (1989) the question about what a musical work is.155 
He rejects the notion that works exist in a physical or material way, or as part of the 
works are neither their performances, nor their scores. He concludes that musical works 
exist as heteronomous objects, in that they depend for their existence of acts of 
composers and listeners. In addition, they are intentional objects, unlike real objects that 
have only material presence or psychical ones; they live in an intermediate zone. As a 
consequence, the work of art has a double nature: a constitutive aspect that of the 
creator and a sustaining aspect or material foundation. Moreover, musical works 
  towards the real 
performances of the work fall.  
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relational conception of time. 
154 See Küng. 
155 Gierulanka, Da
The Structure of Art Works  in On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden, 1989, pp. 1 54. 
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cal aspects, 
articulation, dynamics, are examples of variable places a performance fills out. 
However, it is common to erase this distinction by identifying the work with a particular 
concretization. Ingarden defends the idea that the structure of the work has to be 
investigated. Concretization has relations with the cultural atmosphere of the period.  
      Ingarden 
those which belong to the schematic formation of the work and are axiologically 
neutral, for example, monodic or polyphonic texture. Aesthetic values belong to the 
profundity, etc. It is a fact also that many aesthetic objects can have their origin in the 
same work of art, artistic values differing in their aesthetic values. 
      As a consequence of the above mentioned division, the author solves the problem of 
the objectivity of aesthetic values, ending with the subjectivist thesis associated with 
Objectivity has its foundation in the scheme of the work, qualitative and structural 
re position, by which 
he wants to distinguish the role of subjectivism and consciousness from that of the 
independent real world.  
      In this context, the controversy between realism and idealism can be recast as 
whether the real world has the real or purely intentional mode of being: Ingarden 
concludes that it is impossible to reduce our world to a purely intentional creation. 
Having his interest in aesthetic issues, he dedicated a great part of his work to these 
objects, which provided him the optimum place for thinking about the realism/idealism 
controversy.  
      Regarding the topic of aesthetic values, it was at first considered by Ingarden to be 
out of the focus of his aesthetic works, which were mainly developed as ontologies of 
art in connection with the fundamental philosophical problems of the magnitude 
presented in the paragraphs above. In this sense, ontology proved indispensable going 
into further investigations on values. This latter investigation was carried out after in 
The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art (1937). 
      The result of his detailed and rigorous thought anticipates the posterior philosophy 
of music of analytic inspiration, tendencies described under the general views of 
ogy.156 Ingarden has in common 
with this tradition the prosecution of a conceptual analysis, although his view is non-
                                                 
156 This categorization belongs to Goehr, 1992. 
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analytical. In the most recent studies, defenders of works of music as cultural entities, 
not centred in philosophical analysis, proposed a further step from this way of thinking 
of the problem of the ontological status of the work, namely, the historical approach 
presented by Goehr. For the moment, the arguments of this analytic tradition follow step 
these philosophers enriched his thoughts, 
sometimes they relapsed into many of the problems already brought up by Ingarden. 
      The following subpoints reproduce the main arguments on the ontology of the 
musical work, introduce critical material, and prepare the discussion to move on to an 
ontology of music. 
 
The Musical Work and the Performance 
The point of departure is the distinction of the work from the performance of it.157  
      Each performance of a musical work is an individual process and therefore also a 
temporal object, which is clearly situated in intersubjective concrete time and it is 
unrepeatable. Works, on the contrary, are not processes, but things persisting in time 
once brought into existence. For this last situation, it is impossible for a work to be an 
ideal object. However, it is not a real object; the musical work is a quasi-temporal 
structure: Its parts exist simultaneously but display a definite order of succession. 
      Each performance of a musical work, according to Ingarden, is above all an acoustic 
process, which is causally determined by a real process activated by the performer. 
Musical works instead, are not necessarily dependent on real acoustic processes for its 
creation or continued existence. 
      Each performance is both objectively and phenomenally located in space. In 
contrast, a piece of music possesses no defined spatial localisation. Note that the aspect 
of space in music, as debated in con s view forgotten. 
Dimensions of space, high low, deep surface, would be situated already in the 
relation to performance. 
      Each performance of a musical work is given to us via hearing. The acoustic 
processes are given to us as aspects or appearances, and they are different for two 
different subjects and from different locations in space. On the contrary, the musical 
work does not manifest itself in the changeable auditory aspects experienced by the 
listener. 
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      Individual performances of the same musical work by several interpreters, or even 
by the same interpreter, normally differ. Each musical work however is always a unique 
entity. From this base precisely, we can speak about performances more or less faithful 
to the work.  
      Each separate performance is as an individual object completely and univocally 
determined. This is not true about the work, which is always capable of further 
determinations.  
      Ingarden's analysis of the performances and its distinction from the musical work is 
in trouble with those studies that give emphasis to the performance, being the 
concretization through which one can appreciate the musical work. From this 
perspective, the musical work would seem to have no existence separated from its 
instances. In a critical study of a Polish scholar published in a further revision of 
158 there is indeed a deep questioning of the separation between work 
and performance as it is found in the Ontology.  
According to Andrzej Pytlak, there is indeed a deep questioning of the separation 
between work and performance as it is found in the Ontology. Firstly, performances are 
not subsequent in time to the work in music, if we considered the case of an improvised 
composition. Statements about what a performance is process, acoustic-real, spatial, 
singular, polysemic, and closed are true first in comparison to those related to the 
musical work.   
 Secondly, again according to Pytlak, there is no severance between the work and its 
performances. The determination of instrumentation for example brings the work closer 
to the performance. The case of electronic music, for example,159 tests at the extreme 
that there are common features between a musical composition and its performance. 
Then, if works and performances are similar, it should be possible to reduce the 
similarities to a formally identical shape. If one considered the case of an accomplished 
performance, we could ascribe to it features that Ingarden reserved for musical works: 
Free localization in space, a quasi-temporal structure, non-sonic features, simultaneity, 
the fact of ceasing to be a process or being an univoque object persisting in time. 
            The reflection made by Pytlak somewhat anticipates what Lydia Goehr thought 
-garde music but also thinking of 
the antique, jazz and popular music based on improvisation skills, the theory becomes 
                                                 
158 Pytlak, Andrzej  in Dziemidock-Mc 
Cormick, On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden, 1989, pp. 233 254. 
159 Recorded concrete, electronic, or mixed music, considering manipulation in real time.  
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more problematic. There, concepts 
restricted to a portion of music, an historically situated way of conceiving music. 
Another omission comes from forgotten points of view, of the interpreter and the 
listener. 
 
In order to amplify these thoughts introduced by Ingarden, the so-called Aristotelian 
view160 of musical ontology embraces the idea that works are essences or sound 
structures inherent to their sensible scores or performances. Kendall Walton161 identifies 
the work with the sound pattern belonging to each performance. According to this 
author, the work is not a particular object or event, a substantial thing, but a structured 
and instrumental pattern of sounds plus other contextual specifications that 
performances can fulfill or fail to fulfill. 
We can identify the piece with the complex consisting of the set of sound patterns and whatever 
circumstances (such as the date of composition or the culture in which it was composed) go into 
determining how its performances are to be heard.  162 
      Walton points out that the question of what is primary, works or performances, is 
rooted in our cultural tradition. Some of the patterns that constitute the piece are not 
pure sound patterns, but rather patterns such that to fit them, a sound event must have 
been produced in a certain manner, in addition to possessing certain acoustic properties. 
That is why musical works are not to be identified with any patterns or sets of patterns. 
This set is best understood as only one component of the work.  
      From the analyses of critical work (Pytlak, Walton) following 
of the work in relation to its performances, the conclusion is that the separation of one 
from the other is at least problematic, not only in cases inside the history of music 
which do not exhibit such clear demarcation, but more importantly because concretizing 
aspects of performances help to present and portray, i.e. provide access to the work of 
music conceived as sound pattern. 
 
 
                                                 
160 Term ascribed by Goehr, 1992, pp. 15 16, in reference to Walton, 1977/1988. The topic about the 
already in 1977. 
161 Walton, 1988. 
162 Ibid., p. 257. 
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The Musical Work as a Mental Object 
      A next step towards Ingarden's own definition of what a musical work is concerns 
the study of the relationship between the work and mental experiences.163 The question 
here is: Is the musical work equivalent to a certain multiplicity of mental experiences? 
In other words, is the musical work an idea in the mind of the composer/listener? In 
summary, is it something exclusively subjective? 
      According to this idealist view, what exist are complexes of mental experiences that 
are similar to one another, because of the qualitatively identical objective processes or 
sound waves. In this context, however, the identification of one work by several 
experiences becomes a difficulty. 
      If subjective means that which does not exist in an ontically autonomous manner, 
then musical works are subjective; but according to Ingarden, this is an erroneous point 
of view. These ideas are objectified in scores or performances, but works are not 
identified with the latter but with the ideas themselves. The argument against this 
idealist view consists of denying that the work is something private that cannot be 
shared by a community of receptors. 
      We would also have to deny, thinks Ingarden, that they are experiences or parts of 
experiences. For precisely the experiences of consciousness and the real parts of them 
are ontically autonomous and are thus not subjective in the sense expressed above. On 
the other hand, musical works are not experiences or parts of experiences since they are 
not accessible to immediate cognition merely by acts of reflection (a hearing, a feeling, 
etc).  
      In this line of arguments, Ingarden recognises that the idea that works are rather the 
however designates a real part of an experience of consciousness. In music, the acoustic 
sensory data constitutes the real part of experience; but the tones and tone formations 
are different from the acoustic information we experience in listening. Tones are 
ause the act of 
perception contains an intention, which is directed to what is heard.  
Those which are already past no longer exist, and form eo ipso 
phase of the hearing of the tone. But in spite of that, the perceived tone remains one and the same 
and is perceived as such in its whole duration 164 
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A fortiori, no tone formation of a higher degree, for example, a melody of an individual 
s of 
consciousness. In the correspondent act of perception there is contained a special intention which 
we call the non-intuitive content of the act which is directed to the heard melody.165 
      Ingarden addresses that the musical work is still transcendent in a higher degree than 
performances. For just that reason musical compositions are nothing mental and nothing 
'subjective' but objectivities of a special kind, of course dependent on a composer who 
created them, performers who interpret and listeners who apprehend them. 
      The hypothesis of the musical work as a mental experience is ambiguous and false. 
If they are subjective in the first sense of being not ontically autonomous, this is 
incompatible with the second sense of being mental experiences ontically autonomous. 
constitute a real part, where the crucial intentional non-intuitive side of the work is 
excluded. 
            As stated, this idealist view thinks of the relation between musical works and 
mental experiences as the mental experience of a composer. However, the mental 
experience of a composer does not cover the whole reality of a musical work: a work 
persists beyond its creator, and there are more things than those imagined by the 
composer, as reality demonstrates. Instead, one could say there is a community of 
creators around the work, without necessarily being worthy compared to the figure of 
the composer.       
      Robert Hoffman also refutes the idealist view166 in the audience, according to which, 
the work were the succession of experiences sensations, images, feelings and ideas
 counter thesis is that works of art 
are not private but belong to a community of spectators. Otherwise, a person having the 
same experience, when in contact with two different works of art, would lead us to think 
about one work of art, which is unsound. 
      Hoffman refutes also the notion that the work is in the mind of its creator. If the 
work is the image in the mind of the artist who created it, the work would be 
exclusively an experience of the artist, impossible to share. On the other hand, one 
rience is. But on principle, we can never 
know what the experience of the artist is, hence, we can never know if we are 
experiencing the same work.  
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      Hoffman leaves it to Wittgenstein to explain that, in the context of music, if there 
were no public a
something as a work of art. It seems that the identification of a musical work with 
mental images or subjective experiences is a false path to take, as Ingarden firstly 
refuted and Hoffman amply maintained. 
 
The Musical Work and the Score 
Ingarden analyses also the identification of the musical work with the score.167 This 
by material things. 
      Ingarden thinks that no material thing is capable of having a non-material function, 
which is a symbolic function. And the score serves as the basis for an intentional 
-
free us for postulating non-material objects.  
      Because not every musical work is written down, and the score is a system of 
imperative symbols:  
To provide intentional access to an objectivity is not the same thing as to be this objectivity itself. 
As every symbol (sign) is distinct from the symbolised (signified) object, so also is the score 
distinct from the work defined by it.168 
      Ingarden introduces the comparison between literature and music.  
[...] In contrast with the linguistic entities, consisting on logemes and their meanings, which do 
enter into the stock of the literary work that is read aloud [t]he score does not constitute a stratum 
of the musical work; it remains entirely extraneous to it.169 
      This quotation underscores the falsity of the identification of a musical work with 
the score. Forty years after, Nelson Goodman would develop a somewhat contrary 
statement from his nominalist interpretation of the musical work. In this view, works are 
linguistic items that serve conveniently to refer to determined classes of particulars. 
This view ended up reducing works to their scores.  
      Nominalism as a philosophical school believes that universals are not existent 
entities, but language terms (flatus vocis). Universals are not ante rem (as Platonists 
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believe) neither in re (as Aristotelians).  But they are nomina, voces or termini.170 Only 
individuals and particular entities have real existence. Goehr explains clearly referring 
to nominalism in music ontology:  
Here, one moves away from considering the vertical relation between a work and its performances, 
a relation obtaining between an abstractum and its concreta. One considers, instead, the horizontal 
relation obtaining between performances and score-copies. 171 
      For Goodman works are identified with the classes of performances that are 
perfectly compliant with their scores. Notwithstanding classes are abstract entities, 
Goodman considers his theory to be substantially nominalist.  
      In Languages of Art, Goodmann presents an extensionalist theory of symbols, with 
musical works being part of it as symbol systems among others in the arts. Music is an 
an allographic art, art instantiated in performances,172 as can be said of theatre or dance. 
This, in opposition to autographic arts, where one is interested in distinguishing 
between the original and the forged, as in painting or sculpture. In this way, notation 
serves to transcend time and the individual, and is described by Goodman as central for 
those transitory works. According to the author, notation is sufficient for explaining the 
identity of a musical work;173 meanwhile non-notational features are irrelevant. Musical 
works are the class of performances compliant with a score, hence the primary function 
of scores for identifying a musical work.  
      A score is a character written in a notational system. A notational system consists of 
characters correlated with a field of reference like any other language. A character is a 
general consists of scores correlated with classes of performances. For each work there 
is a single score correlated with a single class of performances. The relation of 
174 a one-directional semantic relation binding 
performances to scores. 
      A notational language consists of atomic characters which in their modes of 
combination form compound characters of greater and lesser complexity; i.e. pitches are 
atomic characters, and compound characters are governed by harmonic, rhythmic rules 
of combination, among others. Goodman presents five syntactic175 and semantic176 
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requirements for a language to be notational, which forbid ambiguity, overlap, and 
indeterminacy among characters and its compliances: i) Syntactic disjointness
character indifference, ii) Syntactic differentiation, iii) Unique determination, iv) 
Semantic disjointness, and v) Semantic differentiation. 
      
given a score-copy it is possible to identify the work which means the performances. 
At the same time, it is possible from a performance to recreate a score. 
      Syntactic requirements:  
1) Given two different inscriptions they cannot belong to the same character (syntactic 
disjointness). All inscriptions of a same character must be syntactically equivalent 
(character-indifference). 2) The characters must be finitely differentiated. Given an 
 
characters, there is an inscription between them and it is impossible to determine exactly 
to what character it belongs. 
      Semantic requirements: 
1) Each character must have a fixed correlation in the reference field (unambiguity or 
unique determination). 2) Compliance classes must be disjoint, they do not have to 
intersect in extension (semantic disjointness). A closer situation is that of two terms 
denoting practically the same (redundancy). Nonetheless, it is less problematic, because 
although redundancy does not imply the preservation of the notation, it implies the 
preservation of the work, which is the main aim of a score.177 3) For every two 
that their compliance-classes are not identical, and every 
differentiation).178 In contrast, a system is semantically dense when given two characters 
there is compliance, being impossible to say to what field of reference it belongs. 
      According to Goodman, the characteristics described above define notational 
systems; these systems can be from now on clearly distinguished from non-notational, 
such as discursive (that respect only syntactic requirements) or pictorial (that do not 
respect any one of the requirements above mentioned). We are going to emphasise 
scores as notational systems, considering only the case of the current common musical 
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notation. Other notational systems such as graphical notational systems deny the 
syntactic requirement of finite differentiation. 
      In current common musical notation, a note-inscription match with one character 
(for example the note do 
same class, it can be substituted.179 So here we have the first syntactic requirement. It is 
also possible to determine that given a note-inscription (i.e. do), either it belongs to one 
requirement.  
      Regarding semantic requisites, a counter-example would seem to be found if we 
think of the case of enharmonic sounds such as for example c-sharp and d-flat in equal 
temperament; here several characters denote the same sound-events becoming 
redundant. But as redundancy is interpreted as not problematic, the requisite of semantic 
disjointness can be considered to be fulfilled. Concerning the last semantic requisite of 
differentiation,180 the argument is that we could think about series of whole notes, half-
notes, quarter-notes, eight-notes, ad infinitum. Here, there must be a fixed number of 
flags for the recovery of the score from the performance to be theoretically possible and 
as tradition has set it, then the question is solved.  
      Regarding numerical and alphabetical characters (those related with indications of 
tempo) that appear in a score, they do not fulfill the above-mentioned requirements. 
unambiguity were preserved, semantic disjointness and differentiation would not be 
maintained. We would not be able to avoid intersection neither could we clearly 
differentiate between two of the compliants. A solution to this for Goodman is that they 
are not indications considered as integral for the identification of the work to become 
possible. The same could be said about dynamic or timbre markings. 
      An implication of meeting the perfect compliance condition is that any performance, 
however boring, satisfies the notational prescription so long as it does not have 
mistakes. Contrarily, the most brilliant performance, if it has one mistake, does not 
count as a performance of the work. And still, by what criterion could one decide, with 
reference to a score, how many mistakes would be admissible in a performance of a 
work? 
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      One could say that if the identity of the more complex parts is retained, we can 
admit mistakes in individual notes; so long as we recognise the melody-gestalt, i.e. it 
does not matter if one or two notes are incorrect. Goehr noticed problems however here: 
recognising gestalten usually does not fit extensional descriptions. To instantiate a 
melody, we must instantiate each atomic part. 
      pliance be 
at least, eighty percent? But why we would choose this number and not another is not 
obvious. Goodman wanted to avoid vagueness. Someone inclined to Platonism could 
argue that it is the work that has a fixed, unalterable set of properties, whereas 
performances are only imperfect approximations or copies.  
      According to Goehr, Goodman cannot recognise intentional and recognitional 
conditions and straightforwardly preserve his extensionalist commitments. He has a 
difficult choice between two propositions that are equally strange: There is a degree of 
vagueness both in the work and its performances, or they are equally and perfectly 
determinate as regards their constitutive properties. He opts for the latter. 
      To conclude, the nominalist view identifying completely the work and the score 
would fail. Under nominalism, there would be important aspects which relate to the 
expressive connotations of a work that could not be explained. Furthermore, not every 
work is written, but most important, only one mistake would result in a new work, while 
it is rare that this is the way things happen in musical practice.  
 
The Musical Work as a Non-Real Object 
Ingarden proceeds to give an analysis of the essential structure of the musical work. At 
this moment, he provides the arguments to demonstrate that the work is not a real 
object.181  
      The work could be distinguished from other acoustic signals because of: 1) a special 
ordering; 2) the appearance of new factors  -
 such as the expression of feelings; 3) something specific, which certainly 
distinguishes music from other acoustic phenomena. 
      Regarding the first option, it appears that there are certain moments in which 
musical formations and other formations coincide, as for example it can happen with the 
Siegfried motif used as the sound of a car horn. As a consequence, it may happen that 
there is no special ordering that music has from which it can be differentiated from 
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other acoustic formations. The ordering alone is not sufficient then for distinguishing 
music from what is not.  
      About the second option, it is tempting to argue that music distinguishes itself from 
other formations primarily because of its acoustic factors, in that it has melody, rhythm, 
and harmony. However, there can be music without melody, or that acoustic formations 
of different nature have melody without being music at all. So, again, this would not 
delimit what is music and what is not. Second, one could say that music is defined by 
non-acoustic factors, in that it expresses feelings or mental experiences or in that it 
portrays other things. However, Ingarden considers 
guided by a program, does not express, and does not go beyond the tones themselves, as 
music too. 
      Finally, Ingarden realises that it is still evident some difference between those 
acoustic objectivities in nature and the work of music. Natural acoustic phenomena and 
artificial acoustic signals form a real event in the natural real world. However, musical 
works as objects of aesthetic appreciation refer to no other real facts. Moreover, they are 
no real events and no real objects, since they are not causally joined with any real 
process or fact.182 However, every performance is real. It was established before, that 
contrary to what happen with the performance we could not apply the categories of hic 
et nunc to the musical work. 
s room, or in the piano, or in the section of space over the piano? And if the sonata is 
performed at the same time in ten different cities, is one and the same sonata then supposed to be 
in ten different places?183  
      According to Ingarden, the musical work is not an individual. Rather, what we 
apprehend with the commerce with it are pure qualities, not individualised by the 
particular mode of existence of real beings. And it is not an individual because it does 
not exist in any time and in any space. If it deserved to be called 
be because of the unique, unrepeatable harmony between the pure qualities of the tone 
formations.  
In the reciprocal qualitative modification of the tone formations occurring together or following in 
sequence, and in the final quality of wholeness, unique in its kind, that results from this reciprocal 
qualitative modification, lay the sole basis of the individuality of a musical work. But this 
real objects, which follows from 
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183 Ingarden, 1989, p. 36. 
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the mode of being of real beings, from the individuating concretization of ideal qualities in many 
real objectivities.184 
      Precisely because of this qualitative individualisation contrasting with that proper of 
every hic et nunc real object, musical works are supraindividual entities. And with 
respect to their content, they are also supratemporal objects. This is the nucleous of the 
present understanding of the primacy of temporality in defining music in general. 
      However, before entering into the analysis of supratemporality, it is illustrative to 
show that the thesis about musical works as non real objects, understanding realism in 
the sense of the traditional philosophical view, is an anticipated critique to what later 
was called the extreme Platonist view in music ontology. Ingarden prevents from a 
worng interpretation of in 
terms of an ideal object. He answers that musical works require the creative activity of 
their composers, and creative activities are different from cognitive, in that they do not 
disclose or uncover their objects.  
 
The Platonist View:  Qualified Platonism 
185 Jerrold Levinson argues against Nominalism. Musical 
works exist apart from their performances and the identity and individuation of 
performances involves intentional and recognitional components. Moreover, according 
to this view, our pre-critical intuitions lead us to say, that the Bártok String Quartet 
itself, and not the class of its performances, is delightful. It seems then that works, on 
the other hand, once created, are permanent and independent of their performance. 
      Levinson does not simply identify musical works with patterns or sound structures 
in scores and performances. Rather, works: i) do not exist before the composer's 
in 
different musico-historical contexts, who determine identical sound structures, 
invariably compose different works.186 That is because the composer represents a 
particular time and place, and this cannot be exhibited by the sound structure alone. 
Auditory 
                                                 
184 Ibid., p. 37. 
185 Levinson, 1980. 
186 at the beginning of this chapter is 
remarkable. However, as it will be explained in the following paragraphs, Levinson pinpoints here rather 
than the musical equivalent to a reader-response theory, a conservative view about the interpretation of 
musical works. 
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Liszt-influenced' determine the aesthetic character of the work. iii) Works, finally, are 
such that means of performance, i.e. instrumentation, are an integral part of them. It is 
not true that composers of the last centuries have been composing 'pure' sound 
structures. 
      
described as constructions derived from structures. A musical work is a 
-means structure as indicated by X at t, where X is a particular 
person the composer  187 
      As pointed out by the critical reading of these theories by Goehr188, this extended 
account of Levinson's thought, allows the definition of works both as individual creation 
as well as social entities, composed from a public musical language. We can refer to 
individual style, the style of a whole opus, the style of a genre or of a period. But his 
ontological position can be maintained without serious problems only up to this point. 
      Levinson places musical works in a new ontological category of initiated types, 
unusual for the tradition. His idea is that musical works are ontologically universal, but 
because of their aesthetic character, historically bounded. Goehr asks: i) is Levinson 
constructing an ontological category just to match his description of musical works, or 
does he have independent reasons for so constructing it? ii) Does he treat aesthetic 
issues satisfactorily whether or not they bear on ontological issues? [And], iii) to what 
extent is he justified in taking aesthetic considerations seriously while he deals with 
issues of identity? 189 
      i) Levinson must face here the age-old problem of the source of ontological 
knowledge: do ontological categories come from aprioristic ways of derivation or are 
they empirically constructed? In the first case, one goes through a wide range conditions 
in search for their match in the phenomena; in the second, one begins with the 
phenomena themselves and seeks for the ontological categories required for their 
account. 
      According to Goehr, Levinson posits a category of objects unfamiliar in traditional 
metaphysical frameworks, to account for what he sees in pre-ontological terms to be 
essential to the phenomena in question. He appeals to the original context of 
production individual and social
context, explains the determinate and fixed aesthetic character. Ultimately, this is 
consistent with his essentialist or objectivist view of the meaning of music and art, 
                                                 
187 Levinson, 1980, p. 20.  
188 Goehr, 1992, pp. 44 45. 
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incompatible with that of a work as a potential source of meaning in the spirit of Hans-
George Gadamer, or Roland Barthes.190 
      -critical claims about musical works are pre-critical relative only 
191 Goehr 
opportunely asks ho  
      iii) Levinson could distinguish two points: 1) a work is identified partially by its 
musico-historical context, and 2) a work has a particular aesthetic property let us say 
essential ontological ones. Then one might identify a link between them saying that due 
to the identification of the work through its musico-historical context, the work has 
essential aesthetic properties provided by that context. Levinson, according to Goehr, 
from ontological ones. In this sense Levinson appears to Goehr to be more respectful 
than Goodman of our pre-ontological and aesthetic understanding of musical works. 
      There is a fundamental conflict in the analytic account, as Goehr explains: some 
theorists try to avoid pre-ontological and/or aesthetic knowledge where convenient, 
others try to accommodate it. There is a serious lack of agreement as to what count as 
 
      It is true that philosophizing has been connected with the provision of definitions. 
And referring to the history of music, it seems that the pursuit of conceptualization 
comes from a need to convince the establishment that certain musical practices are 
among respectable and civilized activities. However, the analytic tradition seeks 
conceptualization for other reasons. Its search is imbued by the positivistic standards of 
objectivity and logic. This was a way of legitimising aesthetics, fighting against the idea 
particular positivistic reading. 
      One virtue of analytic theories is that they provide clear, unambiguous answers to 
questions in cases where no answers are given by the practice itself or by our pre-
critical intuitions about that practice. Perhaps there are good reasons why certain kinds 
                                                 
190 See Goehr, 1992, p. 59. Levinson strengthened his arguments for the essentiality of instrumentation 
signalling that there is a connection between each instrument and an aesthetic quality. The practice of 
performing works on so- eory. 
191 Levinson, 1980, p. 11, n 15. See Goehr, 1992, p. 53. 
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of practice provide indeterminate answers to certain kinds of questions. Perhaps the 
analytic view asks too much of a practice that is indeterminate and complex.192 
      Goehr goes in defence of a post-analytic ontology here, as will be analysed at the 
end of this section. 
 
Extreme Platonism 
In his Introduction to the Philosophy of Music, chapter 11, Peter Kivy reflects on the 
ontology of the musical work. Kivy introduces the topic from the analysis of ordinary 
language: Why do we not react against the idea that a painting can be stolen, but we do 
so when a musical work is said to be stolen? He answers that because we are dealing 
with a physical object in the first case, able to be stolen, damaged, destroyed, or even 
replaced by a fake; all of these are hard to accept when regarding musical works. He 
proposes the cases of the score and the performance as two things that seem to occupy 
space and time at a first glance. And continues, declaring that although notation is not 
the common device that all periods have been using, we could depart from a safe 
moment in the history of music, such as the Fifth Symphony of Beethoven, to begin the 
discussion. 
      Kivy reads his proposal through Goodman's ideas: The performance as the 
compliant of a score; the work as the class of performances, the class of all 
performances, past, present, and to come. This appears to be sufficient to solve the 
defence of music as a performing art, initially deduced by the impossibility for a work 
of music to be stolen.  
      There are, however, more important things we want to preserve, according to Kivy, 
and that cannot be solved by these means. 1) The explanation of the sense of 
completeness of a work. If the work is all the performances including those to come, 
then the work is not complete at all, and this seems to contradict our sense of the work 
being completed when the composer considers it finished. 
      2) Goodman's thesis cannot either cover the idea that many works have never been 
performed, and still they continue be perceived as works by us. So again the work as the 
class of performances is insufficient to explain all our intuitions. 
      3) Finally, it does not help at all to explain that there are true things in the work that 
a performance sometimes cannot be compliant with. We feel that some performances 
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are more authentic than others, because we measure authenticity from a truth apart from 
the performance. So, there are more levels than that of the performing art. 
      Kivy compares afterwards, for the sake of presenting his own ideas, the symphony 
with the number two (different from a number two). He inscribes his opinion inside 
Platonism or realism saying that works are types, eternal and discovered. Meanwhile 
performances are spatio-temporal tokens, different in nature, although there are limits in 
that they have to be the performance of certain works. Just as in mathematics we talk 
about discovery when we say that Pythagoras discovered his theorem, or that proofs 
have been found, the same will be for musical works.  
      The Nominalist view can present to this Platonist view various objections, from 
which Kivy presents the defence for only four: 
      1) The first objection would be that works are created instead of being discovered, 
that they seem to us to be made. To this, Kivy answers that at least his opinion opens a 
'new', 'refreshing', and 'insightful' way of seeing what composers do. And he puts the 
case of Beethoven's compositional process as exemplification of discovering works in 
the middle of an amorphous mass of sounds, by trial and error. What has to be said is 
that at least the idea of works led to the discovery of functions as if they were created. If 
you need still to explain originality, then the notion of first tokening serves by 
explaining that this moment of creation is also an important stage in the process. 
      2) Another idea against Kivy's view would be that works are not pure sonic 
structures but the instrumentation is important. To answer this, he points out that the 
performances would be sonic-structure instances. And that composers' attitudes 
regarding the means of a performance have varied through history and 'recently' in the 
18th century instrumentation began to be fixed more strictly. But the tone colour is an 
included aspect of formalism, a part of the discovered type.  
      There is a further problem here for extreme Platonism. What happens with the 
artificial production of timbre i.e. synthesized sound, constructed sound? Here Kivy 
answers that although all performances are tokens of a type, not all tokens of the type 
are performances, synthesised sound being a case.  
      For some people this is not sufficient and they want to have an answer to the 
problem that a sounding not only cannot be a performance but cannot be an instance 
either. Kivy concludes here that there is nothing in musical scores that rules out the 
possibility of an instance being produced by something other than a performance act, at 
the same time being an instance but not a performance. Another question is in that we 
construe the musical performance as a visual occurrence as well. In this case, a concert 
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performance of an opera would not be an instance of this work, and the visual fact 
would be an aspect of the first token. 
      3) Works are the personal expression of an artist. Kivy says here that the personal 
stamp is in the first tokening, in being able to make it possible for us to hear what he/she 
has heard or discovered.  
      4) It seems possible to imagine a destroyed musical work. Kivy introduces 
Levinson's theory, the alternative to extreme Platonism: the qualified Platonism 
revisited above. Levinson is also attracted to the distinction type/token because of its 
suitability for the explanation of the pair work/performance, but he denies the 
to his idea
explains Kivy. All of these types were created at some point in human history. 
      Regarding the claim that works can be destroyed, for a Platonist a work can become 
nothing to us, but it cannot cease to be. However Levinson thinks that it can be 
destroyed. Kivy, on the contrary, feels strongly attracted to the idea of types that cannot 
be destroyed. An initiated type is an abstract object that occupies a spaceless, timeless 
realm with which we cannot causally interact. Such an object cannot be brought into 
existence through the agency of human action (even having the idea of a first tokening). 
The notion of an initiated type is incoherent; if it is initiated it cannot be a type, if it is a 
type it cannot be initiated, concludes Kivy.  
 
moment where he presents the thesis of the work as a non-real object on the basis of its 
supraindividuality, but more importantly, where he explains its supra and quasitemporal 
condition. 
     Ingarden opens the analysis on supratemporality with a paragraph that condenses all 
that he is going to present in the rest of the chapter:  
If one considers the musical work as a completed product of the creative activity of the composer, 
a formation which, from the moment in which it has originated, exists in all its phases (parts) or 
with all its parts then it is an object existing in time [...] 
But if one considers the musical work exclusively with respect to its content, as it forms an Object 
of the aesthetic apprehension that opens to us the access to all its phases (parts) and their sequence, 
and if at the same time one contrasts it with all individual events unfolding in time in the real 
world, and especially its performances, then one arrives at another result. The musical work then 
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presents itself as a peculiar supratemporal object, which nevertheless possesses an immanent 
quasi-temporal structure.193  
      The quotation above shows clearly the three moments of the argumentation: i- 
temporality of the performance, ii- supratemporality, and iii- quasi-temporality of the 
musical work. 
      
contrasted with the objective time of physics. The coloring depends on what is 
unfolding at a certain moment. But it also depends on the temporal colorations of earlier 
phases. If we attend to the performance, we perceive it in the fullness of its concreteness 
and therefore in its distinctive temporal coloring. In contrast, the musical work is free in 
its content from the temporal coloring. This is because in order to foresee the temporal 
colorations of every performance, they would have to be polysemically determined by 
the score, which is impossible. Moreover, the temporal colorations cannot be foreseen 
by the composer. 
Every real process which occurs in the real world takes place in a definite, nonrepeatable segment 
of time. Whenever the process enters our perceptual field, it has in all its phases, as well as 
extending, so to say, over all its properties, a certain distinctive time quale of the pertinent segment 
of concrete time, since it is constituted in this time by the unfolding of its phases.194 
      This time is also characterised by having the past and present moments but never the 
future.195 
      Ingarden first offers a definition for the concept of supratemporality.  
This and only this is what should be meant when we say that the musical work is, with respect to 
its individual performances [...] 
But it cannot be considered a temporal object in the strict sense, because the finished work 
in each moment of its existence, which is impossible for a genuine real process that unfolds only in 
the course of time.196 
      Every musical work possesses a multiplicity of phases that in general form a 
continuum and follow one another. These parts are univocally established.  
                                                 
193 Ingarden, 1989, p. 37. 
194 Ibid., pp. 37 38.  
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      Now, this is true unless one thought of the problem of aleatorism. In fact, there are 
musical productions that are not conceived in these terms, in which there is nothing 
established temporally speaking or only more or less fixed paths to follow 
(vanguardism, early-improvised music).197 Be they univocally established or aleatoric, 
let us concede that they present a longitudinal form when accomplished, from beginning 
-
in the meanwhile, not a supratemporal one, since these works do not possess all the 
parts simultaneously which would mean that future is excluded, whereas only past and 
present are available to us. Ingarden was not contemporaneous of aleatoric music, which 
could complicate matters.198 His theory must be expanded nowadays to include these 
cases also. 
      To reach the concept of supratemporality Ingarden offers an excursion into the 
-  
[...A]lthough the work is free of those colorations of the time phases in which its individual 
-out 
of the phases of the work itself.199  
      In musical wor
- that one phase will be followed by a later one, and 2- that the 
filling-out of the later phase will be within certain limits of indeterminateness of a 
certain kind and no other. Then we have as a slit-like moment between the retension and 
-
200 
      In music, what is announced does not necessarily have to follow; this is very clear in 
avant-garde discontinuous music but also in unexpected moments in tonal music. This 
situation in music is unlike a similar situation in logic. In temporal logic, the definition 
FA= ¬G¬A the future of an event is equivalent to the fact that this event will never be 
false , the axiom A then HFA if some event is true, then ever will be the case that 
this event will happen , or the theorem ¬HFA then ¬A if it never has been the case 
                                                 
197  
Piotr Graff and Slaw Krzemien-Ojak eds., Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics, essays, 
1975, p. 129 144. 
198 Pytlak, in Dziemidock-Mc Cormick, 1989, also notices this in his critique to the musical work as a 
purely intentional object that is completed as an ideal boundary before the performance, pp. 241 242. 
199 Ingarden, 1989, p. 40. 
200 Ibid., p. 41. 
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that in the future an event will happen, then it will not happen , confirm this 
irreversible sense of directionality. 
      
-temporal 
structure of the work. Kramer explains that unexpected moments in tonal music deny 
expectation searching for an expressive effect. Ingarden himself says that these 
procedures in fact emphasize the earlier later relation. 
      -
non-
always, in a chronological sense, is directed forwards, but not in the sense of its created 
time, which is displayed on top of it and can show, conceptually speaking, also circular 
or branching shapes. These new structures would provide other ways of conceiving 
musical time. 
      This quasi-temporal, seemingly teleological structure, according to Ingarden, is 
what 
in this thesis, including not only what he called (the teleological) musical time, but other 
forms that progressively destroy this pattern, clos s approach, who speaks 
-  
      For the remainder, it is interesting to reproduce his insights about the absence of 
ething after 
which  201. This would be unthinkable in real time. Music, on the 
contrary, concludes; real processes end, says Ingarden.  
      Again, this is not true for recent music, where music that concludes emphatically 
coexists with music that merely ends, and likewise, music that begins coexists with 
music that simply starts. Moreover, there are examples of (in principle) never-ending 
music. In the first problematic case, music ceases, but does not finish. Finally, in the 
most radical case that of pieces conceived as non-ending it neither finishes nor does it 
cease. (1866 1925) Vexations 
(1893) (1912 1922) Organ²/ASLSP (As SLow aS Possible) (1987). 
      To conclu  
work, is determined exclusively by the elements of the work itself [...] The temporal structure of 
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the musical work itself is completely proof, so to speak, against all events and processes of the real 
world taking place outside the work.202  
delimitation and closure of the work.203  
      Concluding, what in this thesis is going to be called the temporal structure, and 
despite of deviating interpretations from Ingarden, will give us the identity of the work.  
      These sentences are some of the deepest ever written about musical time, although 
they deserve an actual revision or addenda. Ingarden is setting the bases for developing 
not only the ontology of the musical work for the first time, but also an ontology of 
music and further, of musical time.  
      He divided the concrete temporal colorations of the real lived time from that proper 
of the work itself. He conceived of musical time as a supra time in that quasi-time. This 
thesis assumes this position as a point of departure.  
      
notes that distinguish a musical work from other natural and acoustic signals. 
posed by Platonists. 
    All this shows levels of temporality: the level of physical or chronological time, the 
level of the experienced time of the performance, where the temporal colorings happen 
fused with the concrete tone formation in an especially intimate way,204 and the level of 
the work, with its quasi-temporal orderings defining its final supratemporality. All these 
levels will be fundamental in explaining musical time. This thesis focuses on the quasi 
and supratemporal levels. 
      The distinction between the field of the temporal in the material world and the 
temporal colorations of the time experienced by the listener and by the performer, 
resembles the distinction between objective and subjective time respectively, altogether 
describing the nature of musical time. 
      Ingarden explains that, regarding the continuum of phases quasi-temporally 
determined, it has its ontic foundation in musical formations, primarily of tonal nature 
such as motifs, melodic-harmonic units of meaning, themes, and movements. 
Meanwhile, the particular properties of rhythm and tempo as well as dynamic properties 
determine a more important role in what he calls the  
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       however for the present thesis 
-
in comparison with the formal tools of temporal logic and later interpreted in terms of 
philosophical and cultural conceptions in Chapter 5.  
      
antecedents his analysis of physical time vs. the temporal coloring of the concrete 
-
appears limited to linear music. 
 
Ingarden goes ahead towards positively determining the mode of existence of the 
musical work having defined it before just negatively, as a non-real object. In this 
context the elements and features of a musical work are going to be analysed. 
      For Ingarden, music possesses both, f
-
qualities.205 
formations, up to the design of entire coherent wholes. Melody, rhythm, harmony, 
agogics, dynamics and timbre, are the elements from which music is elaborated. The 
individual tone formations are characterised by a selection of these features. The first 
three are the basic ones, whereas tempo, dynamics, and timbre are seen as secondary in 
that they are not constitutive structural elements, i.e. we can change them a little without 
fundamentally changing the work.206 
      Non-acoustic formations are constructed on top of the tonal basis. Again, as with 
tonal components, some are indispensable or essential to the musical work, some just 
dispensable. They are going to be presented as extra-acoustic but not for this reason 
alien to music, and ordered according to its proximity to the tone formations. Ingarden 
presents seven: i, temporal structure; ii, movement; iii, form; iv, emotional qualities; v, 
feelings expressed; vi, presentational motifs; vii, aesthetic value qualities. 
 
                                                 
205 Pauses must also be considered here. 
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The Musical Work as an Intentional Object 
Ingarden proceeds immediately afterwards to describe the mode of being of the musical 
work.207 The work itself arises out of certain psychophysical creative activities of the 
composer. These activities can culminate either in writing the work as a score or 
performing it directly without mediators. 
      In the case of a score, the work is defined schematically by specifications that are 
purely tonal, leaving open places of indeterminacy for other parameters that can be 
filled-in in a performance.  
This fact alone is sufficient reason to regard a work set down in a score not as a real, but instead as a 
purely intentional object which has its source of being in the creative acts of the composer and its 
ontic foundation in the score.208 
      On the contrary, the cases of performance and of recording open the question of 
whether the musical work is an intentional object at all if the performance given by its 
composer is the ideal one and there are no gaps of indeterminacy in case of its 
reproduction by a recording. This situation would weaken the thesis of intentionality, 
leaving the possibility of defining the work as a real object. 
      Still, regarding performance, history has taught us that composers seldom 
understand everything contained in his/her own works and that seldom are they good 
performers. Moreover, in the case of works of big dimensions, like a symphony, it is 
impossible to perform all on their own. About the recording, the exact reproduction of 
the work by modern methods is neither identical to the work itself which is a de-
individualised object, i.e. free of individualising features  nor to the performance, that 
always differ essentially one performance from another. What are reproduced there, 
instead, are mere physical processes.  
      Concluding, Ingarden says that the musical work can be nothing but an intentional 
object:  
[...] There is no doubt that the self-identical entity that could be apprehended on the basis of 
individual performances not only is not a real object as has already been shown but also can be 
nothing other than a purely intentional object of a special kind.209 
      If the work were identical to the multiplicity of individual tones produced in a given 
performance, one could take the standpoint of naive realism. But again it cannot be 
identified with individual tones, nor limited only to acoustic moments, since it contains 
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non-acoustic moments as well. It is a supraindividual entity that transcends every 
concrete real object. This is a second argument for considering works as purely 
intentional objects.  
[The musical work] must have several different ontically autonomous foundations of its being: 
Individual psychophysical acts of the composer; real processes in the world which found realiter 
each individual performance; and finally the various acts of consciousness and real physiological 
processes of the listeners.210 
      This does not mean subjectivizing or that the musical work is a mental object. The 
musical work is something that we can create intentionally and not realiter and with 
which we can commerce intentionally. It is transcendent to all concrete individual 
 
       Ontology, it is possible to think of other 
intentional objectivities. According to Pytlak, aleatorism and its uncomposed fragments 
of music show the faults of Ingarden  an intentional 
object does not explain the case of something that still does not exist or does not exist at 
intentionally created schematic pattern.211  
      212 notices a key 
argument 
existence of the musical work would not be exhausted by the purely intentional object.      
Pytlak proposes at this stage an alternative argumentation that in the end moves the 
question from an ontology of musical works to an ontology of music:  
One way to move closer to the solution of the problem of the identity of a musical composition, 
separating its specific structure from other phenomena and acoustic formations, would be to find a 
marker characteristic of music.213 
      Ingarden, according to Pytlak, bypassed an important characteristic of the musical 
 this sense, Ingarden had proposed in the Ontology some 
theses about what would constitute the marker characteristic of music: a) the order of 
sounds either in co-occurrence or sequence, b) new factors such as melody, rhythm, 
harmony; c) something specific distinct from acoustic signals and sounds of nature. The 
results were: regarding a), the order of sounds is insufficient; about b), tonal and non-
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tonal formations do not set music as an unique phenomenon and can be found 
elsewhere; c) does give the key for understanding music: the sound of music does not 
refer to anything but the sound, in its supraindividual sense, as a configuration of pure 
qualities. 
 
The Historical View 
Lydia Goehr, in her book The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works (An Essay in the 
Philosophy of Music)214 introduced us to the most relevant theories in the ontology of 
and ahistorical in nature. The representatives of each theory, already treated above, are 
Nelson Goodman and Jerrold Levinson respectively. 
      Goehr separates analytic from non-analytic theories and at the same time presents 
her historical approach. The analytic approach dealt with topics such as the idea that 
works are created (instead of being ideal entities), performed many times and in 
different places, not exhaustively captured in notational form, and intimately related to 
their performances. The non-analytical approach is found in Ingarden who nonetheless 
had many points in common with analytic approaches Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 1980) 
and Martin Heidegger (1889 1976), among others. On the other hand, the historical 
approach explores the genesis, content, and function of musical concepts Carl 
Dahlhaus (1928 1989), Walter Wiora (1906 1997) and others and in addition 
presents ideas on musical form and time, expression, contemplation, and meaning. 
Goehr chooses the analytic view to begin her critique, saying that it has the advantage of 
being unadulterated, uninfluenced by external considerations, showing with purity the 
issues of its inquiry. Paradoxically, this would constitute the main objection to the 
approach. Instead, what she proposes is a historical based ontology, which does not 
break completely with analytic ontology. 
      Four basic views can be distinguished in the ontology of music according to Goehr: 
1) Platonist: works seen as universals (Kivy). It includes also the quasi-platonist 
view: work Levinson). To understand the differences 
inside this view, we could say that works are seen as independent or dependent, 
distinct entities. That is, either independent from the human intentional act and 
scores and performances, or dependent on all of them. 
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2) Aristotelian: here works are essences exhibited in performances and score-
copies. Each work is identified with the sound pattern presented in each 
performance (Walton). 
3) 
performances and score-copies exist. Works are like linguistic items serving to 
refer to certain classes of particulars. Goodmann sees works as classes of 
performances perfectly compliant with scores. 
4) Idealist: this view, although considered outside analytic theory, considers that 
works are the ideas formed in the minds of composers. Works are imaginary 
things (Collingwood, among others).  
      The analytic view searches for two key questions: the first about the existence of 
works, either as kinds, essences, or names, as we exposed above, and the second, about 
the identity and individuation conditions for works. Regarding the latter, the approach 
has found suitable the Occamist, reductionist tendency that a work is not just any group 
of sounds, but complex structures related in some important way to composers, scores, 
and classes of performances. However, Goehr asks from now on if it is possible to have 
a balance between philosophy and musical practice in the analytic approach. And she 
searches for an answe  
      On the other hand and just indirectly related to her claim in her Imaginary Museum, 
it is worth introducing this historical view applied not anymore to the work-concept but 
to the time-of-music-concept, more relevant to this thesis. It is not only a question of the 
sort: Are there time structures exclusively related to certain moments in the history of 
music? And what kind of nuances can we find exploring the same temporal structure 
within different cultural contexts? But a moving towards: What are the conditions that 
made the time-of-music-concept so effervescent to us today? Is it that time structures 
have to be considered as appearing in a moment of particular reflexion about musical 
practice? 
      
consists of showing the historicity of the work-concept as the key for understanding 
what a musical work is. In fact, this concept began to regulate musical practice at a 
certain moment in time. All this tends to amplify the scope of earlier analyses in the 
complexity of the subject- 215. 
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      Goehr pres
investigation. The concept of musical work is i) open, with original and derivative 
employment; ii) correlated to the ideals of a practice; iii) regulative; iv) projective; and 
v) emergent. 
      i) The theory of open (and closed) concepts was anticipated by Nietzsche (1844
1900), developed by Friedrich Waismann (1896 1959) and noted by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1889 1951) in his Philosophical Investigations (1953).216 This theory was 
introduced when 
what kind of object a musical work is, to asking what kind of concept the work-concept 
217. This reorientation is associated with the linguistic change of contemporary 
philosophy in general. 
      The three main ideas of the theory of open concepts are: 1- the use of concepts 
reveals their meaning, 2- an essentialist or realist theory of meaning is rejected, and 3- 
the meaning of concepts cannot be analysed independently of the context of their 
practice. All this is consistent with a peculiar view of language which is going to be 
analysed in Chapter 3.  
      
nt conditions; iii) they are 
intentionally incomplete, in that a chance of modification of its meaning cannot be 
eliminated; iv) are finally related to vague concepts. 
      They can be open or closed, and the latter has to be distinguished from fixed 
concepts, that define an essentialist view of language and the world. Concepts can be 
closed for certain purposes and open for others. Funding and insurance purposes work 
most effectively with closed concepts, while aesthetics and criticism work better with 
open concepts. A closed concept then can have an exact and complete definition 
designed for a special purpose. If we wanted a change in the system we should replace 
the concept.  
      In contrast, open concepts do not need to be circumscribed within boundary 
conditions or their definition confined to canonical cases. Open concepts are modified 
and amplified but not replaced. Thus, continuity is the key for open concepts. This leads 
us to search for a genealogy of the concept in a determined practice let us suppose, 
moral or artistic. And the identity is guaranteed because of a continuity of connected 
previous and actual uses. An open concept gives us tools for explaining how an object 
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egarding open 
concepts; changes are allowed within a connection of uses. 
      Goehr quotes Morris Weitz (1916-1981), in The Role of Theory in Aesthetics 
(1956), who claims that although there is no fixed set of defining properties for works 
of art, there are paradigm examples of them. On the contrary, Paul Ziff (120 2003) 
wants to go further, in The Task of Defining a Work of Art (1953), he claims that neither 
a set of defining properties for something to be art, nor a paradigm example of art 
exists. At this moment, Goehr asks if paradigms can be necessarily associated with an 
essentialist view. Rather she is tempted to think jointly with Weitz that however 
changeable a concept may be, it is possible to find paradigmatic examples. They are 
paradigmatic in the sense of playing a particular role during certain time in the practice 
where they exist. 
      
according to Goehr, that yields to choose certain examples as paradigmatic. Moreover, 
this principle is in contrast with a principle according to which our choice is moved by 
what we like best, or what is produced contemporaneously. Goehr introduces her 
distinction between original and derivative examples of the work-concept, since the 
historical approach provides us tools for paradigmatic as well as non-paradigmatic 
examples. 
      The model of the open concept provides also an understanding of the objects that 
fall under it. To show this, a division should be made between identity conditions and 
ideals. The distinction serves to allow the move from the description of objects to the 
description of regulative concepts and the projective existence of objects. 
      In response to Frank  (1903 1930) idea of logic as a normative science,218 
Wittgenstein says that it is false that language is meaningful only if it consists of fixed 
(logical) rules and only if it approximates an ideal language (consisting of fixed and 
exact rules). Goehr takes a passage of the Philosophical Investigations to say something 
219 Goehr thinks, with 
Wittgenstein, that these ideals cannot be explained independently of the relevant 
practice or be articulated in terms of fixed rules.  
      For example, accurate notation and perfect compliance are demands that must be 
a Leibnizian logical sort. It is sufficient to have these conditions for being what it is. 
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      Goehr has already demonstrated a problem with identity conditions in the 
intersection between theoretical and practical considerations. But here she adds:  
Most if not all identity conditions for works and performances are, in my view, mistranslations of 
ideals that exist within classical music practice. In all translation something is lost. In this case 
most of the empirical and ideological content is drawn off, leaving what we have seen to be little 
more than generic formulations.220  
      The ideal of perfect compliance has not always existed and might not exist in future. 
She defines the ideal as something that it is rarely if ever realized in a perfect way, but 
still not undermined in its existence and force. If it is an ideal, then perfect notation is 
not a prerequisite for the functioning of a score; perfect compliance is not a prerequisite 
for a performance. 
      A further difference between identity conditions and ideals is that the latter are 
action-guiding. Moreover, talking about ideals forces us to look at the historico-
conceptual foundations of practice in a way that the traditional search for identity 
conditions for musical objects does not. 
      It is precisely because musical practice works with ideals that some concepts are 
interpreted as regulative. Kant was the first to introduce the term in philosophy, and 
notably René Wellek (1903 1995) and Austin Warren (1899 1986) did their part in 
modern aesthetics in Theory of Literature (1944 46).221 They pointed out that artistic 
genres worked r
222 
suspend (without loss) consideration of the former view and speak not of each work, but 
223 
      Regulative concepts differ from constitutive concepts in that the latter provide the 
rules of a practice, while the former indicate the reason for following those rules. A 
regulative concept determines the normative content of subsidiary concepts as it does 
the content of associated ideals. At the same time, subsidiary concepts and ideals 
determine the normative character of the regulative concept.  
The concept of musical work, for example, emerged in line with the development of numerous 
other concepts, some of which are subsidiary performance-of-a-work, score, composer some of 
which are oppositional improvisation and transcription. It also emerged alongside the ideals of 
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accurate notation and perfect compliance. In this process, the work concept achieved the most 
central position.224 
      Regulative concepts are also delimiting and indirectly suggest certain beliefs and 
values to be held and certain actions to be undertaken.  
xample, 
complies with the score, plays these notes and not others, plays in such a way as to indicate respect 
for the genre musically and historically conceived.225 
      How is it that regulative concepts are so stable? Kant said that they function stably 
because they are treated as if they were given instead of merely artificially emerged and 
crystallized concepts in the context of a practice. The same happens with the God-
concept or the human freedom-concept, postulated as if they were transcendentally 
given to justify our faith in morality and responsibility, respectively.  
      The following point is to introduce the projective nature of the work. Thus, due to 
the regulative capacity of concepts, any musical work is understood as if it  were  an  
object or as if it were something beyond the performance and score.  
form; what exists is the regulative work- 226 
      The resultant of all this is that works are fictional entities. However, we still suppose 
 
      The projectivist thesis obliges Goehr to move from describing the ontological status 
of works-objects to an inquiry into the concept of musical work. There are three 
statements that justify this move:  
i) the practice of classical music functions in line with a complex theory about what the practice is 
and should be like. ii) Within that theory, musical works are posited as existants. iii) Successful 
positing of works confirms the effective functioning of the regulative concept of a work within this 
practice.227 
      Statements i) and iii) particularly show how theory and practice work together. 
remains practised. 228 
      The work-concept emerges. Emergence entails development and crystallization of 
new theories, rules, tools and modes of behavior. Goehr interprets emergence as 
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opposed to causal action, since it does not imply pre-determination, rather, it is 
never caused anything; its causal relation is seen at most a posteriori.  
      Emergence is not an ex-nihilo 
separated from the history of the practice in which it functions. As a consequence, 
previous to the emergence of a concept, the threads of what becomes the content of the 
concept already exist.  
Thus, prior to 1800 there were functioning concepts of composition, performance, and notation in 
musical practice, just as there were after that time. This is the continuity. The discontinuity lies in 
the fact that their significance, and the conceptual relations in which these concepts stood to one 
another, differed across the two time periods.229 
      At the moment the concept crystallizes, comments Goehr, happens what Hegel 
described as the unknown, precisely and paradoxically because of our feeling of 
familiarity.230 
      To discover this process neither precise dates nor philosophical definitions are 
worthy. The latter idea seems hard to defend since we always presuppose a definitional 
understanding. However, this only can be accepted if we meant working definitions 
(those with which we operate everyday) instead of philosophical ones. Working 
definitions go hand-by-hand with the theory of open concepts. Finally should we 
dispense with definitions of philosophical sort? No, because philosophical definitions 
and theories play an important role in the development of a practice. Moreover, Goehr 
goes ahead and shows the philosophical content of her claim. 
      The central claim consists of defending that the work concept began to regulate 
musical practice at the end of the eighteenth century. It is probable that one makes an 
objection about the notion of workhood employed.  
[...] Someone might suggest [...] that musical workhood covers a spectrum of cases ranging from 
the most neutral and general to the most contentful and specific, from the ideologically free to the 
ideologically specific. The description of works I have given falls at the latter end the specific 
and the ideological.231 
      But instead of giving a circular definition of musical works as a category in which 
all musics fall, she prefers a concept installed in the musical practice. What she calls the 
pre-critical description appears as such only because of its familiarity. Critically, it 
emerged during Romanticism alongside the idea of music as an autonomous fine art.  
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      [...] I am interested above all in resisting the 
inclination to say that the work-concept must always have functioned in some manner. 
The work-concept is not a necessary category within 232 Prior to 
1800 musicians were dealing with concepts of opera, cantata, sonata, and symphony, 
but this does not imply that they were producing works. To call these manifestations 
 of an anachronistic discourse. 
      Goehr addresses that commonly musicologists put the beginnings of the work-
concept in the early sixteenth century.233 Moreover, they locate the origin of this 
concept in the writing of Nicolai Listenius, where the author describes the three 
beginning of the concept mainly in the third poietic activity.  
Poetic [music is that] which is not content either with an understanding of the subject or with 
practice [exercitio] alone, but rather leaves some opus behind after the labour, as when music or a 
musical song is written by someone, whose goal is a complete and accomplished opus. For it 
consists in making or constructing, that is, in such labour that even after itself, when the artificer is 
dead, leaves a perfect and absolute opus [opus perfectum et absolutum].234 
       has been interpreted to 
indicate the work-concept. It seems that Listenius has benefited from Aristotle and his 
traditional tripartite divisions in this case applied to the spheres of human activity such 
as knowledge (episteme), activity (energeia) and making (ergon
argument:  
First, the work-conc opus absolutum et perfectum, as it is to many 
ancient concepts. Second, even if it was true that Listenius gave crystal-clear expression to musica 
poetica (which he did not), this would not mean the work-concept originated with him. Third, 
looking for origins always threatens an infinite regression backwards through history. 235 
      The Aristotelian reading also suggests that the phrase denotes a finished product 
which is the outcome of work or activity (opus/labore). However, and independently of 
the rightness of this reading, it would not entail the correctness of the argument. Goehr 
remarks that Listenius does not specify for example if the opus existed as a completed 
creation before its performance, if as a musical work its structure would have been 
preserved entirely in a score, not even if it has been conceived as unique, repeatable in 
performances, if its existence above its performance would have been the telos or goal 
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for musical activity. It seems then that musica poetica have been introduced to 
emphasise the idea that an understanding of how to make music is as important as 
theorizing and performing. Note that one can make music or compose without 
producing a musical work.  
      Finally, a way to avoid infinite regression is to distinguish the search for origins of a 
n the history of the concept of musical 
work, is that she devotes all the time to describe the emergence of the work-concept 
amidst the aesthetic, sociological, and ontological considerations of the late 18th 
century. 
      She points out the importance of abandoning the ontology of the musical work as it 
was developed earlier, and postulates an ontology of music as a better path. However, as 
she criticised directly the analytic tradition, Ingarden's analysis was not touched at all. 
Specifically, Ingarden's ideas on supra and quasi-temporality of music can be read as 
not exclusive to 'works' at all, and seem to be suitable for all music. This would 
reinforce Scruton's defence of the idea that certain topics are a-historical; Goehr's 
historical claim being momentarily unaffected by this fact.   
 
Roger Scruton, Return to Ingarden and Further Contribution 
      Scruton,236 in his turn, defends the thesis of the intentional identity. Agreeing with 
Levinson, he says that musical works are identified as structures or patterns that are 
realised in physical sounds. But the problem is that the intentional character of the 
musical work is not delivered jointly with its structure. As a consequence he concludes:  
[...W]e should not expect a theory of musical ontology to give us an account of the intentional 
object of hearing. If it strays into the world where the musical individual is encountered, it is a 
world of metaphor of things that do not and cannot exist. If it stays in the world of sound, then it 
can do no more than specify the sound patterns that make the musical experience available. There 
is no third possibility, which means that there is nothing further to be said.237 
      Scruton points out from the beginning of the chapter the problem of numerical 
identity as the background metaphysical problem, passing through all levels of beings: 
1) things, 2) properties, 3) types, 4) patterns, 5) structures and abstract particulars, 6) 
events, and 7) actions.238 
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      Regarding things, we use to define their identity either by convention/decision, 
because it is given by the subject, or because of the nature of things. The first 
corresponds to material objects. Sometimes we define by convention that something is 
identical with its contrary re
is difficult to describe them in equal terms as above. It seems that the subject attributes 
himself or herself an identity that is not transferable. Regarding entities such as animals, 
we say that they are identical because of their nature, by their continuity as living 
beings. The fourth group would be the subatomic entities, but they seem to be hardly 
recognised as things, in that they are not still organised in systems, as those mentioned 
above. 
      Properties, as for example the case of blueness and certain range of wave lengths, 
have lesser precision. They can be perceived otherwise and still be what they are. As 
conclusion, it is not decisive to define a criterion on the identity of properties. 
      Kinds determine the nature of things that fall under it. Blue things cannot be kinds; 
otion to 
identity. 
      Types are a kind of kind defined by salient features and functions, as in the example 
 
      Concerning patterns, structures and abstract particulars each type is associated 
with a pattern, a set of instructions. Patterns 
creative nature. A structure is abstracted from its instances, instead of being realised in 
its instances as the pattern. Types can be seen either as universals or abstract  
particulars. Design or structure A is identical with design or structure B when every 
realization or instance of A is identical with some realization or instance of B and 
viceversa. 
      Finally, events: the concept of numerical identity is here problematically applied. 
Although they are processes, they are identified by its lasting through time like, for 
process identity. Even in the case of the wind waving the branches of a tree, we do not 
have clear criteria for describing how many events we see there, when each starts and 
finish, and when we reidentify it across time. This is radicalised in the case of pure 
events (i.e. musical events), events that do not happen to anything, identified by 
themselves and not through other things (as instead it could be the case of a car crash 
event). For identity over time it is far less clear than identity at time.  
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long as the physical process that produces it. But there are cases in which the physical 
process is interrupted but the result is not that of different events (as in the case of the 
orchestra dividing the same gesture across all the musicians being perceived as a 
whole). In this world of pure sound, qualitative identity determines numerical identity. 
Scruton explains that in this case the experience of the same again is that of similarity 
and not the recognition of an individual. But what happens with a theme or a chord? 1. 
That sounds belong to types, recognised through their features. 2. That individuals in 
music do not exist in the material world of sounds; they are not even sound types, but 
tones. The theme is an intentional object and to recognise it as the same again is to 
make a judgement of intentional identity. 
      Pitch and duration are the most salient features that define musical types. For a more 
vivid musical experience we require rhythm and movement, characterised by a temporal 
organisation of successive sounds. Pitches and durations are presented in scores, they 
are features that form our primary way of identifying sound types, instructions that are 
realised in performances when the instance of a pattern is produced. The problems of 
identity of the musical work are related to two questions linked to the nature of the 
individuals realizing it: 1. they have fuzzy conditions of identity, they suffer from being 
pure events and 2. they are products of human actions. 
      In the last considered case of actions: actions are events, so they have the same 
identity problems as events, but have further problems from their intentional character. 
Movement is different from action, action involves intention. An action depends for its 
identity on the intention behind it (a movement that causes death may be a murder in the 
case of humans but no in animals). Works of music are intended objects as well. We 
grasp the intention behind an action in an unconscious dialogue with the agent. 
      As a conclusion, for Scruton the work does not have a material, but an intentional 
identity, the work is what we listen to or we have the intention of listening to in a 
sequence of sounds. This can only be grasped through metaphors, by false descriptions. 
There is nothing in the material world that is the work.239 According to Scruton, this 
does not mean that the work is in another dimension, world, or level of being, as Roman 
Ingarden believed. Rather, it reminds us that questions of numerical identity are not all 
important. 
      To identify the work of music in the material world is to identify the sound pattern 
intended by the composer, which is realised in performance by producing sound events. 
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The salient features of a work are those which contribute to its tonal organisation. The 
piano reduction, orchestral arrangement, the transposition, all coincide with the 
organisational foreground. It is when a work is arranged so as to disrupt its rhythmic, 
melodic, or harmonic organisation that we are inclined to deny its identity with the 
original.  
      The question of the relation work-performance is more difficult since performance 
is an attempt to determine the intentional object of a musical experience, by realizing 
the salient features of a sound pattern but also completing those that are not specified in 
it. 
      It follows that a work of music can be fully identified through a system of notation; 
any one which unambiguously identifies the salient features of the sound pattern will 
identify the work. But not every notation does it. There are looser and stronger identity 
conditions. There can be the case of figured bass, where it suffices to follow the chords, 
the patterns of the figure's bass line, to achieve a version of the work. Or one may think 
of the case of aleatoric music or improvisation, of meeting loose conditions. Goodman 
presented a strict criterion for identity: the score uniquely identifies a work of music, so 
that any performance that exactly follows the score and obeys all the instructions 
contained in it is a performance of the individual work. 
      Scruton is of the idea that numerical identity is not the point, but what concerns us is 
qualitative similarity. We wish to know how far two tokens can vary without violating 
our sense of the same again. And that is not determined by a criterion of numerical 
identity ranging over material objects, not even if those objects are abstract particulars 
or items of notation. The identity that concerns us is an intentional identity an identity 
in appearance, which translates into no material fact. 
      Levinson remarks on the danger of describing the identity of a musical work in 
abstract terms as sound structures or sound types. If works are abstract objects or 
universals, then they are eternal, like all such entities. A work does not come into being 
when composer writes it down but he/she discovers it and it might be discovered by 
another composer at some other time. This misallocates an important aesthetic quality 
of the work: its originality.  
      A work, according to Levinson, is a sound structure as specified by so-and-so at 
such a time. The musical design is the result of an action. A problem arises here in that 
it can be that the work construed in this way may exist as a timeless entity although 
there is a personal encounter with it. Peter Kivy concludes that works are discovered 
instead of made. To this, Scruton replies that the first performance of an action, 
although it indicates a pattern, is likely to be regarded as a peculiarly important instance. 
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wrong with Platonism. The sense in which types, kinds, structures, and patterns are 
eternal does not prevent them from having a history.  
The eternal nature of the type consists merely in the fact that considered as a type, temporal 
determinations do not apply to it; it does not imply that it preceded its first token, for it is only 
through its tokens that can precede or succeed anything.240 
 
2.1.2. The Ontology of Music 
      The central author presented in investigations on ontological issues concerning 
music was Roman Ingarden. However, his investigations were developed or 
being a 
historical, short lived concept, in G , we read some 
further into identity issues. 
      Scruton advises on the necessity of turning from an ontology of the musical work to 
contributions. In summary, the different philosophical searches, i.e. analytic, 
phenomenological, and historical approaches were taken into account. The next step, on 
the ontology of time and musical time, will follow the same plural methodology. 
      The inquiry on musical time, despite the circumscribed illustration in chapter 5, 
aims to open this perspective to other music of the world. This is a reason for 
developing an ontology of music instead of works. Secondly, the ontological study of 
music will reveal the primacy of the study of time in music. The question about what 
music is cannot be separated from what is connected with that of what its primary 
dimension is. 
      Many authors wrote about the ontology of music, but only few of them presented it 
as an ontology-of-music as such. Roger Scruton, in his Aesthetics of Music241 wrote 
about ontology of music in the proper sense. Also Erik Christensen, in The Musical 
Timespace242 opens the view presented by Scruton
thesis of a metaphorical space in relation to musical meaning to a more global concept 
                                                 
240 Ibid., p. 117. 
241 Ibid., pp. 1 96. 
242 Christensen, 1996, pp. 19 21. 
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of timespace. Ultimately, a modern manual of acoustics by Juan Roederer243 presents 
considerations coming from physics, psychophysics, and neuropsychology in relation to 
sound and music and shed light from a scientific perspective.   
      Sound is basically conceived either from physical (including psychophysical and 
neuropsychological) or philosophical (including phenomenological and metaphysical) 
points of view. The first position considers the reality of sounds materially; the latter, 
seeks for the appearances or illusions created by sounds, which are nevertheless well 
founded and not unreal according to an intersubjective understanding. The former speak 
about vibrations, waves, energy, elastic medium, pressure; the latter about the notions of 
space and time. 
      Several definitions of sound seem to add a partial truth; phenomenological, physical, 
and cognitive considerations must be afforded in order to have a complete view. For 
o hear a sound as music is not merely to hear it, but al 244 
[T]here is a phenomenal space of tones. It is modelled on the phenomenal space of everyday 
perception
depth; its single dimension is understood not only geometrically but also in terms of effort and 
motion, attraction and repulsion, heaviness and lightness.245 
      According to a scientific perspective physical intensity is the fundamental 
dimension of sound:  
[T]he listening dimensions of timbre, pitch height, pulse and movement are different temporal sub-
areas, segregated from the total energy spectrum of the physical intensity continuum by the 
process of auditory perception [...].246 
      A more recent explanation of the nature of sound comes from a cognitive 
understanding: 
 
undoubtedly was an essential factor for the development of the human race, began to form a 
nervous chain capable of doing ultracomplex operations of processing, analysis, nesting and 
recovery of sonorous information necessary for the phonetic recognition, voice identification and 
comprehension of language.247  
      As we gather all the approaches we go substantially deeper, from 
phenomenological, passing through physical, and down to a cognitive understanding of 
the topic. 
                                                 
243 Roederer, Acústica y Psicoacústica de la Música, 1997. 
244 Scruton, 1997, p. 18. 
245 Ibid., p. 75. 
246 Christensen, 1996, p. 21. 
247 Roederer, 1997, p. 22. Author's translation. 
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      The bridge from sound to organised tone is the first subject Scruton deals with in his 
book, especially in Chapters 1 and 2. He proposes that the passage from sound to tone is 
the key for understanding musical experience, and also that the experience of tone is 
spatial, although in terms of a metaphorical space. Susanne Langer defended the idea 
that music evoked primarily a virtual time. On the other hand, Christensen, bases his 
work on the fundamental listening dimensions of intensity, space, timbre, pitch, 
movement, and pulse as having their source in the temporal continuum. Moreover, 
Christensen founds the ontology of music in a complex timespace, he is not limited to 
the idea of a virtual space as evoked by music but approaches musical created times as 
well.248 Roederer, stemming from the point of view of physics, equally speaks about the 
necessary temporality of sounds, the neurological source of both temporal and spatial 
dimensions of listening, and finally, about the conception of music as a subproduct of 
the evolution on language related skills, conditioned by both biological and cultural 
factors. 
      in their acoustical nature but mainly in 
their phenomenological nature. Two notions crucial for his view are that sounds are 
as a colour may be said of an object. Instead, objects emit sounds and it is not needed to 
here he recalls Murray Schafer implies sounds are neither 
substance in the Aristotelian sense, or physical phenomena. It is not possible to 
encounter them, since they do not occupy any place. Moreover, they are not merely 
mental, private objects either. A community of listeners can agree regarding their 
existence or not.   
      ell-
appearance that is also real. Moreover, sounds, instead of being properties, are 
themselves bearers of auditory properties such as pitch, timbre, tempo, and so on. 
to in a phenomenological but not just physical way. 
      From the point of view of physics, sounds are explained as changes occurring to the 
primary properties of things, causing systematic effects in the perceptual experience of 
normal people i.e., vibrations propagated through the air that reach our sense of 
hearing. But in general, aesthetics is interested in appearances and not in the primary 
structure of things, that is, about the world as it is encountered in our experience. 
                                                 
248 Note the profound coincidences of this approach with that revisited in Ch. 1 by Padilla, inspired in 
Boulez. 
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Phenomenological appearances, however, can still deserve objective judgements and the 
presence of a sound is established by how things sound to the normal observer.  
      A second problem pointed out by Scruton, concerning the nature of a sound, is that 
we do not have clear identity conditions for them. He puts forward the following 
example: the sound of a middle C played by the clarinet and by the oboe. Unless we are 
interested in matters of orchestration, in which case we would perceive them as 
with ordinary language in which words are identified as types and tokens. In the case of 
language, the token utterance is presented as an individual, whose properties are to be 
the token. 
      Here comes a further and especially interesting question, which is presented by 
Scruton as the core for the definition of sound. And he propounds again an example: the 
comparison with sound, which lasts for a certain time and then vanishes without any 
es are indeterminate and vague and 
even temporal properties are unclear unless fixed by convention. 
      Regarding its fluid nature, sounds are either events or processes. Both events and 
processes occur. But only processes endure. Events happen at time, processes last 
through time. An event marks a change in the world; a process may last unchangingly. 
Actions seem to include both events and processes. While all sounds are events, some 
are also processes. Events are then fundamental items in Scrut  
      However, there is a problem about the individuation and identity of events. Our 
world is made of substances; events and processes are what happen to those substances. 
Some philosophers, remembers Scruton, reverse this, like Alfred Whitehead (1861
1947), who regard substances as participants in processes and process itself as the 
fundamental reality; the result of this, according to Scruton, is a philosophy without 
individuals, lost in a sea of happenings.249 
        With the ontological priority of substances, persons and material objects, as Peter 
Strawson (1919 2006) postulated it in his Individuals (1959) granted by Scruton, we 
can live with a fluid concept of the identity of events and processes. We can describe 
many events as our interests determine, simply identifying the individuals and saying 
what happened to them. 250  
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      Our world-view rests on three applications of the concept of identity: to abstract 
particulars (like numbers), to concrete individuals (like tables, animals, and people), and 
to natural kinds (like the lion, the oak tree, or chlorine). Now then, abstract particulars 
lie outside time and concrete individuals are situated in the stream of time. Criteria for 
identity across time then seem to acquire their authority from the identity of kinds, and 
it is because we sort the world into kinds that we can re-identify its individual 
importance to our unending, hopeless, but necessary struggle against the flow of 
251 After all this metaphysical discussion, for Scruton to deploy a strict criterion of 
event-identity is to sacrifice becoming to being. 
      
here: in the case of a car crash the event is identified through its participants; in the case 
of sounds, we are presented with pure events. In this case, the thing that produces the 
sound is not the intentional object of hearing but just its source. Our intention is found 
in the pure sound itself. Moreover, sound events take time. Being pure events, their 
temporal order is the basic order that they exhibit. Then it is through temporal divisions 
position of sounds in the acousmatic world.252  
      Scruton continues enumerating the qualities of sounds that have already been 
defined as secondary objects as well as pure events. One of them is that no sound can be 
opaque.253 This means, if no sound is loud enough to cancel the presence of others, one 
 
      In addition, the world of sounds is metaphysically distinct from us; it contains pure 
events and processes, no persons or other substances. Here would lie, according to 
seeming inside a pure sound world in the second chapter of Individuals; for the observer 
cannot exist in that world of sounds, nor out of it.  
      At the same time, one is tempted to say that the sound world has a spatial or quasi-
spatial order. Strawson made a
space in the Transcendental Aesthetics of his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), as  the  
form of the outer sense. He stated that we cannot perceive something as existing 
objectively without situating it in a spatial frame. For Scruton, the essential feature of a 
spatial dimension is that it contains places, which can be occupied by things and 
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between which things can move. And sounds may be arranged on the pitch spectrum as 
if it were a dimension, but no sound can move from one place on that spectrum to 
another without changing in a fundamental aspect. According to Scruton, far from 
ordered in space only apparently and no
that of a dimension. And it is not a mere continuum; it has salient points and thresholds.  
      At this point Scruton asks what distinguishes the sound of music. His answer is 
tones. 
And it seems that only rational beings, blessed with imagination, can hear sounds as 
tones. This is comparable to the transformation of a sound into a word: at that moment I 
hear language, i.e. an experience of meaning.  
      Tone is then constructed by a transformation that makes it an experience of 
meaning. This transformation consists of the organization of the variables of pitch, 
rhythm, melody, and harmony (just considering the traditional ones). Acoustical and 
musical events are however identical, they constitute one reality that we conceptualize 
in two ways. But at the same time we cannot pass from one to the other in that each is 
autonomous; when sound has been heard as music it has ceased to be sound.  
      Scruton ends by saying music presents us not with the nature of space but of time. 
There is no real space of sounds but there is a phenomenal space of tones. It is modelled 
on the phenomenal space of everyday perception. Yet we cannot advance from this 
phenomenal space to an objective spatial order. The topological character of space, as a 
system of places and surfaces, is not reproduced in the acousmatic realm. In that realm 
we confront only a succession of events, ordered in time but not in space, and retaining 
the directionality and placelessness which are the marks of temporal dimension.  
      In the acousmatic realm, temporal order is dissolved and reconstituted as a 
phenomenal space. We transfer the familiarity and the sense of freedom which 
characterize our experience of spatial order. For a while it seems like we can wander in 
time. Scruton thinks that m by the way, 
takes backward steps, skips ahead, and sets the pace that it requires. 
      The spatializing of the temporal order is also a release from it, says Scruton:254 we 
are granted a sensuous intimation of something we can only grasp in thought, namely an 
order outside time and change. Granted all this, it may be an exception but not a 
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frequent experience with musical time, since there are cases where the composer wants 
to show the unstoppable flow of time.  
      Virtual time is connected to the moving image of eternity in Plato, as Scruton points 
out. But his moving image is 
precisely 'moving', correcting Scruton, who attempted to say that virtual musical time 
move freely from one illusory location to another and in which all process is reversible. 
At this stage, Scruton deviated from Plato  ideas. 
      
but he did not fully emphasize in its importance as essential to the understanding of 
musical experience: the quasi-temporal array of musical events, is by no means 
cancelled by the following metaphorical organisation in space, but it has its own weight 
and shows equally, if not primary, interesting ways of constructing our musical 
understanding. This thesis provides tools to continue arguing for the half  that is 
lacking here (that which concerns time structures). Suzanne Langer seems to adopt the 
other side of the contest: that music exemplifies time metaphorically, that music is 
primarily virtual time.  
      The claim is that not only that space is phenomenological, but time too. Tone is 
virtually involved in time as well as in space, so both metaphors are necessary. How 
should we explain the sensation of a time which stops in music, if not by thinking about 
the phenomenon of creating this virtual cancellation of movement as it is, as a mere 
appearance over the normal flow of time, lineal, and one-directional? How about 
branching time? Would we not explain it as a line instead of this phenomenological 
appearance of many worlds sounding simultaneously without any common sonorous-
mattress? And even in relation to our sense of linearity as finiteness, would not perceive 
the work as a teleological moving, an animated organism, be something that goes 
beyond the linear objective chain order? This phenomenon was described by Clifton as 
the difference between time used and time evoked. Maybe we could say that it is a 
simile which is working here instead of a metaphor, but the point would be the same, as 
stated by Scruton, to transform in one glance something that is normal for us, to have a 
new meaning that we know is not real. 
      Feeling and Form is different to 
what Scruton tries to make her say. She believed that time was primary instead of space 
in our encounter with music. Now, both metaphors are necessary or are they naming the 
same phenomenon differently, so making it an issue over terms? One is inclined to say 
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they do not mean the same at all and both distinctions are necessary to give an account 
of different things. 
      Suzanne Langer's treatment of musical time in Feeling and Form
more imbued with Langer's spirit than he shows in his Aesthetics, although he finishes 
saying exactly the contrary to what Langer says, regarding the primary substance of 
musical understanding. Space is a secondary illusion, but it is as virtual as time is: 
The primary illusion always determines the 'substance', the real character of an art work, but the 
possibility of secondary illusions endows it with the richness, elasticity, and wide freedom of 
creation that make real art so hard to hold in the meshes of a theory.255  
     Again, what Scruton did is the opposite. As Langer said, there is a simulation of 
physical motion and displacement in music to finally identify the existence of virtual 
time or music living in the realm of pure duration, parallel to internal time and opposite 
to clock time; Scruton says that there is a spatial array, but as it is not physical so then it 
is metaphorical, consequently cancelling the temporal organisation from the realm of 
tones and music. 
      This is not however the only amendment that could be made 
Chapter 4 on Music and Logic, I will add to his opinion on the emptiness of the 
analogies of music and language, the idea that, on the contrary, analogies are not vague 
enterprises but ones that throw light on the depth of the still metaphorical uses. Indeed, 
the analogy music-formal language of time, for example, allows mediation between the 
opposite thesis of semanticity and a-semanticity in music theorising.  
      Music exemplifies time metaphorically. This means that music expresses time, not 
were time: it is created time. What time does music express? According to Langer, it is 
lived time. According to Kramer, it is a mix of lived and measured, which is more 
sensible. According to this thesis, music expresses ideas of time forged in philosophy 
and culture. 
      Could we say that music represents time too? A way of seeing time is that it 
represents when the composer consciously manipulates musical language so as to 
convey temporal conceptions. Unlike Langer, she could not allow a thesis like this after 
her idea of the presentational, unconsummated symbol in music. This last idea is closer 
to Kramer, who says that music is meaningful primarily through time.   
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      Music generally embodies time, and this implies that it both expresses and 
represents time. It would be the case in which music as intrinsically involved and 
unfolding in time shows temporal ideas as manifested from its structure (this still can be 
not even intentionally expected by the composer). 
      Scruton has spoken on the metaphors of animation, movement, and space that 
revealed the transformation of sound into tone. And he follows by asking about what a 
metaphor is. In Poetics, he remembers, Aristotle describes metaphor as the deliberate 
application of a term or phrase to something that belongs to something else.256 
Metaphors are transferred to another context from the central context which gives them 
their sense. The success of figurative language consists precisely of bringing dissimilar 
things together, in creating a relation where there was none before. In this case, music 
would metaphorically exemplify time.  
      The metaphor cannot be eliminated because it defines the intentional object of the 
musical experience. If we were to take the metaphor away, we would cease to describe 
the experience of music. Music belongs uniquely to the intentional sphere and not to the 
material realm. Music is the intentional object of an experience that only rational beings 
can have and only through the exercise of imagination. There are tertiary qualities, in 
that they are not objects of merely sensory perception, but require the rational exercise 
of imagination. 
      Studies on the ontology of the musical work have overshadowed those of ontology of 
music. Typical questions of the first group are for example what makes A and B the 
same work, or what are the true performances of a work. The ontology of music, 
instead, asks more basic questions, such as what is a musical sound and ultimately what 
is music.             
 
2.2. From the Ontology of Time to the Ontology of Musical Time 
An ontology of musical time requires firstly a decision concerning the substance of this 
time, i.e. an ontology of time257: the decision about whether points, intervals, periods, 
moments, or events conform to this time. Stemming from this primary decision this 
section will present the three separate aspects or levels of musical time, i.e. music 
temporal constitution from the temporal continuum, the creation of time or musical 
virtual time, and of music reflecting a temporal conception. 
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duration of something happening. Both Richards (et al.) and Allen have contributed to 
either one or other approach, defined by the acceptance or not of the reality of instants. 
258 demonstrated, they 
are composed of points; so, intervals would not be the best word if we wanted to 
indivisibly small periods, and it expresses those occasions in which points which mark 
clearly the division between states but which do not have duration do not fulfil the 
case.259 For Allen & Hayes, what finally exist are either moments or periods.  
      
but a word referring to things that happen. Time is only expressed in the relation of 
events to each other. It was Van Benthem who developed this view, following a 
Leibnizian style260 concerning the nature of time. Notice that in the sense taken here, 
d to 
advance in any ontology of time, as was the purpose for the present authors.  
      For computing interests in representation, those different ontologies are chosen 
structure is suitable for barlines or grace notes, objects that do not have duration; a 
period ontology, for representing notes, something having a start time and duration; 
needing however duration to be satisfactorily translated.  
      From a philosophico-logical perspective, we will have to evaluate and take a 
position for one of them in order to represent temporal conceptions in larger pieces of 
music, or at a macrotemporal-scale. 
      The decision point-period could be reproduced in musical terms in principle in the 
question of meter and rhythm or metric beats and rhythmic groupings. Remembering 
group is defined as any segmentation of the 
music by the listener, beginning with motives, themes, phrases, periods, theme-groups, 
sections, up to the piece itself. Meter is the regular pattern of alternative strong and 
weak beats that one discerns when hearing a piece.261 
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259 Marsden, 2000, p. 34. 
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261 Lerdahl-Jackendoff, A Generative Theory of Tonal Music, 1983, p. 12. 
Ideas of Time in Music 
 
 
 
102 
      -
representation will be . There is no point containing another point considering a 
discrete texture; however it is essential in order for periods to function for them either to 
contain or be contained by others, either by divisibility or addition. Containment 
relation implies transitivity and anti-symmetry:  
(x  y)  (y  z)  (x  z) 
(x  y)   (y  x) 
      Axioms combining precedence and containment are:262 
(x  y)   (x  y)   
If one period precedes another, it cannot be contained within the other 
(x  y)   (y  x) 
If one period precedes another, it cannot contain the other 
(x  y)  (y  z)   (z  x) 
If a period precedes any subperiod of another period, then it cannot follow that other 
period 
(y  x)  (y  z)   (x  z) 
Any period following a subperiod of another period cannot precede that other period 
Another axiom would be: 
(x  y) z((z  y)  ((z   x)  (x  z))) 
      Any period containing a subperiod must be partitioned by that subperiod into at least 
two subperiods. If x is a subperiod of y, then y must contain another subperiod  z which 
either precedes or is preceded by x. 
      
hierarchy as one of the main characteristics of grouping: a musical motive is heard as 
inside a theme, a theme as inside theme-groups, a section inside the whole piece. 
Hierarchical organization can be weakened however with grouping overlaps and 
elisions (i.e. a cadence at the same time forming part of the beginning of the next 
phrase) occurring in music. Period ontology of the sort developed in temporal logic also 
                                                 
262 These rules are not applicable to circular time since precedence is not contemplated in this ontology 
and it is symmetric. 
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implies overlapping, as is stated by the following axiom, which is by the way a more 
complex axiom than that of point ontology for expressing linearity: 
(x  y) (y  x)  (x  y)  ( y  x) 
a b c((a  x)  (a  y)  (b  x)  (b  y)  (c  y)  (x  c)) 
a b c((a  y)  (a  x)  ( b  y)  (b  x)  (c  x)  (y  c)) 
(x = y) 
For any two time periods, one must come before the other, or one must contain the 
other, ore one must overlap the beginning of the other, or they must be equal. 
      The connectedness of linearity is obtained by the axiom:  
(x = y)   (x  y)   (y  x)  z((x  z)  (y  z)) 
(w  x)  (x  y)  (w  z)  (y  z)  (x  z) 
For any two distinct periods not contained one in the other, there must exist a period 
which contains them both, and all periods between the two periods must also be 
contained in any period containing those two periods. 
      chy is however operational for their own 
theory and does hardly admit overlapping: In a strictly hierarchical organization, a 
dominating region contains subordinate regions but cannot partially overlap with those 
regions. 263 
      The most important conclusion that can be taken here is that periods function 
altogether different from points. Overlapping, disjointness, neighborhood, co-start and 
co-finish are their main relational categories.264  
      In logical terms, translation between points and periods ontology was demonstrated 
to be possible.265 In the translation from points to periods in a discrete time texture, 
periods are sets of points and points the shortest possible periods. But when the texture 
of time is taken to be dense, however, there are problems, such as the case that periods 
are infinite sets of points and the definition of being true becomes a definition during a 
set of infinite points. Some extra problems arise as to whether either or both end points 
are considered as part of the period. On the other hand, when points need to be 
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266  
      Marsden had his reasons for avoiding these complexities: 
...S ince practical representations cannot be truly dense because of the limitations of computers 
and other means of representation, these theoretical complexities are of little consequence. The 
decision between points and periods depends really on questions of the efficiency of representation 
and processing.267 
      Still it is important to decide whether periods or events are going to be chosen to 
display an idea of musical time logic. Allen and Hayes defended the position that time 
is just the projection of the occurrence of events and its properties, an idea that belongs 
268 In the present thesis, the operational concept is that 
an event is described as something with musical connotation (a note, a rhythm, a 
harmonical construction, a silence) happening in time. According to Marsden, passing 
from an ontology of periods to that of events implies changing questions of the sort: 
Does there exist a time period during which both X happens and Y to that 
of  st two events a and b which coincide in time and which have the 
properties X and Y respectively? 269. 
      An important difference between periods and events, although events share the same 
relations as periods (overlapping, disjointness, etc.) is that events carry their own 
specificity: the notion of simultaneity. In period ontology this notion is reduced just to 
identity in that they are purely temporal and no intrinsic property is described by them. 
According to Van Benthem, the most remarkable indeed is the notion of causality 
between events.270  
       In a computational approach271 events are distinguished by three categories: events 
with fixed duration (a recording), events with undetermined duration (a fermata), and 
events with no intrinsic duration but whose duration must be specified (for example, 
notes).  
      In this special field of computing, a particular process that affects the internal 
structure of events is when they are made to fit into certain extent of time. This fitting is 
carried out by three procedures: by clipping (fitting the event to a particular extent, so as 
                                                 
266 Ibid., p. 120. 
267 Marsden, 2000, p. 37.  
268 Ibid., p. 39. Also see Casati, Roberto and Varzi, Achille,  Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 
269 Ibid., p. 40. 
270 Van Benthem, 1983, p. 10. 
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many as possible components are presented, the remainder being omitted), by stretching 
(a whole sequence is made to fit into the allotted duration of the event), and cycling 
(repeating the same event a number of times until completing the duration). Marsden 
exemplifies these technical proceedings within usual musical practice: the piano key 
when it is pressed generates a sound that is stopped whenever the damper stops it 
(clipping); the bowing of the string player will dawn across the string slowly so that it 
prolongs the necessary note without running out of the bow (stretching); a musician 
playing a trilled note, will do more alternations the longer the duration (cycling).  
      Events are going to be understood here as quasi events 
of music. In this thesis events of the following sort are going to be implied. Metric: 
, Rhythmic: 
, Melodic: 
, Harmonic: 
. These musical events can have extra properties added to their main properties of 
being melodic, rhythmic, and so on. Added properties of musical quasi events are 
typically timbrical and accentual (as Seeger understood them).272 Descriptions of 
mf accelerando 
defining musical events. 
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Symbolization, then, is to be judged fundamentally by how 
well it serves the cognitive purpose: by the delicacy of its 
discriminations and the aptness of its allusions; by the way it 
works in grasping, exploring, and informing the world; by 
how it analyzes, sorts, orders, and organizes; by how it 
participates in making, manipulation, retention, and 
transformation of knowledge.273  
                                                                                                                   Nelson Goodman 
3. Philosophy of Musical Language 
 
The problem about the connection between logic and music is associated with the 
different results both activities pursue: (classical) logic comes from the idealisation of 
natural language, and its goal is to arrive at a correct argumentation; meanwhile for 
music, the principal aim resides in its aesthetic commitment. As logic has its roots in 
natural language, first it is necessary to explore similarities and differences between 
language and music, for a posterior delimitation of the idea of a musical logic. 
      The motivation for such an exploration is that temporal logic consists of 
PA). The question is whether music can be revealed via analogue materials, that is, for 
example, grammatical tenses, in order to speak about a temporal logic in music in strict 
terms. Even if the answer is no, this does not preclude the development of a sui generis 
musical temporal logic helped by selected tools of this branch of logic, nor the strict 
application of temporal logic to the musical realm.  
      The question of signification or meaning in music, in this case via time ideas, 
requires the study of a position around the topic of music and language. It should firstly 
answer the questions of what the historical relationships between them were, and 
secondly, whether music is language in an analytical sense. Music has been dependent 
own terms. In this last context, philosophies of language provide a framework to decide 
a notion of music as language. 
      The relation of music with language can be found explicitly formulated for the first 
time in the Baroque274,  in  the  use  of  rhetorical  classical  forms  as  a  framework  for  
inventing, structuring, embellishing, and even delivering music. From this point 
onwards, other aspects are crucial for understanding the sustained exchange between 
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274 Blake W., et al. "Rhetoric and music." Grove Music Online. 
Ideas of Time in Music 
 
 
 
107 
music and language: linguistic contents were imitated by music in different ways
, the model of literary narrativity was assimilated275, 
and a similar sense of abstraction was reached.  
      According to Scruton, whether music is a language or not will strictly depend on 
finding identical conditions that language needs to be called as such: substitution rules, 
transformation rules, syntax linked to a semantic goal.276 Here, different theories of 
signification in the philosophy of language should be presented in order to test their 
results in relation to the problem of musical signification. The vision of music as 
language will vary depending on the notion of language one is considering, such as the 
picture theory of language, semantic-oriented, or the theory of language as expressive, 
pragmatic-oriented.277 
 
3. 1. Music and Language in History 
The antique divisions of the Greco-Roman tradition of rhetorics, inventio (finding the 
argument), dispositio (arrangement of the argument), elocutio or decoratio (style and 
ornamentation), memoria (memory), and pronuntiatio (delivery), were adopted in the 
Baroque unless it can be dated as beginning at the early sixteenth century as the 
grounds for a theory of music, the situation even extending until the eighteenth century. 
Consequently, the maximum goal of rhetorics, the persuasion by means of the stirring of 
emotions, was also transported to music. Although traditionally some aspects of 
rhetorics were more developed, such as the dispositio and decoratio, the resonance of 
rhetorics in music was complete.278  
      (1683 1729) Der General-Bass in der Composition 
(1728) includes, among other information, important clues for understanding the theory 
279 Heinichen exhorts 
his readers to search for the affect of words in the inventio. To invent, orators had 
resources that helped them to generate ideas, the loci topici (sources of arguments). 
Common loci were those of cause, place, time, manner, and means, but the 
classifications increased in complexity as time went by. The locus circumstantiarum (of 
                                                 
275 Tarasti, Eero, 1994, pp. 138 180, narrativity in Chopin. Tarasti, Eero, 2002, pp. 112 115, narrativity 
in Sibelius. 
276 Scruton, 1997, pp. 174 and 177. 
277 Levinson, Jerrold , 2003: 
 http://www.musicandmeaning.net/issues/showArticle.php?artID=1.2 
278 Blake Wilson, et al. "Rhetoric and music." Grove Music Online. 
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circumstance) for example, which proposed the use of a textual antecedent, 
concomitant, and consequent, was mentioned by Heinichen as the source for finding 
musical ideas in texts of arias consisting respectively of a preceeding recitative, section 
A of an aria and section B, or eventually a following recitative.  
      
cases where the texts were obscure regarding a certain emotion, by searching in their 
antecendents, concomitants, and consequences. For example, he shows how an emotion 
could be extracted from the recitative in the search for the correct music for the section 
A of an aria, whenever the composer could not find anything as inspiration in that part 
of the text. Examples of affects musically exemplified in the treatis
-changing or 
calamity-
 
      The exordium-medium-finis form adopted for music came also from the antique full 
structure of the dispositio: exordium (introduction), narratio (statement of facts or 
thesis), propositio (brief summary of what one is about to speak on), confirmatio (main 
body of the speech where one offers logical arguments as proof), confutatio (devoted to 
answering the counterarguments of one's opponent), and conclusio or peroratio 
(conclusion).280 
      Likewise, the use of mnemonic aids as early notation and the Guidonian hand 
music, standard melodic, rhythmic, and harmonic figures could be retained and 
composed in the singer's mind. 
      Those aspects in language considered as musical phenomena belonged to the 
pronunciatio.281 It was the division of rhetorics dedicated to the variations of tone in 
speech; it concerned timbrical colors, but also gestures. Matching the gesture and the 
affect to be represented was also important for this part of rhetoric. Pronunciatio was 
linked also to dynamics: the raising and the lowering (volume) of the voice to captivate 
the audience. It dealt with variety in the use of pauses, to prevent monotony in the 
speech. Likewise, as music was a constitutive part of speech, speech was for music. 
Treatises of the time state that the affect of the text had to be respected by the music. 
                                                 
280 Fernández, Eduardo, 2003. For an antecedent see Burmeister, Joachim (1566 1629), Musica Poetica, 
1606. 
281 Pronunciatio, and Music: Hearing Rhetoric in Renaissance Sacred 
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This can be seen in the motet genre, e.g. Orlando di  (1532 1594), In me 
transierunt, but also in sixteenth century polyphony in general.  
      The interrelation of music and rhetoric was at first discovered in the development of 
a musical decoratio. Orators had the diverse figures of speech for the embellishment of 
their discourses; musicians invented the musical figures. In sum, they could be 
described in general as figures of melodic repetition, figures based on fugal imitation, 
figures formed by dissonant structures, interval figu -
, anadiplosis282. They were 
devices proposed as analytical tools for understanding the polyphony of the late 
. 
      The musical commerce with rhetoric led finally to the prosecution of affects as its 
sadness or 
joy. The Baroque composer would plan the work, pairing each element to a very 
determined affect that had to be interpreted in the same way by the listeners contrary 
to what happen in the 19th century where the emotions were spontaneously represented 
comprehensive, organised theory of how these affects were to be achieved in music.  
     There is a fundamental debate between rhetoricians and musical semioticians. Rubén 
López Cano answers to 
283 where Vickers rejects the possibility of seriously 
applying the rhetorical apparatus to music. Despite the historical fact that music took 
from rhetorics its categories and the birth of the opera was going to crystallise these 
achievements, Vickers shows analytically that it is impossible to pass from an 
aesthetical verbal system to one which is not, such as music. He invites us to think for 
example of the case of the hyperbaton, dislocation of the logical grammatical structure 
of the phrase.284 It is impossible for music to generate the degree of deviation offered by 
language with the same intensity, since its norms do not work under strong convention. 
There are also other problematic examples to consider, such as euphemism or paradox. 
      For Vickers, there was a simplification in the translation of rhetorics to music. 
Music cannot translate the modus operandi of rhetorics. Musical figures are like formal 
                                                 
282 Figure of repetition in which a word that ends a line is repeated for emphasis at the beginning of next 
line. Musically it is reinterpreted as the repetition of a motive which ends a phrase at the beginning of the 
next phrase. 
283 Vickers Figures of Rhetoric/Figures of Music?  Rhetorica, 1984. 
284 sa / en soledad confusa, / 
Soledades, 1613). 
Ideas of Time in Music 
 
 
 
110 
amendments of rhetorical figures and cannot reproduce the functions over a semantic 
level. In this sense, music is more vague, diffuse, and general. Secondly, music can 
neither produce the same effects of emotional states, nor convey the complete 
dimension of its significance with the precision language does. Finally, semantic 
connotations in music are reduced to mere structural analogies and he remembers here 
285. 
      What 
figures yields similarities, but also differences and even some original musical figures 
that do not appear in rhetorics. What deserves discussion from now on is the question of 
whether this kind of approach gives us a clue for comprehending the music analysed, or 
not. 
       of rhetorics, 
although with the known caveats.286 He defends the idea of rhetorics as a major 
discipline, but the theory of musical rhetorics in the Baroque would be only an early 
 
Rhetorics is not in the text. Rhetoric does not underlie in the immanent configuration of the text or 
in its linguistic substance. Rhetorics is a metalanguage rising over it. The rhetorical discourse is a 
construction, helpful for the work of producers and analysts of discourse. The rhetorical apparatus, 
although expressed through verbal means, does not belong to the same epistemological level of its 
object-language ...  It is at this level of the meta-language, that the rhetorical apparatus moves into 
musicological categories (but not musical ones ).287 
      The conclusion is of an important dimension in relation to the one explored by the 
project of finding a musical temporal logic. López Cano reformulates the primary 
question Vickers used as title of his article and instead of asking whether figures of 
rhetoric were in fact figures of music; he rewrites:  
I n what measure can the metalanguage developed for studying certain phenomena of verbal 
systems be applied to similar phenomena of non-verbal nature? What adaptations and 
adjustements  does the metalanguage withstand when required by another object-language?288 
      
semiotics, studying actually the semantics of music. Emotional repercussions of music 
are a fact. If musical experiences cannot be put into words this does not mean that any 
                                                 
285 Langer, 1942, p. 232. 
286 López Cano, Rubén, Ars Musicandi: la posibilidad de una retórica musical desde una perspectiva 
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semantics could be deduced from music. Moreover, there are two kinds of references in 
music: extrinsic and intrinsic given by its implicit reference to time. He notes here that 
for rhetorics, language is not literal either, and that the same ambiguity of signification 
is present in language, situation which is the core of literature. 
      Todd Borgerding gives an alternative to the problem of the legitimacy of crossing 
borders between music and literature. If rhetorics in music were criticised for the 
vagueness of its translation, the emphasis on aspects of pronunciation in ecclesiastic 
rhetorics would provide an exchange that would moderate matters. Borgerding bases his 
ar Rhetorica ecclesiastic (1572), showing how the 
indications of pronunciation by preachers are useful to discover a musical oratory in 
vocal polyphony.  
There is  a tradition of listening that informed both musicians and orators during the sixteenth 
century. Notwithstanding
explore the way that pronunciation intersects with the use of figures and tropes.289 
      Through the emphasis on aspects of pronunciation, one would pass from mere 
analogies of the visual construction of figures, to acoustic, heard analogies, more 
important for the art in question.  
 
Peter Hoyt explains how with the Enlightenment (18th century) the florid discourse of 
rhetoric became undermined by the clearness of the informative discourse, which led to 
progress.290 Moreover, rhetoric became an utilitarian art in comparison to those pure arts 
such as music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and dance. In this context, the association 
music-rhetoric would take another meaning.  
      The stereotyped way of associating objectively one figure to one affect was 
increasingly felt to be unnatural. On the contrary, passions were believed to be unique 
and individually experienced. This new atmosphere led to Romanticism in music. 
Figures were regarded as entirely subjective and highly personal. Each piece reflected 
the inner character of its composer, and the formulaic loci topici that once aided the 
invention became superfluous. Music came to be seen as a true universal language 
superseding speech, which was merely conventional and therefore arbitrary. The pre-
eminence of music among the arts was characteristic of the period. 
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      Programmatic works of the Romantic period owed little to the ars oratoria. 
291 was a term invented by Franz Lizst (1811 1886) for music of a 
descriptive or narrative kind; but the term also extended to all music that attempted to 
represent extra-musical concepts without text, and became traditionally opposed to 
  
      Scruton distinguishes t
an example could be Clément Janequin's (1485 1558) chanson 
especially by Lizst (e.g. Tasso
programme music, developed in the Impressionism, notably by Debussy (e.g. La 
Cathédral engloutie). Here the narrative programme became as blurred as were the 
traditional tonal progressions. Note the delicacy of cases of cross-fertilization with 
make music programmatic. A certain musical idea is implicit that develops and traces a 
story. 
      Hector Berlioz (1803 1869) introduced the device of the Idée fixe, a melody 
representative of a character or feeling, which reappears in a variety of forms and 
develops with the changing circumstances. This led to the Wagnerian leitmotif, a theme 
that is associated with a character, a circumstance, or an idea, and which develops 
sometimes out of all recognition in order to convey the evolution of its narrative idea. It 
was primarily through the leitmotif that music became able to emulate the descriptive 
nature of language and Liszt was able to approach his ideal of a music that could not be 
understood even as music unless the correct poetic conception was invoked in the 
listener. 
      
reality of things than to depict any content, to express more than represent. He proposed 
a new organisation distinct from that of the traditional symphonic forms; the 
programme music of the symphonic poem would derive from the subject it attempts to 
describe. The difference with imitation music, the first type of programme music 
poem Tasso,  
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      Absolute music 292 on the contrary, is considered pure as it is not subordinated to 
words, or drama, or any representational meaning or emotional expression. Absolute 
music is music that has no external reference, to the extreme of neglecting not only any 
reference to external objects but also any expressive content. This latter idea is the most 
problematic.  
      Absolute music could be described positively as music that is pure form, according 
to internal canons, and autonomous of any extramusical reference. Objectivity and 
structure were the terms used to define such type of music. Paul Hindemith (1895
1963), Igor Stravinsky, and the followers of Arnold Schoenberg (1874 1951) believed 
that music was essentially a structural art. In the domain of theory, Heinrich Schenker 
(1868 1935), with his structural analysis, demonstrated this claimed autonomy of 
music. According to Schenker, there is a main structure (original, germinal) in tonal 
music, which needs to be uncovered from the whole piece in order to comprehend its 
ultimate meaning. 
      Roger Scruton wrote on the relative autonomy of music, a moderate point of view:293  
The advocacy of absolute music has brought with it a view of musical understanding that is as 
questionable as anything written by Lizst in defence of the symphonic poem. It is of course absurd 
Vltava primarily by u
that seems to imply that the grasp of the melody, development, harmony and musical relations are 
all subordinate to a message that could have been expressed as well in words. But so too is it 
absurd to suppose that one has understood a Bach fugue when one has a grasp of all the structural 
relations that exist among its parts. The understanding listener is not a computer. The logic of 
uld 
not the musical experience embrace feeling and evocation just as much as pure structured 
sound?294   
      Entering into the Romantic period obliges us to enter into the study of expression. In 
fact, Romanticism ends with the old aesthetic theory found in Aristotle, that of art as 
imitation of nature, that was current until 1800. As it was seen, rhetoric constituted the 
method in music by means of which passions were imitated. But in 1800 the expressive 
power of music is emphasised over the imitative. From the resemblance of passions to 
the expression of passions there is merely the same difference as between imitation and 
interpretation. 
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      Music was not imitative anymore but analogous of the emotions, a language 
independent of the others. The theory of the meta-feelings appeared in this context, 
according to which one aesthetic sensation can arise many different feelings but none in 
particular. These ideas fed the 19th century idealistic view of music. 
      The non-representational character of music that was for the Enlightenment cause 
Critique of Judgment, 1790), was now the reason 
for its elevated status over the rest of the artistic disciplines. Music could go beyond the 
limits of rational knowledge, had an infinite potentiality, and could describe indefinable 
feelings, leading up to mystical revelations. 
      Schopenhauer developed this idealist thinking about music within a systematic 
philosophy. In The World as Will and Representation writes that music is the direct 
expression of the Will. For Schopenhauer, the world is representation, appearances 
guided by causality. But the underlying principle sustaining the world is the Will.  And 
the passage from the world of representations or appearances to that of the Will or 
Absolute comes from the self-experience of the Will. The impulse of the Will is 
irrational. The Will is one; representation is plural, however, there are intermediate 
genres that join representations: Ideas. The contemplation of the ideas emancipates 
human beings from the pain caused by the Will, always unsatisfied. Within this context, 
consciousness, in this sense, is what at the same time discovers the dissatisfaction and 
the path of suppression of dissatisfaction.295 
      According to Schopenh
ideas is an act of artistic geniality. The artist by contemplating the ideas dominates the 
Will. Music is, in the scale of the arts, the maximum revelation of the Will, far from 
spatial representation. It is the revelation of the emotions without the object that 
produced them, pure abstraction of pain and joy, and liberation of the Will through its 
serene vision and domain. The passage from art to the knowledge of oneself constitutes 
the last stage of Schopenhauer's philosophy, imbued by the notion of the Buddhist 
nirvana, the negation of the individual and the immersion in nothingness.  
      This vision tips over into the Formalism developed by Hanslick in Vom Musikalish-
Schönen (1854)296, often seen as the opposite of idealism. Hanslick criticised a theory of 
expression which led to the belief that music expressed something outside of itself. 
Music expresses nothing but itself, the shaping of the musical idea itself. Hanslick 
refutes the expressionist theory of music, arguing that music traces the dynamic motion 
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of feelings and this is not the same as expressing an indefinite emotion, for to represent 
an emotion is a contradiction in terms. 
      According to Paddison, both Hanslick and Schopenhauer influenced what came 
after, Impressionism (Symbolism), which can be seen as an extreme refinement of either 
autonomic or expressive aesthetics.297 Both influences appear in Expressionism as well, 
 the Will is replaced 
by the Freudian unconscious, a withdrawal into the self in the process of disintegration, 
at the same time showing formalist implications: extreme abstraction and non-
representation.   
      Poétique musicale (1942) constitutes the following step. He was, 
jointly with the Darmstadt school, founder of the anti-expression aesthetic. For 
Stravinsky, music was a certain organisation of time that implied calculus and 
speculation.  of impulses that converge 
298.  
      abstract music, 
adjective reserved to be an exclusive characteristic of verbal language. Precisely from 
this vision of music as pure language, a conception of a musical temporal logic is built, 
299 is 
proposed in the sense that time ideas provide meaning. 
      The historical process of the relations between music and language could be 
summarised in four steps: 
1. Music emulates linguistic manners, being associated with rhetorics. 
2. Music emulates language in that it can refer to contents outside itself (imitation 
music). 
 
4. Music can reach abstraction, in the sense of being separated from an extrinsic 
reference and play with its own elements in a formal way. 
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3. 2. Music as Language, an Analytical Approach 
In addition to the historical relations music had with language, the conception of music 
as language deserves an analytical treatment. Roger Scruton presents one in his 
Aesthetics of Music (1997).300 Scruton asks if an analogy with language or the search for 
a grammar would cast any light on a theory of musical understanding. His answer is 
discussed below. 
      The general science of signs studied language as one system of signs among others; 
this was extended to even consider artworks as signs. The association was made from 
the context of structuralism, which led to the belief that structure and meaning were 
connected. In music, particularly, the idea was developed to include even the idea of 
 
      According to Scruton, however, this school does not provide a persuasive theory of 
syntax, or an explanation of how syntactic structures encode meaning for the following 
certain substitutions, but not all, are allowed to fill the free places in a row and every 
moment of this row limit what is before and what come after, e.g. 12-bar blues. Every 
chord is taken from a paradigmatic class and constitutes a syntagma whenever it can be 
explained by the rules of grammar. This works for the three musical dimensions of 
rhythm, melody and harmony. 
      To reveal if the presence of this kind of structure shows the meaning of music, 
Scruton takes the opening bars of Claude (1862 1918) prelude to his opera 
Pelléas et Mélisande (1898). Semiotic analyses should arrive at a correct description, 
which justifies the place of the chords in the syntactic structure, showing how they 
follow from the preceding harmonies and how they condition the harmonies that come 
after them. He arrives at the conclusion that this example shows that there is more than 
syntagmatic structure. A person who hears with understanding perceives, at bar 5 of the 
example, neither a chord in D minor (the flattened fifth of D in this case), which is the 
key established at the beginning, nor the chord in any other key. In fact, it was written 
precisely to deny any sense of key, by ruling out the possibility of a dominant using the 
whole-tone scale.  
      According to Scruton, the wrongness of assimilating syntactic structures to music 
resides in the absence of any link between syntax and semantics; whereas in language 
syntax and semantics goes hand in hand. The meaning of the music is not provided by 
the syntactic order but by the acoustic sensation provoked by the music. 
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       us whether a sentence is a possible sentence of the language, 
which of its component sounds is a word rather than a phoneme, and how the words are 
the meaning is. Scruton goes on to explain that a theory of syntax would explain how 
we can derive sentences of the language, by finite transformational rules, from a finite 
vocabulary and a repertoire of deep structures. We recognise syntactically correct 
sentences by grasping their derivation; deviant sentences are those that we cannot derive 
from the repertoire of rules and structures.  
      syntagmatic 
structures. Transformation rules explain our ways of grouping words in a sentence; they 
together.  
      Scruton shows consequently that our rules of grammar must take into account more 
than the surface position of a word to generate a natural language. The point is 
illustrated as well by reflecting on the intransitivity of syntax. A word may be 
acceptably joined to its successor and the successor to its successor, and the result may 
Gebrauchmusik, there is an example where each bar leads smoothly into its 
successor, but the whole is non-sensical.301 From this situation a consequence can still be 
derived that there are indeed intuitions of right and wrong that can equally be shown in 
music. 
      But for the analogy with functions of language, one should provide a rule-governed 
syntax for all dimensions of musical organisation that is for rhythm, for melody, and for 
harmony. Scruton examines a first case in which a metrical pattern is interrupted by a 
syntactical incorrectness. Then, a second case in which, substituting a falling fourth in a 
melodic syntactically correct example, we feel the pressure of redefining the other 
consecutive 
rule-governed order. Given certain melody, a bass-line could be derived directly 
according to its tonality. 
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      Scruton remarks that these intuitions of right and wrong in music remind us of those 
which the linguist tries to explain through a transformational grammar. Consequently, 
he concedes at this point of the analysis the following facts: 
- There are infinite utterances in music, but constructed from a finite (discontinuous) 
vocabulary, i.e. the twelve semitones. 
- Music implies a cognitive process in which we pay attention and every element is 
understood in relation to the whole. 
- There is a context-dependent affinity between tones, more than a step-by-step 
substitution of syntactically equivalent elements. Music is organised, but sui 
generis, through variations, imitations, parallels, and structural and prolonging 
episodes. 
- There i
are perceived as forming a unit, as words forming a sentence. 
- In music, memory plays an important role, aiding the recognition of the structure as 
a whole. 
- And there are in fact 
in measure 5 should be derived from a whole-tone scale (D E F# Ab Bb C).  
      According to Scruton, a generative theory of tonal music should offer the following 
 
1. Horizontal grouping into phrases or melodies and vertical grouping into chords.  
2. Metrical intuitions. 
3. Melodic intuitions, how a melody splits into episodes which elaborate, answer, 
or continue. 
4. Intuitions concerning tension and relaxation or the presence of unsaturated 
chords requiring a completion.  
5. Intuitions concerning the part-whole relationship, episodes either answering each 
other or being independent. 
      According to Scruton, with these intuitions we could develop, as a linguist does, a 
theory that would explain those patterns that sound right and exclude those that sound 
wrong. It would be a theory of musical understanding par excellence; it would show 
how and what we should understand. 
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      Generative Theory (1983) distinguishes two kinds of 
-
formal languages.  
      Lerdahl and Jackendoff propose four structures in tonal music according to 
grouping, meter, the organisation of pitches according to their structural importance, 
and the order of tension and release. They constitute hierarchies, which derive 
perceivable musical phenomena from underlying structures, in the same manner that the 
word order in a sentence is derived from the deep structure of rules of transformation. 
The first step in a transformational grammar is the design of trees302. They construct 
similar trees to explain which musical elements are heard as subordinate to which. The 
analysis has the following layers: 
1. The grouping structure: divides the piece into motifs, phrases, and sections 
hierarchically in a tree diagram. 
2. The metrical structure: divides between strong and weak beats at various levels 
into the grouping structure. 
3. -
pitches. 
4. 
and melodic elements hierarchically, from an underlying harmonic and melodic 
structure (equivalent to the Schenkerian Ursatz)303. 
      
about the preference of the event leading to the more stable metrical order, as the most 
-span. The corollary from this enterprise is that 
 
      According to Scruton, we should hesitate to call this a theory of musical syntax, for 
the rules do not determine any musical surface uniquely. This is because preference 
rules can conflict. It is impossible to think of these rules as procedures which one might 
obey: the listener acts in accordance with these rules, but not from them. 
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      By the way, Lerdahl and Jackendoff admit that preference rules have no parallel in 
natural language because the rules are precisely obeyed in language at least in normal 
discourse, but with possible exceptions in literature. The problem of preference rules 
 
      Moreover, the reduction acquires a tree structure familiar to generative theories of 
syntax. The same authors admit also that this is misleading, since linguistic syntactic 
trees relate grammatical categories, which are absent in music. In music, on the 
contrary, it is the individual events that are hierarchically related.  
      The principal question for Scruton is whether a theory of tonal music conceived in 
cognitive science terms would really show how we understand tonal music. Scruton 
presents three arguments for diminishing the power of the generative theory in music. 
Each of the four reductions proposed by the theory offers to explain our experience of 
sequence: why this sounds right after that. However, he regards counterpoint as just as 
important. We can affirm for example that a chord heard in the second voice of a canon 
is right, being knowledge that here is first a matter of musical expectation, and not of 
derivation. 
      
derived from its cadence. Scruton notes that we can treat a passage as subordinate to a 
cadence only because we perceive the temporal Gestalt. The basic experiences evolved 
in hearing music, recognising parallels, movement, and force are not explained by the 
 
Franz  (1797 1828)  (1821). At the beginning, three 
measures displaying an ambiguous G seventh chord arrive at the dominant F# of B 
minor in the cadence; the situation he wants to explain is that we already hear B minor 
in the first three measures.) By the way, Lerdahl and Jackendoff also admitted that they 
Gestalt is 
therefore required before the generative theory of prolongation can get off the 
304 
      Finally, according to the author, the theory does not mention the key component of 
the grouping phenomenon: the experience of movement of phrases beginning, moving 
on, and coming to an end and the experience of metaphorical space in which this 
movement spreads. Scruton appeals here to his main thesis presented already in Chapter 
2: 
                                                 
304 Ibid., p. 196. 
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To notice the movement in music, you must perceive the notes not merely organised into groups, 
but as moving; and that means perceiving the music under an irreducible metaphor ... . A 
generative theory of grouping is necessarily blind to this fact: it can, perhaps, explain the grouping; 
but it cannot explain the metaphor -nor the fact that this is  how the  music  is  heard.  The  crucial  
component in our understanding of music will therefore not be touched by the theory.305 
      Conceding that Scruton went ahead with a more convincing theory of musical 
the partial ontological point of view he is defending, the works of the structural analysts 
such as Schenker, and Lerdahl and Jackendoff have offered substantial explanations for 
the way music is organised. It seems wrong to understand their studies as if they had to 
replace music itself; analytical explanations suppose fragmentation. It is evident that the 
explanation will not return us the music and the direct way of experiencing it. 
      
capability to recognise parallels, and the work memory does in expecting and 
remembering, with the consequent experience of movement, are sufficient to consider it 
a crucial addendum to these established theories.  
      Concerning the status of musical rules and the way in which they shape musical 
practice, Scruton arrives at the following conclusions:  
1. The order that we hear in music may be likened to, but it is not, truly syntactical. 
It resembles the order of style in language, unless it is less independent. 
2. There are rules in music but they are not usually prescriptive, they are derived 
post facto; generalisations instead of rules of grammar. 
3. There are no parts of speech in music, no syntactic elements playing a single 
specifiable role. In music, as in language, it is only in the whole context of the 
utterance that any element has meaning. But in music, unlike language, the 
contribution is not and cannot be constant. 
4. In language, speaker and hearer have the same competence. In music, the 
composer must have the hearer's competence, but he must also have much more 
than this if his music is to be meaningful. A generative grammar of tonal music 
would not tell us how tonal music is composed. 
5. Rule-governed music is, in general, vacuous and uninteresting.  
      As a second stage, Scruton later elaborates another claim (perhaps the stronger one) 
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coherent conception of deep structure in natural language is linked to a semantic 
interpretation of it. Even in formal languages, syntax is modelled on an implicit 
interpretation. And there is no way in which we could build a theory of language syntax 
without depending on intuitions about the meaning of words. 
      This means that music could be described syntactically only if we could propose a 
musical semantics. The weakness of the semiological approach resides in its inability to 
combine syntax and semantics into a unitary theory. Music has a quasi-syntactic 
structure and also a kind of meaning. But there is no reason to believe that its structure 
is the vehicle of meaning. 
      According to Scruton, we could still think of music as having a semantic value, only 
if we could signal the meaning of a piece from the meanings of its elements. We should 
search for a musical equivalent to a vocabulary phrases, harmonies, progressions, and 
so on with a repeatable significance that regularly and predictably contributes to the 
meaning of the musical whole.  
      For Scruton, meaning is assigned by perception, not by convention in the case of 
music; a case completely unlike language. And through an example shows how rivalling 
semantic meanings could be assign
Winterreise, 1828
the same standard meaning for those who are competent to deploy them, regardless of 
any accompanying text. The absence of parts of speech implies that there are no clear 
procedures for deriving a semantic interpretation of a whole phrase or movement from 
the interpretation of its parts. Instead, music simply accumulates meaning without an 
articulate structure. Expressive meaning is chiefly context dependent and irreducible to 
laws. The constancy of meaning cannot be assumed, and the process of accumulation 
say that the move from the minor sixth to the dominant in the minor key means the 
same in  Al Wagner, Rheingold,  scene  I
Symphony, K. 550 opening 306 The hypothesis of semantic structure in music as 
literal truth is for Scruton unsustainable. 
      The constancy of meaning which is a fact found in tonal tradition must be explained 
however. The apparent musical vocabulary is the outcome of a long tradition of 'making 
and matching', and his rules of meaning are really habits of taste. 
      Follo
structure. He remembers Nelson Goodman and Suzanne Langer who notably presented 
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the category of symbol systems without semantic structure, symbols that present their 
subject matter directly. The intention was to formulate a concept of symbolism that 
would allow us to speak of music (and other art forms) as signs, while denying that they 
describe what they signify, as language does. 
      Scruton arrives at the conclusion that there are no rules that guarantee expression, 
even if a background of rule-guidedness may be necessary for the highest expressive 
effects. Rules have a different role from the grammatical rules of language; if you 
rewrite the rules then you can change the possibilities of expression. All this would lead 
to the topic of the aesthetic experience. Scruton believes that finally the linguistic 
analogy in the case of music is more metaphor than simile and although it is not useless, 
it is anyway not appropriate for founding a theory of musical understanding.   
      The analyses made by Scruton hide a particular conception of language in his 
critiques to musical semiotics, which comes from the semantist school of philosophy of 
language of the 20th century. Before leaving this analytical inquiry on music as 
language, a different notion of language will be approached briefly just to mention 
another possibility of dealing with the matter. 
  
307 consists of claiming for music the 
same association with thought that one usually attributes to language. He begins 
remembering here how music served the late Wittgenstein for speaking about our deep 
308; 
point to particular places in a tune by Schubert and say: look, that is the point of this 
309. Again in Culture and Value: 
meone 
were expressing agreement, or as though this were a reply to what came before, my 
understanding of it presupposes my familiarity with conclusions, expressions of agreement, 
replies.310  
      Music served Wittgenstein to show how language was intertwined in our ways of 
comprehending the world, as Levinson explains.  
                                                 
307 Levinson, 2003. 
308 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, 182. 
309 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 1977, 47e. 
310 Ibid., 52e. 
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Music is ...  inextricably embedded in our form of life, a form of life that is, as it happens, 
essentially linguistic. Thus music is necessarily apprehended, at least in part, in terms of the 
language and linguistic practices that define us and our world.311 
      
speaking about music as thoughtful activity: 
E mbodied thinking in music is thinking we ascribe to the music, as something it appears to be 
doing, and has no identifiable object, whereas implied thinking in regard to music is thinking we 
ascribe to the composer, and has a quite definite object, namely the evolving composition itself. 
...  Intrinsic thinking  may reside instead in the mere succession from chord to chord, motive to 
motive, or phrase to phrase at every point in any intelligible piece of music, whether or not there is 
any suggestion of recognisable extramusical action, or any implication of specific compositional 
deliberation. ...  It is a purposive-seeming, goal-directed temporal process, an intelligent form of 
continuation in time, and one naturally subject to assessment in cognitive terms, such as 
 
      This last category of music as intrinsic thinking has a big impact in the context of 
the project of a musical temporal logic.  
      Now, the turn from searching for the question of meaning in language in its 
semantics to searching for its meaning in pragmatics, means that one is passing from 
believing that grammar is underlain by reality (the object), to rather a belief that the 
meaning of language is formed by conventions and practices, such as in the following 
speak
Tractatus, 
the question would appear mysterious, intangible, abstract; according to the second 
period, the Philosophical Investigations, its significance would be given by its use in an 
act of communication (the person would be asking if the little child is already able to 
speak, or whether a patient is in condition to speak).312 
      In music, like language in this particular pragmatic-oriented sense, there is no 
grammar, no content that has to be deciphered, but outwardly responses and capacities 
(gestures, apt comparisons, hummings, and movings). In Levin  
Both music and language are forms of thought. Understanding music should therefore be 
analogous to understanding language. The former, like the latter, is a matter of use,  that  is,  of  
knowing how to operate with the medium in question in particular communicative games, in 
particular contexts. But knowing how in regard to music, as with knowing how generally, does not 
consist in propositional knowledge but rather in behavioral and experiential abilities and 
dispositions. Hence if music is thought we should naturally come to understand it as we come to 
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understand thought in words; not by learning how to decode or decipher it, but by learning how to 
respond to it appropriately and how to connect it to and ground it in our lives. 
      It is far complex to decide if this notion of language is totally convincing when 
taken alone in the case of natural language. But for the moment it is presented as an 
alternative for showing how a certain notion of language serves for a later reflection on 
music 
many points in common with this other notion of language. 
 
Through this chapter, an overview of the history of the relations between music and 
language and then an analytical investigation on their strict analogy, produced 
independent results. The first part dealt with some general ways in which music has 
following the narrative structure of the linguistic discourse and, finally, reaches 
what a cognitive analysis is testing nowadays based on neuropsychological studies: 
language and music share, although not entirely, systems of the brain.313  
Music appears to mimic some of the features of language and to convey some of the same 
emotions that vocal communication does, but in a nonreferential, and nonspecific way. It also 
invokes some of the same neural regions that language does, but far more than language, music 
taps into primitive brain structures involved with motivation, reward, and emotion [...]. Music 
breathes, speeds up, and slows down just as the real world does, and our cerebellum finds pleasure 
in adjusting itself to stay synchronized.314 
      From these two philosophical analyses some results can be extracted: there must be 
a limit in the association of a syntax and semantics in the case of music, but music can 
be considered to be in the same boat with language in that it supposes a meaningful act 
of communication: embodying, implying, and intrinsically involving thought. 
      Sanz González-Marrades Millet ,315 helps here to join not in terms of 
language conceptions in music but with aesthetic tendencies the different theories of the 
philosophy of language. In this way, historical currents in musical aesthetics could be 
                                                 
313 Levitin, Daniel J., This is your Brain in Music: The Science of a Human Obsession, 2006. Appart from 
-product of evolution, music 
stimulates and develops our mental capacities in its own way.  
314 Ibid., p. 187. 
315 Los problemas del significado de la música en relación con la Filosofía del 
, in Vega Rodríguez M.-Villar-Taboada C. (eds.), Música,  Lenguaje  y Significado, 2001, pp. 
107 113. 
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seen in parallel with different theories of signification born from the study of natural 
language.  
      In very general terms, Sanz-González juxtaposes Baroque music constructed around 
rhetorical principles, with an aesthetic of imitation, in the sense of an imitation of the 
natural emotions; Romanticism with an expressive aesthetics, expression of the 
individual emotions of the artist;  contemporary music tends to avoid the notion of 
music as referential, either of conventional or private emotions or of any natural scene 
or description, thus it is compared to a formalist aesthetic, the signification of music 
was found in the music itself, in its own ways of organising. 
      These theories of musical signification (imitation, expression, and formalism) were 
revisited by Sanz González 
referential theory of language finds a basic relation 
between the noun and the named an object. As it describes a relation of imitation, its 
counterpart in musical aesthetics would be the aesthetics of imitation. The intentionalist 
believes that language is the mere outward manifestation of the internal 
consciousness consequently failing to explain intersubjective knowledge. Its counterpart 
in musical aesthetics would be the aesthetics of expression. A semantist, unlike the 
antique referential theory, considers the minimum unity of signification is not the noun 
but the proposition. The proposition reflects a fact in the world; this vision implies an 
analytical study of the parts of the proposition. Formalism in music is associated with 
this vision for studying the relation of the parts of the composition. But yet for semantist 
philosophers, the reference outside the world of the sentences they analyse is crucial for 
the epistemic goal of language. A crucial difference is that for the musical formalist, the 
signification is however internal to the musical work.  
      In addition to these, the philosophy of language offers the pragmatist theory of 
language. For this last one, signification is neither associated with an external object or 
with facts, nor to an internal consciousness, but resides in the use of the words in 
different situations. For this reason, signification is dynamic and open. Pragmatism 
would allow, in the case of music, an explanation for how symbolic qualities of sounds 
certain sonic combinations, are shared, and are not illusory, but are also distinct from 
those inherent to pitch (high/low), duration (long/short), intensity (loud/soft), and 
timbre. They function as certain rules which are current in a community, as rules of 
taste and of a practice. It is a matter of use, again, that determines their significance. 
      From the first historical part of this chapter, it is deduced that the idea of a musical 
temporal logic already involves a vision of music and focuses directly on the analysis of 
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a very determined music. The notion of absolute music and formalism influenced the 
idea of viewing music as an ascetic organisation in time, whose modalities could be 
deciphered from formal proceedings. The basic aim is to describe general rules hidden 
behind the works that would give an account of a certain meditation on time in music. 
      Concluding, we are going to move from a general understanding of music as 
language to an extension of these theories to the present purpose of a philosophico-
logical analysis of temporality in music. The ultimate purpose of this chapter is to 
decide which perspective on language serves at the time of deciding for a semiotic study 
of the temporal signification of music. A syntactist perspective towards musical 
temporality would concern the study of time exclusivelly within musical syntagma; 
semantist approaches relate music to general abstract ideas of time; a pragmatist 
position descends to particular temporal conceptions inside a whole period or the work 
of a composer. The pragmatist meaning is emphasised at the end of this thesis, 
considering the nuances exhibited by different musical temporal representations and the 
particular temporal meanings arising from different periods and geographies, nowadays 
studied specifically as the social psychology of time. This pragmatist position decides 
also in advance a special understanding of a musical logic as an organisation of its own 
type, as follows in Ch. 4, independent of the development of musical language as logic 
in its strict sense and on the other hand, of an application of logic just for technical 
purposes. 
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I n music, there is no form without logic, there is no 
logic without unity.316 
Arnold Schönberg 
One notices a double evolution in the principle of the 
20th century: logic has become more mathematical, 
thereby loosing its ancient status of philosophical 
discipline; the question of a musical logic has become 
This musical evolution is contemporary with the end of 
tonality and of thematism which were the principles that 
until then, ensured the coherence of musical works.317 
François Nicolas 
4. Music, Time, and Logic 
 
This chapter presents three paths to explore the topic of music, time, and logic. It first 
tackles the comparison of music with formal logic (as classical logic, the logic of 
Antiquity), born for the sake of preserving the correction of reasoning in an eventually 
complex chain of arguments. Here it argues that the general associations with music are 
simply metaphors, on the basis that music cannot reproduce either the specificity of 
verbal language or, moreover, its informative goal. Secondly, a comparison is also made 
from the point of view of formal logic as logistic (the modern symbolic logic) but 
which, again, cannot be taken in any strict sense as can be deduced from the treatment 
given by Frederick Taylor318 and from Peter Gibbins'319 critique of it. 
      Further on, the chapter concentrates 
radition,320 its 
connection with the history of instrumental music and its relationship with the idea of 
the so-called is the most relevant. This germinal idea is amplified with 
other works on musical logic in musicology321 and musical logic in 20th century music322.  
                                                 
316 Schönberg, Arnold, Style and Idea, 1975, p. 244.  
317 François, Questions of Logic: Writing, Dialectics and Musical St  Mathematics and 
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318 The British Journal of Aesthetics, 1974, pp. 214 230. 
319 The British Journal of Aesthetics, 1976. 
320 Dahlhaus, 1999. 
321 Seeger, 1960, pp. 224 261. 
322 François, heorize Music Today in the Light of Mathemat
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      Finally, the chapter discusses the topic of the strict application of logic as a 
representational language for technical purposes connected to music. It presents the 
connections between computation and music in general,323 but emphasising temporal 
logic and music computation.324 However, these technical approaches relate to the goal 
of this inquiry on music, time and its logic, only in the sense that philosophical 
discussions are connected to them and could arise beyond their practical implications.  
      There seems to be a fourth way of connecting music and logic, in philosophico-
logical studies of the sort undertaken by Kari Kurkela325 and Cynthia Maria Grund326. 
These theses use logical means to initiate a philosophical debate outside that of time and 
music properly, i.e. musical performance, the first, and the theory of metaphor and 
counterfactuals in relation to music, the second. As they do not entail directly musical 
temporal logic issues, they are not going to be considered in this chapter.  
      327 In consonance with the present study, 
Kunst adopts logical tools, modal logic specifically, a logic extended from the classical 
one, from which temporal logic originates, as a language for understanding the logical 
.2.1. of this 
chapter.  
      Section 4.3.2.2. will support the idea of a musical logic from a philosophico-logical 
perspective, using the means of temporal logic but mainly for an aesthetic reflection. At 
the end, this aims to enlighten ideas in section 4.2.  
      The difference of perspective that is involved with Susanne Langer,328 Jonathan 
Kramer329 and Alan Marsden330 around the topic of music and logic should be a point of 
departure. There certainly are differences between (1) trying to compare strictly the 
logic of language with that of music and (2) trying to use logic as a meta-language for 
-
(the timing). Langer and Kramer, were thinking within the first side of the issue; 
meanwhile Marsden was pursuing the second. The present thesis, although it considers 
                                                                                                                                               
 http://www.entretemps.asso.fr/Nicolas/english.html. April 2009. 
323  New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians (paper 
version, updated online), 1980, pp. 603 615. 
324 Marsden, 2007. 
325 Note and Tone, 1986. 
326 Constitutive counterfactuality: the logic of interpretation in metaphor and music, 1997. 
327 Kunst, 1978. 
328 Langer, 1942,  pp. 204 245. 
329 Kramer, 1988, pp. 2 3. 
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these antecedent works as important, develops a third path with the aim of contributing 
to the topic from other perspective. It offers a philosophical interpretation or 
hermeneutics on the idea of musical logic, particularly musical temporal logic. To sum 
up, it can be said at this stage that logic connects metaphorically with music in the 
search for an answer to the question of coherence of musical universals, helps musical 
technologies to produce effective musical software, or, finally, it serves as a fruitful 
language for elaborating a philosophical and rational discussion around music, 
especially about music as a temporal art. This third path is the one chosen for this thesis. 
 
 4.1. Music as Logic 
The idea of music as logic is metaphorical if strictly taken as it was for music as 
language, when we compared music with the specificity defining verbal 
communication. The comparison can come from a search into classical or symbolic 
logic. None of them satisfy at the end in that both logics are, with different technical 
capacities, coming from the formalisation of schemes of verbal arguments. 
      Charles Seeger (1886 1979), in his pioneering article on the logic of music, delimits 
in what sense music is logic and in what sense it is not. What are the meeting points and 
what the points that indicate a specifically musical version of logic? Music-knowledge 
and speech-
(analogy) and difference (heterology) 331 
      
units (beginning-cursus- mall ones.332  
      T mean for 
understanding music  is that logic is more 
convincing for this study in that it provides notions of coherence, order, and 
transformation. 
      Eduardo Fernández, in his analysis of Johann Sebastian 
transcribed for guitar
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ws from what, logically 333. 
This seems contrary to rhetoric, where what follows could not be logically but 
fallaciously extracted from its premises. He focuses mainly on one aspect of rhetoric, 
that which is dedicated to the organisation of discourse (the dispositio), rather than 
looking in the music for a thorough association of the rest of rhetorical stages (i.e. 
invention, ornamentation, pronunciation and memory). Fernández remarks that the goal 
of rhetoric, persuasion, must be reinterpreted in music as an acoustic persuasion. In this 
sense, rhetoric seems to be closer to artistic discourse, since it does not attend so much 
to the senses  
However stics of logical than of fanciful 
discourse and in great measure Fernández concedes this idea, as he explains throughout 
 
      Gorgias are not likely to be demonstrated in 
music since we do not have grammatical categories that leave us with clear conditions 
for solving the problem. However, ideals of the sort propagated in this dialogue such as 
-
refutation  can be 
demonstrated, i.e. of an argument which wins by proposing a more convincing idea.  
      334 general conditions for discourse as well, namely, the 
Cooperative Principle (CP) that states that we have common purposes when we talk 
about something. It also resembles the more specific maxims inspired by the categories 
), 
, 
(although always  
      Seeger states that there is a degree of predictability in the logical development of 
music:  
The degree of uncertainty is less in a comparatively stabilised idiom, cultivated within a small, 
homogeneous society with few or no acculturative impacts than in rapidly changing idiom 
cultivated in a highly diversified society and across political boundaries ...  But even in this latter 
case, the limitations are ponderable.  335  
      This associates from the beginning the topic of logic in music with that of 
predictable organisation. It means that it is not very difficult to predict what will come 
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acquires certain degrees of complexity and originality still within certain restrictions. 
unpredictability, a characteristic not found in discursive language, where rules must be 
obeyed for communication to be possible.  
      describe the ways in which the logic of 
music has any relation with the logic of speech. Seeger assumes at the beginning a 
having musical counterparts, being concepts that come from speech-logic. However, he 
terms would seem to have no counterpart in music. The second hazard is 
(music) in terms of another (speech).336 These two hazards can be very well translated to 
the present thesis. 
      Homology between music and speech is recognised since both are traditional 
techniques of communication, implying sound signals and messages to decode. 
(re-presenting) of selected functions, constructions, and relationships, which are shared 
by a certain community of competent users.  
      Analogy between music and speech is described by the presence of units for 
signa
 
      Speech-logic lies entirely in the message complex, not at all in its signal. Although 
it can be communicated only by the signals of a language, the speech-logic 
communicated by the speech-message is not dependent upon the signals of any 
particular language. A speech-logical cursus can be translated into another language 
using entirely different sound-signals without the least distortion. A music-logic, on the 
other hand, certainly lies in the signal of a signal-message complex; in the message, to 
whatever extent this can be distinguished from the signal. A music-logical cursus cannot 
ifferent sounds in the signal without 
distortion.337 
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      Heterology lies in the fact that sound signals play no logical role in the (common, 
informative) speech, meanwhile in music, units of musical-logical form are found in 
pitch, loudness, timbre of tone, tempo, proportion, and accent of rhythm. Polyphony 
successive combinations of simult ), or its 
multilinear order, is also unique to music. Speech, however, is characterised by 
monophony, unilinearity in its cursus, generally pursuing correspondence between what 
is said and what exists in reality.338  
 
4.1.1. From the Classical Logic Perspective 
A fresh view of speech-logic allows Seeger to consider the three main principles of the 
have their musical counterparts:339 
- Identity
traditions for music communication and consensus on skill and taste. This kind of 
identity is interpreted as social identity. 
- Contradiction though no musical production 
music-logical form can be transformed into any other by traditional forms of 
procedures. Poor or amateurish music skips this principle of seriation.340 
- Excluded middle
proportion, tempo, and loudness show different degrees of variance. Variance of one 
kind is compensated by an opposite variance, e.g. a raising of pitch compensated by 
a falling of pitch. This tends to establish an axis from which the two kinds of 
 
      ogic. It 
-logical device consisting in the form a=b, b=c 
 a=c. The syllogism has three propositions in total considering the two premises with 
the conclusion or inference. Propositions are divided according to their quantity 
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(Universal and Particular) and quality (Affirmative and Negative), combinations that 
give the four main propositions: A (universal affirmative), E (universal negative), I 
(particular affirmative), O (particular negative).  
      There are 256 possible modes of syllogism. The number is the result of calculating 
44 (64 moods, extracted from 4 propositions A, E, I, O and 3 premises: 43, altogether 
again by the 4 figures). The figures are the different arrangements in which the Subject, 
Medium and Predicate terms can be ordered in the syllogism. From these 256 
combinations not all respect the rules for creating valid forms of arguments, for 
different reasons, resulting in 19 valid modes. 
      
resulting from the syllogism can be true or false. This means that the syllogism 
preserves the truth but does not create truth. Thus, having true premises, the true 
conclusion is guaranteed by the scheme of thought.  
      To conclude, Seeger describes the logical modes of possible organisation of the 
musical parameters, without attributing to them any truth-value. Seeger says identities 
(homology) between music-logic and speech-logic proved to be of a very general 
character; while analogies less so. Finally, differences are clearly distinguished and 
necessarily inferred. Affirmation, truth, and concordance are attributed to music in a 
poetic and mystical way rather than in a scientific and logical one. At some stage he 
recognised that the idea of truth as coherence (rather than correspondence) is anyway 
much more convenient. For the moment, the result is that logics of speech and music 
have to be dealt with separately. 
      -
compositional functions of pitch, loudness or dynamics, tempo, and proportion are 
in the 
musical cursus will resemble the consistency of the premises of the logic of discourse. 
-logic would thus appear to be a pure logic. And it seems an unnecessary 
complication of our vocabulary to designate any factor in such a logic as truth or 
341 The order the author follows to arrive at the moods of musical logic is 
summarized in the form of steps. But this topic belongs already to section 4.2. on the 
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4.1.2. From the Symbolic Logic Perspective 
A second author dealing with music and formal logic, but generating his arguments 
from symbolic instead of traditional or classical logic (as Seeger mainly did), is 
Frederick Taylor. Taylor addresses in Music and its Logic 342 certain notions displayed 
by music such as  , 
musical axiom, he understands those certain selected sounds from which all the work 
derives; either of the type working in whole styles (general axioms) or in particular 
works (particular axioms). Implication and rules of inference are found in the relation of 
expectation and similarity between sounds. According to him, a musical segment is 
consistent when it keeps the above-mentioned relations of expectation and similarity in 
relation with other neighboring segments. 
      ltimate goal is different from who seeks for the moods of  a  
music-logic. It resides in the comparison of music and logic as means of defending 
universals in music, which in the end are just partially defended. 
      The idea of a literal meaning of a musical logic supposes much more than a 
stimulus-
its listener, idea that Leonard B. Meyer (1918 2007) defended in his Emotion and 
Meaning in Music from 1956. Taylor, on the contrary, has in mind the defence of some 
principles behind the music, which make it understandable: 
It is my contention to the contrary that meaning and value in music are greatly determined by 
certain universal and necessary properties and that while we must agree that a familiarity with the 
music of an individual culture, period or composer plays its part in musical understanding, this 
of the meaning of any work.343 
      According to Meyer, 
344 Taylor then 
searches for a musical logic by indicating two rules of inference. The first obeys to 
expectation. Here he presents some comparison with the logical deduction, from which 
he explains the wrongness of that usual equation of musical logic associated with 
determinism in creation: 
                                                 
342 Taylor, 1974.  
343 Ibid., p. 214. 
344 Meyer, 1956, p. 152. 
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We must not think that because a composer has chosen a set of axioms and rules of inference the 
direction his music will take is therefore determined any more than we believe that a logician 
presented with a set of formal axioms and rules of inference is thereby regulated to deduce a 
prescribed order of theorems. As in formal logic, the necessity involved is not a forward direction 
but a backward one by which any derivation (theorem) can, by using various rules of inference, be 
traced back logically to the axioms. What is musically logical is what makes sense, what proceeds 
expectedly and without surprise; what is illogical and underivable is what is unexpected and 
unfamiliar.345   
      S imilarity 
occurs as a result of at least one aspect (melody, harmony, rhythm) of the former sound 
segment being retained or repeated in the latter. 346 
      Once Taylor defines the sense of derivation by finding in musical expectation and 
similarity of sounds the ideas of musical implication and inference, he goes ahead by 
defining a musical axiom, i.e. by principle, something that is not derived. 
There  are  two  types  of  axioms.  The  first,  general  or  external  axioms,  are  abstract  relations  of  
sounds found in many works of a particular style or period which when coupled with a musical 
rule of inference imply a proceeding set of sounds.  
[...] 
The second class of axioms, particular or internal axioms, ...  comprise the subject matter of 
themes, motifs, tone rows and rhythms as well as, though rare, particular vertical relations. ...  
Unlike general axioms they are seldom used in more than one work.347 
      
derivation. This means, different parameters developing different degrees of expectation 
and similarity. There are stronger and weaker degrees of derivation. Melodic and 
harmonic parameters imply a greater degree of expectation, for example, than form or 
instrumentation. This leads to consider a subtle linear continuum going from what is not 
music to what is music. If sounds are increasingly connected by expectation and 
similarity then one is in the presence of music.  
      t he understanding and aesthetic 
appreciation of a work is far from a relative thing. 348 However, Taylor does not defend 
his position straightforwardly when he assumes 
                                                 
345 Ibid., p. 216. He points out here as a quotation 6, p. 229, the example of the rules of substitution in 
logic: the logician derives freely new formulas from old, depending on what he chooses to substitute. This 
means, different theorems (subsidiary truths) can be extracted from the same axiom (underivable truth), 
showing that although expected, some sort of creativity belongs in logic as well. 
346 Id. 
347 Ibid., pp. 217 218. 
348 Ibid., p. 229. 
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styles in art modifies previously held expectations or gives rise to new sets of 
expectations which are relevant to a new kind of art in question. 349 This is a balanced 
view, permeable to a combined vision that universals exist but manifest in particular 
ways in music. hat is culturally determined and learned is not 
the logic of music but only its axioms. 350 
      The author connects appreciation with cognitive aspects. Aesthetic judgements are 
not exclusively judgements of taste (something relative and impossible to be defined). 
On the contrary, aesthetic judgements depend in great part on the comprehension of 
T
its axioms and an understanding of its logic. 351 
     
underst  
Certainly without the knowledge of general axioms derivations from expectations could 
immediately not be formed; and there would probably be some derivations (e.g. formal ones) 
never made. However, derivations by similarity would surely be made and with a limit on the 
number of axioms the work would be organised and gain meaning. Derivations in rhythm, 
harmony, melody and instrumentation could all be formed, establishing the significance of 
particular axioms.352 
      This is concerning axioms and rules of inference. The third important notion Taylor 
develops is that of consistency. This property is kept in musical works when they 
respect relations of expectation and similarity. On the contrary, inconsistency comes 
from the lack of certain degree of expectation and similarity.  
      Taylor discusses finally about ambiguity. Ambiguity in music can arise from two 
ules do not 
function) or by intricacy and complication that obscures the clear logic of the work. 
to envisage with any reliable or decisive degree of probability what the future terms will 
be. 353 Taylor replies to this former notion: 
Ambiguity is not simply a doubt as to the direction a passage is taking, nor is it a simple delay in 
resolution (in which case tension and suspense may result). Ambiguity in its true meaning is the 
understanding of a single passage or sound segment in two or more diverse ways as, for example, 
in the case where the logic of two or more vertically related axioms or derivations is not 
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350 Taylor, 1974, p. 227. 
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understood or, as in the case of deviations, when a passage seemingly does and does not have 
meaning.354 
      contribution would reside in the 
interpretation of its logical terms in a strict sense. Although it is dubious that Taylor 
himself had this in mind, from the -and its- already 
deviates from the straight question of how music can be comparable to logic, there 
already is a point on discussing whether a parallel would be fruitful, in that it is more 
confusing than clarifying.  
      355 that  if  the  logic  model  is  
appropriate to music, music must show similar operations indicated for formal 
language connectives, similar implication to the conditional, and analogue notion of 
negation for a definition of consistency in the usual way. 
      Gibbins reasons are of the following sort. Musical sound-segments if corresponding 
to logical well-formed formulae (wffs) have only one operation, that of concatenation. 
In logic there are several: conju
-
of sound segments which results in a new sound-
356 
      Then, regarding musical implication, Gibbins argues that it works not as a 
connective in a language in which sound-
implication as well as being unlike the conditional in logic is unlike both entailment and 
the conditio - 357 That is, if y is 
expected  after  x,  and  z  after  y,  z  is  not  necessarily  expected  after  x.  Similarly,  if  x  is  
similar to y and y is similar to z, x is not necessarily similar to z. Implication associated 
with expectation or similarity does not equal to logical conditional. Finally, musical 
similarity would be associated with logical equivalence (given the symmetry between 
its segments) if it was associated with the conditional, which was already refuted. 
      The third weak correspondence between music and formal logic is consistency. As 
consistency is defined in terms of negation, a system is consistent whenever it has a 
theorem and excludes its negation as part of it. The negation of a musical passage can 
be any passage, the result being: Y  may be a negation of x while x may not be a 
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negation of y. A negation with this property is at best a peculiar sort of negation. For a 
sound- one another. 358 
      As conclusion for this whole first point of the chapter, logic, in its classical or 
symbolic versions and adopting a realist position, will never be predicated from music, 
whose elements are not words and cannot have a reference in reality. Music is logic 
only in a metaphorical sense. The concept of metaphor a figure of speech in which an 
expression is used to refer to something that it does not literally denote in order to 
suggest a similarity fits this case, where music can be said to be logic by analogy but 
with constraints. 
 
4. 2. Musical Logic 
4.2.1. Musical Logic in the History of Musical Aesthetics  
      According to Taylor, the idea of logic in aesthetics in general,359 has its origins in 
 (1729 1797) treatise A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757). Specifically, the idea of a musical logic in 
musical aesthetics originates at the end of the 18th century, when a transformation inside 
instrumental music from an aesthetic of action, involved in moral affection, to an 
behind which all defenders of autonomy in music could shelter.  
      Dahlhaus360 wrote that it was Johann Nikolaus Forkel (1749 1818) who first spoke 
positively about a musical logic in a harmonic sense. In the same manner that logic 
regulated and determined linguistic expression, harmony regulated and determined 
melodic expressions. However, this particular sense of musical logic continued attached 
to an idea of music as a language of affections. 
      According to Dahlhaus, it was Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel (1772 1829) who 
in turn noticed that, for the logic of music to deserve the pure character proper of the 
aesthetics of autonomy, this autonomy should be found in the thematic process. The 
instrumental music. 361 Music in this way creates a text, develops, confirms, varies, and 
originates contrasts, in the same manner as a sequence of philosophical ideas. 
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According to Dahlhaus, Schlegel inspired the later, foundational treatise by Hanslick on 
absolute music. later formalist approaches to 
music as it was held by Wittgenstein.362 
 
4.2.2. Musical Logic as a Search in Contemporary Music 
There is a second stage in the discussion about musical logic within musicology. 
363 explores the topic from a mathematical symbolic logic. It provides musical 
examples beyond the musical logic traditionally conceived in tonality (either harmonic 
or thematic) mainly related to the repertory proper of European Classicism and 
Romanticism, as it was mentioned by Dahlhaus. François  article changes the focus and 
enters into European Contemporary music repertory, discussing its exchanges with 
contemporary logic.364 
Today we are witnessing a proliferation of the power of calculation applied to music, witness 
Ircam. What might be called musical reasoning risks of lose some of its rights: the right to direct 
and to canalise this surplus power in calculation that is extraneous to music and invading the 
terrain of well-established operations, traditionally conducted with pen and paper. The increased 
capacity of calculation can no longer be ignored by composers. Their task is to identify the lines of 
force capable of aliment their own thought.365      
      François  speaks about a musical logic properly, putting restrictions to the 
mathematical, acoustical, and psycho-physiological tutelages.  
I will defend a quite different thesis: that music as thought is capable of self-normalisation (which 
by no means signifies self-entrenchment or self-definition, and even less self-demonstration of its 
own coherence: musical autonomy is neither autarky nor, strictly speaking, a nomology). What is 
claimed is that the logic of music is a musical logic. It is not a mathematical-arithmetical, physical-
acoustical or psycho-physiological logic.366 
      Although he is against any definition of music and in the end, of musical logic, he 
searches for the interaction between new music and logic.  
                                                 
362 Philosophy 80, 2005, 
pp. 513 529. 
363 François, 2002. 
364 For an introduction to non-standard logics see Haack S., Philosophy of Logics (Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), on deviant, quasi-deviant and extended logics from classical logic (for example, the case of 
temporal logic as extension logic, supplementing classical logic). 
365 François, 2002. 
366 Id. 
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If music cannot be defined, could musical logic be? Surely not, again, because of the too strong 
proximity between the names. 
Just a very simple demonstration scheme ad absurdum: if one could define musically what musical 
logic is, one would be so able to define musically what music is. From the impossibility to do this 
(see the previous axiom, or axiom of proper name) follows directly the impossibility to define a 
musical logic.367 
      What is interesting about François  article as well is his position regarding 
calculation and music. The reason why his work could not be put in the following 
section titled Logic Applied to Music is that he does not pursue a straightforward 
application of mathematical logic to music, but just a theoretical comparison. This topic, 
the double path going from mathematics to musicology and from musicology to 
mathematics, was explored recently by François.368 
      On the contrary, the most dominant approach for François is that of reducing 
mathematics to a collection of formulas that can be applied to, or transposed as, music. 
Iannis Xenakis as composer has built his reputation on operations of this kind. 
My thesis is that any assumption of a relation between music and mathematics must proceed by 
way of philosophy, not through a compendium of calculations. If there is a question of 
contemporaneous thought between mathematics and music, not of vassalage or of application, then 
it is philosophy to which we must delegate the setting up of a conceptual space capable of 
containing it. This is so because musical thought is not scientific but artistic, so that direct links 
between, for example, mathematics and physics, have no counterpart in the case of mathematics 
and music: in the former case, such relations are rendered valid if one assumes the ontological 
character of mathematics [...]. But, more precisely, music is not a science, and musical logic is not 
an acoustical logic.369 
 
4. 3. Logic Applied to Music 
4.3.1. Music, Logic and Computing 
Logic as a formal tool for managing musical data in order to accomplish practical goals, 
such as software designs for composition or programmes for automatic musical 
analysis, has been fruitfully applied.  
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      The present section will not so much be concerned with the ideas of music-as-logic 
n the musicological tradition, but rather with music as processed by 
logical means. This situation departs from a general towards a restricted perspective: 
from computers processing musical data in general, where logic serves as intermediate 
language for the design of automata, to particularly the evaluation of the efficiency of 
representations of musical time, via the tool of temporal logic. The section will 
concentrate on developing this last concrete issue, since it is directly related to our 
proposal. 
      Briefly, and concerning the first general aspect above mentioned, on the necessity of 
logic for musical data computation, Michael Kassler370 explains: 
Whereas musical processes manipulate music only, musicological processes manipulate music 
together with statements about music, e.g. to verify the statements or to falsify them, or to test two 
for compatibility with respect to particular musical compositions. Such statements are traditionally 
written in one or another natural language, such as English. It is far beyond the current state of 
knowledge to have a machine analyse natural language well enough to extract its meaning 
otherwise machine translation would be feasible now. Consequently, before a computer can 
handle such statements properly, one must reconstruct them in some specially designed code 
whose form and interpretation are sufficiently constrained to eliminate any uncertainty or 
ambiguity of meaning.371 
      When Alan Marsden, reflects on logic as a language for computing, he refers to the 
same issue expressed by Kassler: the simplicity of logic for collaborating in the design 
of a language easily implemented by automata. However this has its costs: 
While a logical statement might avoid misunderstanding arising from misinterpretation of its 
component terms, because the logical significance is precise, absolute and well defined, it does not 
necessarily facilitate understanding nor avoid misunderstanding arising from simple mistakes. 
Logical statements can become extremely lengthy and complex, even when the idea to be 
represented can be expressed rather simply in natural language. [...]. 
Computers, on the other hand, are well capable of coping with complex expressions constructed 
from many layers of simple components.372  
      The use of computation in musicological research is specially underlined by 
-tone 
music, is proposed to provide an algorithmic determination by which any given musical 
composition belongs to this class of music and, if so, to provide an automatic analysis of 
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      Kassler refers to Schenkerian analysis of tonal music in particular as an informal 
theory still, in comparison to his own study of atonal music. The question whether it 
could be possible to obtain a formalisation of tonality (as for atonal music) and provide 
373 From the point of view of musical analysis, the task 
implies creative work, so, many alternative analytical insights, all equally possible, can 
be provided for the same piece. 
      Kassler dares to predict:  
Since the theorist could ask the computer to generate (for his evaluation) new music to satisfy a 
proposed theoretical formulation, the man-machine environment here outlined could blur the 
present distinctions between composers, theorists and performers.374 
      A reflection on this should take into account however that the theorist is always 
working on ready-made music, i.e. existent, ready-made rules. So, first instances of new 
music would be always dependent on human creativity. 
 
4.3.1.1. The Use of Temporal Logic in Evaluating Musical Time Representations  
temporal logic and especially his use of one very sort, chronological logic375 that works 
with the so-
-value is fixed, inscribe him in this tendency. Atemporalists 
 other approaches in 
temporal logic (namely tense logic); tense logic defends the temporal condition of our 
that the truth-value 
depends on the point in time from which the assertion is done. These assertions are 
376 
      Temporal logic formalises, then, basically two modes of expression present in Indo-
European languages: grammatical tense and chronological statements. There is also the 
possibility of formalising temporal adverbs and prepositions expressing temporal 
377 Marsden applies 
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two of the above mentioned temporal logic frameworks: the chronological one and the 
temporal logic working with the operators Since and Until. (Grammatical tense logic 
Chapter 5). 
       In general, temporal logic adds to classical logic means of generating sentences and 
inferences involving time and for making inferences on the basis of the time at which 
statements are made. As was mentioned, temporal logic is divided into tense and 
there will 
uncertain, but can be true or false when the moment is reached. The second type of 
a rev -
Urquhart as two basic perspectives. Characteristic of the first type of propositions is its 
change in truth-value with time; of the second, that are invariant with respect to time, 
they are always true or always false. 
      
first 
occasion the version of temporal logic that most serves to his purpose, that is, the 
atemporalist one.  
The present study is concerned with -of-
two kinds described above are appropriate (This means that, in the terms of Rescher & Urquhart, 
the present study is not concerned with temporal logic, but with chronological logic (1971, p. 30).) 
-
intended to describe the behavior of dynamic systems.378 
      
s ended, 
when one has the spatial organisation of it).  
      379 that is, a language 
that permits the comparison of existing systems and demonstrates its expressive 
capacities for later processing. What is important to be mentioned for the present 
proposal however is that, for the temporal information to be explicitly expressed, 
This more or less equals to wh
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time. Substance will deal with the kind of things time consists of (points, intervals, 
periods, moments, or events) and structure comprehends the shape of time (linear, 
circular, or branching). Furt
 
      To evaluate existing representations of musical time, then, it is necessary for 
Marsden to enter into a study of the ontology of musical time, since it brings the 
principles which are underlying these representations. Marsden introduces the key 
developments around shape, extension, texture, and substance found in temporal logic 
literature. Once all this material is presented, he advances choosing what the best 
ontologies for certain technical purposes are, in that some schemes appear more useful 
than others.  
      Concerning the question of the shape of musical time, it is the precedence relation 
(before after) which is at the basis of any definition of time. The changes operated on 
this relationship, will bring the different ontologies. Linearity is the simplest shape time 
380 
      However, there are cases where musical situations deal with things recurring 
continually. It is circularity , 
annulling the sense of the before after relation. Nevertheless the precedence relation 
not applying here, it is possible to give a certain notion of direction to the circle. Two 
ircular time 
defined by non-
relation, applied to non-discrete texture). Musical examples used by Marsden include 
dal segno senza fine  
chord sequences of jazz pieces, African drumming, and repetitive minimalist music. 
      Strictly, circular music is impossible. This would mean music with no 
-i
be appreciated in music such as it happens in the minimalist case, in logical terms 
circularity supposes no heterogeneity of times.  
repeated segment which has a distinct starting point; and those which are more homogeneous and 
consist of continual repetition without any distinct point to mark the beginning and end of the 
repeated segment ... . 
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The rarity of homogeneously circular music suggests that it is not easily achieved. Sequences have 
to be composed in such a way as to ensure that no point stands out as a candidate to be perceived 
as the ending/starting point.381 
      As strictly circular music, Marsden mentions some kind of ostinato figures and 
rounds. Continuing, an interesting conclusion he presents here from the point of view of 
this study, associating this circular structure with certain cultural images of eternity and 
persistence. In this opportunity, he divides between examples 
 
      Even though circularity is generally not used as a device for representing music to 
be processed (instead, circular time is treated as a kind of linear time in which events 
recur in a continuous manner), it seems to be adaptable however in some situations. 
Marsden mentions the study of Seifert et al. (1995) where the author uses a circular 
representation with a starting point devised for African drumming patterns.382 However, 
in perceptual experiments, these patterns appear to have no clear starting point, 
consisting in a truly circular model.  
      A way of representing imperfectly circular music a mix of linear and circular 
time is to use a helix-like figure: 
In a representation of a piece of music which consists of continual repetitions of a sequence, each 
turn of the helix would correspond to one cycle of the sequence. After one cycle the music has, in 
one sense, returned to where it started from, and indeed in the representation it would have 
returned to the same point in the circular dimension. However, in another sense the music has 
advanced, and so it would have moved on to a different point along the linear dimension of the 
representation.383 
      This model appears appropriate for minimalist music, which returns to the same 
time that changes gradually. 
Note also how the representation gives a neat account of how, if we listen for the progression of 
 something 
longer, encompassing the whole of a single cycle of representation.384 
      Marsden also takes questions of perception into account. He deals with the 
thresholds of our perceptual structure and concludes: 
Half a second (500 milliseconds) is also mentioned as the shortest time period subject to conscious 
control, whether in perception or action. Events perceived or performed at a faster rate are 
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automatic and the ability to process them at this speed is either innate or acquired. ...  This 
plethora of data suggests that it would be advisable for anyone designing a particular application to 
examine closely the perceptual limits involved in the perceptual and behavioral processes 
modelled in that application.385 
      
on issues of perception.386 Marsden is not dealing here, however, with perceptual issues 
concerning the different modes of time but with perceptual issues that must be taken 
into account in the design of a computational product.  
      A third important shape remains. In branching time the connectedness 
property given two events one must occur before the other , which is essential for 
linear time, does not apply. The consequence is the possibility for two events to happen 
at the same time, generating parallel branches. This structure can be conceived as 
something fanning out from the past, another from the future, both sharing a single 
onset and outcome or its opposite, displaying open branches to the left (past) and to the 
right (future).  
      Marsden applies the branching model to cases of indeterminacy, rather common 
musical situations in which we are obliged to interpret the same passage in different 
manners. Indeterminacy examples are seen in the case of simultaneous grace notes or 
indeterminate musical situations is that presented in ossia sections, where alternative 
String Quartet in Bb major, op. 130, 
where the composer writes two endings for the same piece.387 
      The branching model is interpreted in this thesis to approach very determined ways 
of structuring music. A first case is that of branching to the right, to the future. It is most 
common in indeterminate situations (in the domain of action but also in science fiction) 
and examples in music are found in mobile forms.  
      The second is that of branching to the left. It is less frequent, but cases can be found, 
for example, in certain deteriorated states of our memory, among other situations.388 In 
music, this system could be found only in the case of actual branching time, while in the 
potential sense of the branching there is no chance that the past has ramifications.  
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      The third situation of the branching allows a single beginning and a single outcome; 
String Quartet, with its passages of unison interpreted in a multitemporal 
performance, could be represented through this model.389  
      The fourth possibility represents branches fanning out to the past and to the future. 
Musical cases of actual parallel branching time could be seen through this type 
(examples of this last case will be mentioned immediately below). In Figure 1, system 
music, all systems could conceptually apply.390  
 
Figure 1 
      The last case presented as fourth possibility is considered to be the most typical of 
story The Garden of Forking Paths,391 then in contemporary physics, the theory of many 
worlds presented by Hugh Everett (1930 1982) in 1957, and finally recreated by 
Rescher in temporal logic studies392. Marsden omits all this information, mentioning 
.393 
      it is easier at a first glance to interpret his above-
mentioned cases as branching time instead of linear with disjunction, for conjunctions 
among the branches in branching time are easy to process by computers. However, 
linearity with disjunction representations uses fewer logical constants. So, in this sense 
it is hard to decide here on the basis of simplicity for one or the other representation.394 
      More important is to consider that, according to Marsden, branching representations 
ossia section to perform, and 
                                                 
389 Kramer, differently, interprets this work as Moment time. 
390 E The Borgesian Recreation of the Theory of Possible Worlds and its 
Simile in Music  2005.  
 
391 Ficciones, Buenos Aires, Emecé, 1941. 
392 The Primacy of Practice, Ch. V, pp. 88 106. 
393 London, Cape, 1969, quotation in Marsden, 2000, p. 28. See also Kramer, 1988, p. 13. 
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the notes of the other version simply do not exist in the performance. 395 Thus, linearity 
plus disjunction would be a more sensitive model for expressing these cases. However, 
things are more complicated from the point of view of computer processing:  
...R epresentation in this manner linear with disjunction  does not rule out the possibility of a 
performer playing both versions of an ossia at once. To do so would require adding more clauses 
to the representation explicitly preventing this, and so considerably complicate the representation. 
It is therefore in situations where this must be prevented or where one wishes to reason about the 
events in alternative sequences together that a representation in branching time has a clear 
advantage.396 
      These two cases of musical branching time mentioned by Marsden do not 
contemplate the sense of the branching as conceived in this thesis, which is not only 
potential but also actual branching, uncovered from the whole organisation of the piece 
of music, whose form is conceived from parallel lines of opposite material. Two 
examples are A Requiem (a multi-
String Quartet No. 3 (as it presents temporal modulation along superposed, highly 
contrasting levels). 
      
representations from temporal logic tools; to have a global perspective of his view: 
Schemes which treat time as linear are generally more useful, since the advantages of circular time 
are very particular, and the disadvantages principally a complication of reasoning about temporal 
relations because the simple relation of precedence no longer holds away are quite severe ...  
Similarly, for most purposes it is generally useful to treat time as of unbounded extent and of 
unboundedly dense texture. A truly infinite extent and infinitely dense texture is impossible if a 
representation is to be actually implemented. While a finite extent and discrete texture do give 
theoretical advantages in processing, these become very small if the number of discrete elements 
encompassed is large. On the other hand, a discrete texture is essential for applications which deal 
with minimal temporal quanta, such as digital audio. The area of greatest variation in 
representation schemes is whether they treat time points, time periods or events as the fundamental 
units.397 
      In general, there are four important points Marsden is searching for at the time of 
choosing for one or another ontology: 
1. Expressiveness: that the ontology reflects with most fidelity the substance, 
structure, extension, and texture of the music to be represented. 
2. Conciseness: some ontologies adjust more simply to the music. 
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3. Extensibility: some ontologies facilitate representations of open music that 
require always further extensions; some others have the characteristic of 
exhausting their extension in countable steps. 
4. Processing: representations must allow either finite or infinite individuals but 
 a mechanism 
398 
To sum up: 
The most expressive representations would be based on branching time of infinite extent with 
periods as individuals and a dense and continuous texture. The most concise and most easily 
processed would be based on linear time of finite extent with points as individuals and a discrete 
texture. Most representations of music, if not based on events and event relations, are actually 
based on linear time of unbounded extent with periods expressed by start and end points, and a 
dense texture.399 
      Marsden says that the concepts of circular or branching time are useful as exceptions 
to be applied for cases in which other more standard, i.e. linear options are less 
adaptable. This would reflect that his vision is ontological according to the definition in 
Ch. 1, since irrespective of every time conception prevails the adoption of standard 
ways of dealing with time, coincident with common time. It is important that computer 
studies focus on issues of the sort above mentioned: principally conciseness, 
extensibility, and processing, which demarcate the difference between them and a 
philosophical, aesthetical point of view, which search for the meaning of music time 
elections.  
      Reviews on substantial work that applies the logic of time to music400 
wonder about its musical interest, beyond the fruitfulness of its theoretical contribution. 
The question is that these studies fail to establish any connection with time ideas in the 
context of the problem of musical signification. Martin 
taken, emphasises how 
important it would be to treat the more fundamental issue of time as evoked by music, 
internally and externally, in the double sense of composing and expressing time 
conceptions. 
does not seek insights into how philosophical, psychological, scientific, or sociological discourses 
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have attempted to elucidate the concept of time or demonstrate how such conceptions could 
usefully be extended to music [...] 
Rather, what is being sought is a means of rigorously representing an appropriately desubjectified 
and dehistoricized chronology [...] 
[...] One might wish to venture that in so far as time is implicated in music in ways that distinguish 
measured relative to an abstract 
clocked  time,  as  act  upon  time,  produce  a  time  for  itself,  or  make  time  a  thematic  for  its  own  
structure or process.401 
      In this sense, the departure in this inquiry from a purely ontological approach is due 
to these concerns. This means, logic alone cannot provide here the total explanation for 
phenomena, which are ultimately aesthetic, but it is recognised as affording a neat 
explanation of an important part of its functioning. The logical base is still important in 
that it inserts and links musical time issues within the traditional philosophical 
discussions about time, untreated in a systematic way by musicology. 
 
4.3.1.2. Exploring the Formalisation of Timing in Music 
In musical computation, temporal logic serves not 
of temporal order such as linear, circular, etc. as they were introduced above. It is also 
temporal logic to explore the issue of timing in music.402 This logic is required for 
modelling the listening process in general, for memory and anticipation in actual 
situations, as Kunst does (developed in 4.3.2.1) and in particular, for questions of actual 
timing, either in the design of automata to create/perform music in real time or 
ultimately, to reflect the human cognition of timing. In this paper Marsden explores 
precisely the latter case. 
      Temporal logic has been exploited linked especially to the design of automata, 
which are programmed to be used in real-time contexts. For example, the logical 
requirements that a burglar alarm has to fulfil are expressed in this type of logic: 
Temporal logic can function not only as a quasi-mathematical problem-solving device, but also as 
a language for the description and design of automata and computer systems. Indeed, there have 
been substantial research efforts to develop temporal logics for use in the specification and design 
of real-time systems, especially where proof is required that the system will work safely.403  
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      Formulas of the following sort then, are precisely operative for designing a burglar 
alarm:404 
S(A  B, A)  U(  A, X),       (1) 
 A   X                                (2) 
A is true when the alarm is set 
B is true when there is an intrusion 
X is true when the alarm sounds 
Since, Until 
            The treatment read in Marsden before, that of temporal logic in music 
-of-
again mentioned to contrast this new application:  
The score represents temporal relations in an abstract time, which can be related differently to 
other hand, on which her or his performance relies, refers implicitly to the time in which the 
per -
representations for those cases where reference is made only through memory and anticipation, 
-of- 405 
      The purpose in this 
formalising the requirements of automata capable of musical timing. 406 This means his 
goal is to underline the mathematical rigour and to provide the necessary elements for 
the design of correct proofs in order to write effective software for music.  
      The temporal logic within the in-time perspective that Marsden uses particularly 
works with the operators S (Since) and U (Until). 
S (A,B)=def t(( t  now)  A(t)  s(( t  s  now)  B(s))) 
B has been true Since A 
U (A,B)=def t(( t  now)  A(t)  s(( t  s  now)  B(s))) 
B will be true Until A 
      Marsden opens to the reader a paradigmatic triangle-player problem, which is a 
matter (very familiar to musicians) of coordina Note x must be played at the same 
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time as note y, using the timing information conveyed by the preceding notes a, b, c, 
407 
 
Figure 2 
A simple formula could help to describe the situation: 
P(P(PA  B)  C) 
      However, the requirements a mathematical formalism has to fulfil to describe such a 
situation are of the following type: 
- Intervals must be specified and must be of an equal nature and of certain range 
- The formula must avoid intromissions between notes such as silences, notes, same 
notes doubled. 
- The formalism has to avoid other notes in addition to a, b, c. 
      Marsden describes levels of logical requirement for musical timing according to 
three types of schemes: one for discrete time, one for dense time, and one using the 
ontology of time periods. These three levels are in correspondence with three levels of 
focus: the level of the design of automata imposing some quantization of time, the 
higher-level implementation of automata with different actual quantizations of time, and 
the last one, appropriate for describing human cognition on timing. Complexity in 
formulae decreases from the lowest to the highest levels of focus, while the 
implementation mechanism is assumed to do the opposite (mechanisms tend to be more 
complex, e.g. think about that describing human cognition).  
      To conclude, Marsden comments on the importance of meter and timing for music 
in general:  
It is possible for timing in ensemble performance to be determined by other means. In 
for each other to complete one segment before they start another. However, I do not know of any 
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case where two musicians are required to cause sounds to happen at the same time without using a 
metre to facilitate co-ordination.408 
      Timing certainly has a philosophical counterpart in studies which have emphasised 
the relation between mood and interpretation; also in personal, characteristic timings; 
finally, in the much more general sense of performance as a medium of self-
construction. Although the formal design or philosophical related discussions about 
timing are a core for investigations on time in music, not much is explored for the rest 
of this thesis.409 
      
technical view is not pursued. This thesis is committed to inscribe into a philosophico-
logical view, to offer a rational account but ultimately pinpointing an aesthetic realm. 
Marsden focuses on temporal logic for formalising the representations of musical time 
available to the computer engineering field, for a possible comparison of their 
advantages as well as, in this last article, for exploring the formalisation of timing in 
music. This thesis emphasises on ontological questions concerning musical time, to 
enlighten ultimately the topic of musical signification in the form of conceptual ideas 
coming out of the internal structure of the pieces. 
 
4.3.2. Temporal Logic Applied to Music with a Philosophical 
Perspective 
This section is, on the one hand, connected to the preceding one in that logical tools 
continue to provide the frame for research on music. On the other, it presents its own 
position concerning music, time, and logic. It intersects also with the ideas expressed in 
4.2 on musical logic, extending them. Here, an idea of musical logic is devised via 
concepts inspired by temporal logic. Up to this point, while the first approach of music-
as-logic (4.1) was unconvincing because of its metaphorical sense, the one developed in 
4.3.1., is not convincing since it omits the treatment of the idea of the logic of time in 
music as key for providing an answer to the problem of musical signification.  
      Section 4.3.1. searches for a logic of time in music that could be technically 
manipulated. A great deal is obtained from this perspective: accuracy in representations 
of musical time. This last enterprise, undertaken by Marsden, does not suffice alone in 
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order to underline the primary meaning of music as temporal art, i.e. as teaching us 
something about time in the sense Marvin Minsky thought, and it is here conceived by 
adding some extra thoughts: that it teaches us about inner time and general time, which 
is the key concept of philosophies of existence and of nature.410 The profound 
repercussion of music in our lives could be related to this primary signification.  
      In contrast to the phenomenological approach, the logical treatment of musical time 
is supported and recognised as a basic level of representation. This treatment acquires at 
a more conceptual level other necessary definitions and extra supportive work. That is, 
the reading of the main axioms of temporal logic according to a musical, rather than to a 
purely logical, perspective. This means, when speaking about linearity, that not only 
 the music, but a sort 
expected moment to its resolution. Modifications 
also occur in the cases of circular and branching times. In music, except in extreme 
cases of minimalism, each iteration of circular repetition is not identical, not the same, 
but similar
single line of actions. 
      It has been noticed that musical time as perceived can have different meanings: it 
can refer to the listening process in general (as Kunst studied and is presented 
immediately below), or it can be shown as suggesting listening strategies according to 
the different temporal modes, the shapes of time in music specifically. These topics 
have been developed either from the phenomenological and psychological sides or from 
a formal perspective. Regarding the first formal approximatio
formalization of time as perceived in listening via the use of temporal logic.411 From 
these works, only Kunst related his search to the topic of musical signification, in the 
sense of the epigraph transcribed at the beginning of this thesis. At this stage, this thesis 
attempts to develop an interpretation 
s useful for, as uncovering modes 
of time, the time in which we inhabit and think about having different possible 
organisation and nature. 
      There are few works on this aspect of musical time in both groups, logicians and 
phenomenologists, as judging from the following quotations: 
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How should the phenomenological description of time in music proceed should such description 
be formalized or should it be left free? Although many of these issues will certainly not be 
resolved in the immediate future, the work that has already been done by theorists has opened up a 
rich source of questions and possibilities which will hopefully stimulate and enrich the field of 
music theory for many years to come.412 
      In turn, Marsden writes: 
A formal treatment of musical time as experienced is the most important area not covered in this 
-
-of- rent 
logical mechanisms, such as the indexical and modal logics [...], would be required for such an 
enterprise, and some formal work along these lines exists already (see, for example, Kunst, 1978, 
and Leman, 1985). For the present, however, it must remain the topic of a different study.413 
      The hybrid goal of this thesis is developed in the basis for a formalization of the 
phenomenological described temporal modalities not the formalization of the listening 
of music (Kunst) or its timing (Marsden). The goal is to arrive at a sort of scheme of 
time in the music analogous to, for example, what Schenkerian theory achieved for 
tonal music, i.e. to exhibit the bones of the musical structure in time as a basic 
grasped not only as a byproduct of the tonal-harmonical linear structure but also of the 
cyclical or branching ones, expanding the traditional notion of musical logic, as 
developed in 4.2.  
      One objection could immediately appear and it is certainly not a minor one. This 
thesis includes the topic of musical time inside the chapter on ontology of music. Now, 
it includes the logic of time in the chapter on musical logic. All this, without clarifying 
important assumptions. Musical time is conceived here as having logical, cognitive, and 
aesthetic value. It is assumed, then, that there is no possible division of these aspects in 
Marsden, the logical value is emphasised and therefore, music and time are explicitly 
dissociated, for time is a supra-order, applicable to domains other than music as well. 
Marsden thus separates himself from Kramer and phenomenologists who tended to blur 
this division, resulting finally in the equation of time and music. In  case, a 
similar objection could apply: without a division results in conceiving the logic of time 
in music as a musical logic itself. We are not implying that music operates with 
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formalised times. But we still want to emphasise the idea that music shows this in a 
peculiar manner. 
      On the cognitive value of musical time, Minsky arrives at the conclusion that music 
teaches us about time, and this opinion will be supported here with the above mentioned 
addenda. Concerning the aesthetic value of musical time, phenomenologists have 
implied it in several applied studies on how different historical periods, different 
composers, and different works have had Time as motto to inspire their creations; an 
election which has been accelerated and commented on more emphatically during the 
last century. This condition does not exclude the idea that time is at the basis of all 
music and that can be found intrinsically in the music itself. 
      y exemplifies a case in which temporal logic applies to a kind of 
reflection about music. By the way, Marsden himself leaves open the door for ulterior 
treatments mentioning other important ways of using temporal logic means in music 
analysis, remember the 414 which 
constitutes, at the same time and slightly modified, the goal of this study. This brief 
sentence will be adopted here, as interpreting the syncretism of the present project 
concerning existing studies on musical time: phenomenological and logical 
developments are linked under the same proposal.  
 
 
1996) dissertation Making Sense in Music (1978) is considered 
among the main antecedents for this inquiry. His rational approach to musicology and 
his aim of integrating his investigations into a more general philosophical framework 
are the first basic similarity. The difference however, is that he neither intendeds to 
provide any philosophical interpretation of temporal conceptions hidden in musical 
works or link the formalisation of the listening process to any concrete idea of time, nor 
to enter into the topic of musical time in the philosophy of arts or musicology itself. 
 
The Trichotomy of Signs Extended to Percepts and a General Sense of Pragmatics 
To arrive at his primary aim of describing a formal pragmatics for art in general and 
i.e. of musical understanding and 
meaning, that is a formal pragmatics for music itself), he deals firstly with important 
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issues that this thesis already visited under the chapter of philosophy of musical 
incoming data which is sufficiently structured to admit of the discrimination: it can, or it 
cannot, be matched with some conceptual st 415 Percepts are interpreted under an 
extended, in the sense of a more general, including the non-verbal field, i.e. surpassing 
 notion of the Morrisian trichotomy of signs (syntax-semantics-pragmatics). 
Thus, a percept would have syntactical, semantic, and pragmatical interpretation as in 
the following example:  
The sound of rain outside can be heard and recognized as such by me: it is then found well-formed 
and interpreted semanticly [...]. It also admits of a pragmatical description: a description of the 
change effected by it. In such a description may then loom large such questions as whether I 
brought my umbrella with me or not: in one case I may still feel free to go as I please, in the other 
I may know myself to be marooned where I am until the rain stops, that is.416 
      Kunst uses a more general notion of pragmatical meaning, interpreting Richard 
(1930 1971) definition as severely restricted even for language, and 
T he most general approach would be, I take it, to 
require that a pragmatical theory describe, for each sentence/utterance, the change 
417 
h conditions for sentences containing indexical expressions: it is a 
semantics incorporating special context-
theorists of literature [...] hey seem 
to presuppose the existence of systematic relations between utterances and contexts to which they 
governed by (more or less general) conventions, we would not recommend the general use of such 
a concept of pragmatics, not even for the whole written verbal language.418 
      Kunst rejects, under this particular pragmatical approach, any syntactical or 
semantic approach to musical meaning altogether. The question of correctness and that 
of the native speaker competence present serious difficulties of being described in music 
1983, would seem to predict their results as stated in the final chapter of their work). No 
semantic meaning could be grasped with certainty either, unless one could speak in 
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verbal terms about the meaning of the non-verbal. (These matters were already 
discussed in Ch. 3). 
     At this stage, Kunst quotes ideas by Meyer as one important antecedent, for having 
n order to know what a 
given musical object means I have to know the past of the given music, its 
in it, and I must continue on to extrapolate 
419 Meyer had said: 
W hat a musical stimulus or a series of stimuli indicate and point to are not extramusical concepts 
and objects but other musical events which are about to happen. That is, one musical event (be it a 
tone, a phrase, or a whole section) has meaning because it points to and makes us expect another 
musical event.420 
      The present thesis adopts the pragmatical point of view for reasons developed in 
Chapter 3; a purely syntactist vision or the question of universals in musical grammar 
and that of a musical vocabulary, implied by a semantist vision, are putting aside and 
the culturally conditioned signs in time are emphasised in this study coinciding with 
pragmatist thesis. 
 
 
semantic, and pragmatics to cover the realm of percepts and of sounds especifically) he 
introduces Jaakko Hintikka (b. 1929) logic of perception, interpreting it as being in a 
insight on the logic of perception however, Kunst finds a more precise difference 
between natural perception, based on our knowledge of natural laws, and musical, 
-
Modal logic that works with the operators of necessity and possibility is 
reinterpreted and given the case of music, evaluated with the help of tense logics. The 
applied now to the music domain. 
      This apparatus not only yields Kunst a revelation of the structure of listening but 
ultimately it also unveils the structure of art, providing a formal explanation of our 
experience with art 
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contexts based on convention-determined law-likeness, and hence generally in practical 
semiotic research. 421 The method, again, generally aims to provide a pragmatical 
percept. 422  
      According to Kunst, musical semioticians until then were more interested in 
describing musical objects, e.g. pieces; he is interested instead in musical activities: 
Then  it  is  the  listening  process  that  seems  somehow  to  be  the  basic  one,  and  thus  the  one  that  
would serve best as a primitive. Composing would be defined as designing the listening situation, 
and playing as providing some specifiable physical necessary conditions of the listening situation. 
If all this holds water, it is perception that we must choose as our starting-point.423 
      Hintikka offered these specialized branches of logics (the logic of perception) as 
realities of our ordinary use of, e.g. perceptual words, and in terms of which these 
complexities can be accounted for. 424 
      the same applies to belief, 
knowledge, etc. , is taken as a propositional attitude of a subject, as expressed by a 
- 425 This perception involves modal notions or the consideration of more 
A perceives that p
of affairs compatible with what a perceives it is the case that a A does not 
perceive that p sible state of affairs compatible with what a 
perceives in which not-p 
special cases of modality statements.  
      Kunst had previously used, in a free manner in his exposition about syntax, 
G iven the 
wor ... , his semantic processing of a percept specifies those possible worlds which 
are compatible 426 
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could imply strange (unrecognisable) noises, while for an adult these sounds are 
 
      Hintikka himself shows the case of disclaiming a perception to clarify how 
perception involves modality. In this case, both seeing not-p and seeing p are perfectly 
possible. Thus, two possible worlds enter into consideration. According to Hintikka, 
ical) information is closely tied to that of a possible world: to 
specify an information content is to specify a set of possible worlds. 427 This  fact  
influences Kunst in his defence of perception as having a cognitive function. For that a 
perceives more than b 
he perceives is smaller than the class of possible worlds compatible with what b 
perceives. 428 In the previous example, this class is smaller since it goes from noises to 
raindrops, specifically. 
      
relations obtaining between them, in order to display the real strength and fruitfulness of 
429 He does this using tense logic as the most adjusted modal-
equivalent logic for dealing with what music perception requires: not just objects (as it 
would be for seeing) but actions and events, which are the essence of hearing: 
processes. The clauses a) and b) above will be explained through the use of temporal 
logic. 
 
 
Generally speaking, non-
by K
language, notion of well-formedness and his proposal of two-kinds of concept learning.  
      Following his purpose of defending a cognitive status for perception, Kunst 
i b. 1935
see something is to find a use for the concept I have of it, and, if (as we do) we take a 
concept to be any recognitional capacity, to recognize 430 Perception is interpreted as 
. 431 R eading the 
environment, ...  is to be thought of ...  as a continuous activity of matching incoming 
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data with the internalized model of the external sorroundings: as is proper a 
432 A percept well-formedness then will depend on the 
 of its match with some conceptual structure.  
      Kunst asks what happened however, if confronted with ill-formed percepts and we 
reacted by adapting our internal model, consequently provoking the well-formedness of 
organism has adapted itself better to the environment, and many people will be inclined 
to say that it has learned 433 
this fact will show two kinds of concept learning. This, having in minds the important 
goal of defining the peculiarities of art perception against those of normal perception, or 
of natural laws vs. artistic law-likeness. 
      Concept learning does not always mean unlearning-plus-learning process. Kunst 
set of people I am acquainted with; the set of objects of which I know what they look 
like; the set of sounds of which I know what produces them, etc., etc., [...] 434 they are 
all part of concept learning which nevertheless does not imply an unlearning-plus-
ation UNLL). Consequently, he proposes 
these two kinds of concept learning: one that implies UNLL and one that does not. This 
last roundabout anticipates the topic of the cognitive value of art, as expressed by the 
key concept of UNLL and defines in his terms what art is from what it is not. 
      Poetry offers a paradigmatic example for UNLL processes as described by Kunst. 
many ways) yielding to new meanings, and finally, the effect obtained by pairing 
sound-forms, creating thus a similarity in their semantic field, are instances of UNLL.  
This implies the breaking of conceptual habi
-
435  
      The understanding of poetical texts requires at least two conditions: 1. the 
background produced by the culture the text at issue belongs to, in as far as it draws 
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upon it 436 -
437  
      Condition 1. is explained by the fact that music includes much more than what a 
instrument and a way of playing it, enjoying the (imaginary) muscular exertion and 
pleasure involved, all these things do not necessarily involve intra-musical concepts, 
438 Sound 
comprehension equals to the first level of soundscape.  
      Kunst exercises two different explanations of natural vs. conventional laws in 
-and-such description in such a way that the 
set of possible worlds compatible with what I perceive ...  all exhibit the causally 
439 On hearing a musical 
precedent(s) that make it law- 440 This, it will be seen, happens at both the macro 
and the micro perspective, i.e. at the level of including the work in a tradition and in a 
listening perspective of a single work. 
 
The Logic of Time for Representing Listening Situations 
Kunst continues here by describing the requirements of any mathematical formalism for 
the representation of elementary musical listening situations. In principle, there are two 
levels of understanding whenever one faces a piece of music: the understanding of the 
musical material and the understanding of the relations between two consecutive 
441 
      For that purpose, Kunst notices that the propositional calculus (PC) would be too 
strong a tool. PC is unable to admit conflicting hypotheses: 
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match 
all incoming data with (at least) two mutually exclusive hypotheses, which are thus both 
maintained for a certain time. (Ours is not essentially a one-track mind).442 
      The necessity of a logic that would admit more than one path in the same framework 
is linked to the interpretation of music as having law-
behavior is law- 443 There is still a problem 
for Kunst here: the question that in any listening-process, a potentially variable or 
subjective assessment of the law-
being acquainted with sonata form, for example, would be surprised and would have to 
-like. 
      Modal logic finds in listening a candidate for formalising, it works with the notions 
of the necessary and the possible, and from it stems the possible worlds' semantics. A 
greater number of notions come from it, as perception in this case, giving rise to 
intensional logics.444 A way of making precise qualifications in modality statements 
describes relations between possible worlds: the R-
the most common: world w1 has access to world w2 if w2 is possible with respect to w1. 
      Priorean tense logic is structurally similar to modal logic. Simply, the possible 
worlds in tense logic will refer to or represent moments linearly arranged in the time-
line(s). In tense logic, the R-relation equals to before after. Thus, branching time, 
relativistic time, non-ending/non-beginning time, converging time, circular time, 
dense/discrete time, etc. will be captured by suitable conditions on R. However, Kunst 
seems to use a very specific tool from this tense logic and will not deal with possible 
conceptual ideas arising from these different arrangements of time as it is developed in 
this thesis. He will re-interpret the Diodorean modalities (introduced below) as 
previously translated into temporal notions and thus select only this for the 
representation of listening situations in which unexpected moments in music will be 
formalised as typical UNLL processes.  
      There is a contact between modal and tense logic in the so-called Diodorean 
modalities: 
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Necessarily A=both now A and always in the future A (or, in current tense 
= conjunction and G= always is Going to 
be) 
Possibly A=either now A or at some time in the future A, or both (in tense logic 
= disjunction and F= in the Future) 
      Kunst operates a simple transformation of the Diodorean modalities by turning 
 
represented time-lines, possible courses of events. As Kunst reformulates them, 
Diodorean  modalities to be applied to music listening, are defined in the following 
terms: 
A=the music has now behavior A and has always had it in the (its) past ( A is 
a musical law now obtaining). Where =operator for necessity 
A=either the music has now behavior A, or had it at some moment(s) in the 
(its) past, or both (A is not forbidden by any musical law now obtaining; no 
law A (or, alternatively, A) can be asserted). Where =operator for 
possibility and = negation. 
      This is for a model-theoretic way of describing. Concerning the axiomatics, Kunst 
imposes the following plausible conditions to models of musical listening: 
1. The reflexivity of the relation R: 
W -  it will 
interfere, at that moment or point of musical space-
-time a law is asserted, there cannot be, at 
that point no more than at any other point accessible from it, any behaviour that goes against the law 
445 
2. The transitivity of the relation R 
i of musical space-time I have access to some points that constitute its past, 
then, at all points in wi future, not only wi, but also its past remains accessible to me. Consequently, if at 
any given moment we have p, then at all moments in the future of that moment we will have (at least) 
446  
3. The assumption of special cases, in the form of so- -
of music, there will be a certain number that have a purely ad hoc character, viz. the laws that govern 
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those aspects of the piece that guarantee its recognizability, its uniqueness. ome aspects of any 
447 
he absolute arbitrariness of all things true in n.n. worlds is taken by us, in our interpretation 
of them, to be one of the main features determining their usefulness in our models. They reflect the 
newness of new musical behaviour, by showing on the one hand its initial lawlessness with respect 
to musical laws, and by permitting on the other hand suitable new musical laws to be worked out 
later, and in retrospect. 
s reflecting the conventional character inherent in the framework of musical thinking. 
Indeed, we may, in the Diodorean  perspective, fi -like by 
reference to some earlier music; this earlier music may again be law-like in the same way and so 
on; but this process cannot go on indefinitely .448 
      This fact is expressed by: p= of any musical law it is true that it did not always 
obtain.  
This squares beautifully with our intuitions about conventions, for it says that all law-like 
situations are preceded by some situation(s) characterized by arbitrary decisions: p was true in 
them, but not because any law p, which did not obtain.449 
 
 
 
 
evolve as large networks rep
diagrams have for their construction the following rules: 
A. The direction of the past will be toward the top, that of the future toward the bottom. 
B. Worlds, or points in musical space-time, will be represented by rectangles, and labelled 
according to the vertical columns and horizontal ranks in which they occur, by superscripts 
and subscripts respectively. Thus, w127 will be the world situated at the intersection of column 
12 and rank 7. 
C. Formulas in a rectangle will state truths-in-that-world. 
                                                 
447 1, 1.2.3. 
448 Id. 
449 Id. 
Ideas of Time in Music 
 
 
 
167 
D. The relation R is pictured by arrows, in such a way that an arrow pointing from w j to  wi 
indicates that wj has  access  to  wi. In view of rule A it is clear that, given our Diodorean  
interpretation, all arrows will point upwards. 
E. Reflexivity and transitivity of the relation R will remain implicit throughout. 
F. Non-normal worlds will be  represented by double-lined rectangles.450 
      
451 
      A list of symbols that appear in formulas in the diagrams plus propositional letters 
or variables p and q: 
      Apart from operators of Necessity and Possibility already introduced, and symbols 
of 
 
 
r both 
Also, 
 
 
 
 
            Brackets: ()       
             
      
452 
      Thus, 
-  
- -  
                                                 
450 Id. 
451 2, 2.5.1. 
452 3, 3.1.2 
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-p-and- -  
-ness implies q- 453  
      The two-place function (Figure 3) is exemplified by a simple example: let us 
suppose you hear low tones below middle c followed by a higher tone played by a 
context (of notes below middle c) in which it is heard. At a first moment of the music 
one listens at p q is 
moment in which one hears only low tones to that when the lowest pitch of the piccolo 
appears, but outside the usual register within the context, is represented by the 
-
w that in one moment was current has changed in 
another (after having been broken). However, it is not only that first we had one value 
and then another.  
Although the semiotic unit concerned had one of its values before, and, in principle, only the other 
after the UNLL process, it cannot be properly understood without taking into account the exact 
way in which two perspectives, two contexts, for a moment intersected on it.454  
      In the case of the examples reproduced here, the moments of intersection would be, 
for the case of the two-place BivF, when the low tones in the piccolo are discovered as 
paradoxically higher than the others in the context. In a three-place BivF as will be 
shown next, the intersection moment is in the passing through the pivot note/chord to a 
second tonality. 
      What is involved in this kind of change is the following axiom455:  
   p  ¬   p    p 
 
                                                 
453 Id. 
454 2, 2.5.1.  
455 2, 2.0.1. 
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Figure 3456 
      The three-place function (Figure 4) is rather complicated but involves very 
interesting cases. The three-place function describes situations free from the assumption 
that the first laws attained in the listening situation457 are going to be held for long (thus, 
provoking the symmetry of power between right and left columns in the diagram). The 
example of modulation for this three-place function is the most familiar one described 
by Kunst. Here one should read a=we have tonality (key) T; b=we have some 
specifiable succession of notes 
U. 
 
                                                 
456 2, 2.0.2. 
457  
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Figure 4458 
      minimal buildingblocks for labyrinths 459 This 
function serves for explaining not only musical processes but also poetical, pictural, etc. 
goes on and applies this minimal model to large pieces of music, aiming to develop a 
meta-language for comparison and hypothesis of larger understanding. 
      
...  the  basis  for  a  
460 However, 
his work as a whole is mostly contributing to aesthetics. So, in this sense its discussion 
is situated at this point in the chapter.  
...F inally, Kunst  returns to the broader issue of art in general. It endeavours to narrow down 
the interpretation of the Bivalence Function in such a way as to make it a suitable definiens of art-
as-we-perceive- rception logic, combined 
                                                 
458 2, 2.3.2. 
459 2, 2.5.1. 
460 Preface.   
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actually suffice to give an interesting definition of art in that sense.461 
      The UNLL process as described by Kunst certainly approaches in a very elegant 
way the listening process of musics which are governed by a linear time conception. An 
example of this is the aut .7 (les Sylphides).462 Figs. 5a 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5a463 
 
                                                 
461 Preface. 
462  
463 3.2.3. 
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Figure 5b 
 
a...belonging to the melody 
b...motionless (as for pitch) 
d...belonging to the first half of each statement:464 quarter note/eight 
note/sixteenth note with dot/quarter note  
 
      Translations of some of the logical formulas in the graphic to facilitate the 
reading:465 
Figure 5a: 
 
b  
 
d  ( b  
   
 
                                                 
464 
alluded in the BivF designed.  
465 Ibid., pp. 4 5, (12). 
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Figure 5b: 
b  
 
(b  d)  (a  (b  
outside the melody, and by motion out  
a  ( b  
466 
      In this example Kunst shows the change of meaning of the concept of melody: first 
it includes all the music to be 
as belonging to it. Also it shows a change in the concept of motionlessness: from a 
quasi-
concept as non-melodic, to 
(weak) motionlessness iff, in a chain of two successive attacks occurring within a 
467  
      Figure 5a evolves from the fact 1) that there is melody, which is opposite to statism 
and that this law is applied to the first part of each statement according to the score, to 
the fact 2) that not always that there is movement there is melody and only sometimes 
there can be movement and melody. 
      Figure 5b evolves on the other hand from the fact 1) that there is melodic movement 
if we are in the first part of the statement. Also, if there would be no melodic movement 
(weak movement), it would be out of the melody and part of the first statement. With 
this, we arrive at 2) this weak movement belongs to the melody. 
      In consequence, the diagram exhibited shows listening as evolving from naive 
accounts of the piece (= melody as belonging to half part of the statements only), to 
more sophisticated ways of listening (to include motionless as weak motionless having 
melodical value).  
                                                 
466 Chopin, op. 28, nr 7, Note 2. 
467 3.2.6. 
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4.3.2.2. A Philosophico-Logical Approach for the Temporal Signification of Music 
Kunst arrives at the question of musical signification via modal logics; in Chapter 5 the 
question of musical signification is tackled via hybridization between logical 
developments and phenomenological descriptions of musical time. 
      
context of this thesis, to the linear logic of musical time. However, how could BivF 
explain listening situations in which an evocation of permanence is pursued as an 
hand, what happens with music evoking many musical times as if many worlds would 
proliferate simultaneously? Maybe to satisfy the definition of music firstly and 
following Kunst, that they have to be described by a BivF. So there can be a sense in 
which BivF also applies for this music. However, concerning the temporal signification 
of those works, this logical description seems insufficient. While Kunst elaborates his 
diagrams for conceptualising the listening, here the conceptualisation is applied to 
temporal ideas behind the work. 
      This section presents a hierarchy of temporal levels of organisation in musical 
works. It elaborates, on the one hand, the idea of classifying music as linear, circular, or 
branching (with the corresponding subdivisions developed in Ch. 5) and on the other, it 
appears as a more comprehensive picture on musical time. 
      
in Philosophy in a New Key, followed by her idea of music as the image of our temporal 
essence in Feeling and Form, Langer moved from the particular symbolic nature of 
logy of music with inner life. 
According to Enrico Fubini,468 the result is that her primary goal of defining the rules of 
the artistic symbolism in music, particularly to rescue music from that ineffable sphere, 
of measuring it by the reputation acquired by discursive language, is abandoned in 
favour of an intuitivist view in 1953. She ended believing that the form and significance 
of music were ultimately intuited. Although this is not totally objectionable, what might 
be so is to apply an intuitivist philosophy to reasoning about. 
      This final intuitivism should be 
F&F, already in a more extended 
version, i.e. music is conceived here not only as a semblant of inner time but other 
times, and at the same time answered to what she had stated in PNK? This logic of time 
                                                 
468 Fubini,1990, pp. 358 364. 
Ideas of Time in Music 
 
 
 
175 
in music could not only represent time (as temporal logic serving computational 
purposes showed amply) but instead clarify for us how music symbolises time as its 
aesthetic goal.  
      PNK
469 The mapping between the symbol and the object is effected by 
if as stated, music symbolises time, temporal logic rules could be the rules of projection 
that make the symbol (music) be the symbol of that object (time). If symbol and object 
ules 
as representing music) then each would be symbol of each other. Symbols have to lack 
something from objects to be so; music cannot be described only from a strict 
comparison with ordinary time if it is conceived as an aesthetic object. To apply 
temporal logic tools to music, these rules first have to be slightly modified or 
translated.470 
      The hybrid hypothesis defends a balancing view between phenomenological and 
ontological trends, to answer questions about musical time. This view recognises 
ontological representations are possible and valid (contrary to what philosophers like 
Bergson and Langer thought) but limited to technical purposes. Phenomenological 
analyses are valid when the goal is the explanation of the aesthetic side but end in a sort 
of intuitivism. The strict application of temporal logic to the domain of music explains 
the mathematical organisation of its disposition in time and allows for calculations on 
music. However, it offers no reflection on the aesthetic intention or the symbolic aspect 
of musical time, either as cultural or ideological content of the music.  
      
mentioned the possibility of applying logic in a strict way, and leaving the wrong idea 
that music could be interpreted straightforwardly as having the logic of discursive 
tradition of musicological studies as defined in 4.2. This tradition searched continuously 
for an idea of logic that was exclusive to the music domain. 
      Still Langer reflects:  
M usic presents reality no more directly than philosophical discourse, but it presents a sentient 
and emotional reality more adequately in a non-discoursive image globalement, as the French 
would say. With this tool it does exactly what he Bergson  demanded of la vraie métaphysique, 
                                                 
469 Langer, 1942, p. 228. 
470 See Budd, Malcolm, Music and Emotions: the philosophical theories, 1985, pp. 106 107. 
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cake and having it too; and for this reason art is neither philosophy nor a substitute for philosophy, 
but is itself an epistemological datum about which we can philosophize.471 
      
 than discursive language, which is objectionable. To be precise, if 
discursive language pretends to get a convincing picture of music it can obtain it by 
applying the logical developments available to temporal logic since 1960, with some 
necessary modifications. These explanations do not replace music (they do not pretend 
to!) and treat music as the epistemological datum Langer refers to. The consequences of 
would be indistinguishable from music, something that surprisingly Langer wants to 
avoid at the end of quotation, but she does not seem to attain through her theory.  
      It is possible to object to the idea of deriving signification exclusively from time 
ideas. For standard listeners it is more common to associate meaning to emotions than 
to time ideas, as philosophy of music nowadays would agree. The link between ideas of 
forms of lived time with the help of the theory of the UST (Temporal Semiotic Units).472 
Otherwise, with no connection between time patterns and emotive life we would be 
473 as explanation of musical 
meaning, now simply as ideas about time. And at this point it must be said that 
Formalism failed in some sense at reproducing the immediate repercussion of music in 
humans, that beauty is explained in terms of form is only part of the explanation for that 
frequent human commerce with listening to music, something recovered by Enhanced 
Formalism in the spirit of Langer and others.  
      The theory of Temporal Semiotic Units temporally expresses that music reproduces 
release, excitation, sudden 
-
rpreted as possible 
varieties within the more generic classification of musical temporal modes as linear, 
circular, and branching, as they appear just as very general temporal patterns.  
 
                                                 
471 Langer, 1953, p. 118. 
472 MIM Laboratoire Musique Informatique de Marseille, Les Unités Sémiotiques Temporelles: nouvelles 
  Introduction, CD-ROM, MIM (coll. INA/GRM), Marseille, 
2002. 
473Hanslick, 1986, Ch. III.   
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Figure 6  
       
TIME OF MUSIC 
general properties  
 
Ontological Priority 
Integral  
Ambivalent 
Multileveled 
SHAPES 
classification  
 
 Linear: Progressive/ Teleological/ Total 
 Circular: Strict/ Broad/ Particularist 
 Branching: Potential/Actual 
TECHNICAL ELEMENTS 
mechanisms  
 
 Rhythm, Meter, Tempo 
 Melody 
 Harmony 
[signification] 
 : 
Rules of Projection inspired in Temporal Logic 
-background level- 
UST 
-middleground level- 
Dynamics of Feelings: 
-foreground level- 
Adapted from: Epstein, David, Shaping Time, Music, the Brain, and Performance, Schirmer Books, New York, 1995, p. 11. The crucial 
c theory, i.e. 
rhythm, meter and tempo, which here appear as part of the integral whole. 
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      A division is proposed in the following hierarchical levels. It shows the relationship 
between dynamics of feeling, semiotic units and ideas of time as levels of musical 
signification (see Figure 6): 
- Dynamics of feeling (motion/rest, agitation, sudden change, etc.) in the 
 
 
- 
 
al 
conceptions, as they were developed in philosophy of nature and existence and 
ultimately, suggest music's primary signification.  
      This hierarchy would serve to show different levels of complexity according to if 
ominant temporal modes from minimal details of a 
work to larger levels, but admitting also the surface of affective and perceptive layers.474 
The idea of a musical temporal logic, again, is not implying that music is logic (strictly 
speaking), not an application of temporal logic or formalisation of music, but a 
philosophico-logical reflection on the idea of musical logic as developed in musicology, 
which historically was thought as thematic or harmonic logic, as the logic proper for 
tonal absolute music. Musical temporal logic expands the description to other types of 
temporalities other than from the one created by tonal music (linear time) and tries to 
open the idea of temporal organisation to other music. Finally, it brings to the musical 
domain an exchange with the logical domain in the same spirit that François thinks 
about the fruitful commerce (but not the vassalage) of contemporary music with the 
logic of 20th century. 
      The philosophy of music interprets time as one of the most revealing levels of 
musical signification. Problems that belong to music understood as expressive of 
emotions seem solved under the prism of time studies. Philip Alperson475 summarized 
those pr  or what is really appreciated when listening, its 
association with the form instead of with certain emotional content, and of 
                                                 
474 Cone, Edward T., Musical Form and Musical Performance Postlude: On Two Modes of 
Esthetic Perception  
Cone proposes, is agreeing with this hierarchization from immediate perceivable units to larger, more 
comprehensive ones. 
475 The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics, 2004. 
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the problem of how music itself could express specific emotions.  
      The problem of reconciliation is solved under the prism of time, since the temporal 
can be recognised more immediately as formally exhibited, or in coincidence with both 
the formal arrangement and certain dynamic of feelings. As for the causal problem (first 
antipode of the intelligibility problem), the listener unequivocally understands the 
music, at least at the middleground, the perceptive layer of temporality. For the 
representational problem, this thesis associates music with certain ideas of time; here 
interpretations may vary, but there is no problem in the nexus between music and time 
shapes, as in associating music with the emotions (that vary in much more degrees and 
are not ontological priority). For certain music, specific emotions (in opposition to the 
general dynamics of feelings) could appear but only further on be explained as iconic 
(imitating the gestures of our inner life) or by convention (historical associations).476 For 
this study, however, the general dynamics of emotions are a limit, as Langer thought 
them. 
      Langer expresses in some passage that we perceive time passing because of the 
movements implicit in our emotional life, those intellectual, physical, emotional 
tensions. It can be thought as the being other way around, that we experience these 
emotions because there is time. 
      Music, as a symbolic activity on its own, does not equal language or its logic. It 
neither is above them in terms of any special kind of metaphysical reach, as Idealism in 
music supposed. Music is just a tool for the sensuous communication of time concerns, 
different from other tools like logic or language. This does not mean that music cannot 
be analysed rationally. With the aid of logical approaches it is possible to arrive at an 
explanation of its aesthetic commitment. 
                                                 
476 This solution belongs to Peter Kivy, see Alperson P., 2004, pp. 267 268. 
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The so-called primitive considered the abandon of land 
an injury against the sun, against the Inca, and against 
their sons. 
Mistral477 
To compose, in my opinion, is to create an architecture, 
to formulate an order and set in values certain 
structures, considering the totality of its components. In 
music, this architecture unfolds in time [ ]. When time 
has passed, when the work has unfolded, a sense of 
inner perfection survives in the spirit. Only then can one 
say that the composer has succeeded in creating that 
architecture. 
Ginastera478 
5. Temporal Modes in Works of Alberto Ginastera 
 
 frequently considered an elusive concept that has multiple interpretations 
according to different perspectives. Inside philosophy, two main corpuses grew from 
subjective (human time or temporality) and realist (abstract, natural time) ways of 
looking at the topic. Introductory books on philosophical time gather similar views on 
time related to the question of understanding, i.e. the study of its series (earlier-later and 
past-present-future), content, order, and scope and views arising from experience, 
especially in phenomenology, that understand time from a holistic point of view and as 
a lived, purely existential, phenomenon. The greatest philosophers spoke from either 
one or the other perspective about the topic: Aristotle and Kant from a realist point of 
view; Augustine, Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger developed their thoughts on time 
from a subjective point of view. 
      In the musical domain, studies on musical time have also followed ontological and 
logical (realist) or phenomenological (also called conceptual) inquiries. 
Phenomenological approaches received more attention; time as experienced and what 
this meant in music received ample attention. 
      Within musicology, the technical or syntactical approach predominated over the 
more conceptual interpretations that appeared later under the name of musical time 
                                                 
477 ntra el Inca y 
contra sus hijos.  Algo sobre el pueblo quechua  Prosa de Gabriela Mistral, 1989. 
478 
Musique Information, Journal of the Jeunesses Musicales de Suisse, 1982. 
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studies. Studies on the temporal parameters of rhythm, meter, and tempo investigated 
the temporal engines of music; however, a broader conception of the time of music 
allowed the discovery that time was significant not only at the semiotic level of the 
signifier but also at that of the signified. This means, to associate music with cultural 
ideas of time that can be considered a clue for understanding its temporal meaning and 
not just its temporal structuring. Musicologists Carl Dahlhaus (1928 1989), Edward 
Lippman (1920 2010), Lewis Rowell (b. 1933), Raymond Monelle (1937 2010), 
Jonathan Kramer (1942 2004), and recently, Karol Berger (b. 1975), to mention a few, 
dealt with this broader view. They searched variously through the music of the 
Renaissance, Baroque, Classic, Romantic and Contemporary eras, focusing in the 
European and North American production of art music, excepting Rowell, who also 
extended his investigations to include non-Western music. 
      
here. This sense of unity for musical pieces is achieved by following linear, cyclical or, 
branching musical time logics that have origin in homologue philosophical ideas of 
time:  
The straight line and the circle, respectively, are the traditional geometrical representations of 
time. According to the linear conception time is progressive. Strictly speaking, nothing will stay as 
it was, everything will change. Even if a phenomenon appears to be stable, say, the whiteness of 
since that 
which does exist. According to the circular conception of time nothing is really new. Any event is 
a repetition of previous events, and will be repeated indefinitely in the future. These two 
geometrical images of time have been dominant within the philosophy of nature and other strands 
of systematic thinking from the antiquity and up to this century. However, during the last decades 
a number of intellectuals have suggested a new kind of time model. According to these models 
time is viewed as a branching system a tree-structure.479 
 
5.1. Music and Linear Time 
For Westerners, the idea that time develops upon a line is such a familiar concept that 
everyday routine can hardly put it under discussion; it is undoubtedly the first answer 
one could obtain after asking how time is structured. It is at more profound levels that 
we allow ourselves the impression that other times are governing us. 
                                                 
479 Øhrstrøm, 1995, p. 180. 
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      It was with Augustine that the defence of linearity in time was established, as one 
can find in the Confessions, X XI and The City of God, XI XII.480 Augustine condensed 
the temporal conception of the Hebrew world, opposed to that of the Greeks. The 
Hebrews conceived time as temporal perceptions or pulses, which were perceived 
internally as duration and temporality. The Greeks, as it will be recalled in the next 
section on cyclical time, conceived time as based on the movements of celestial bodies, 
with their cyclical and repetitive way, emphasising atemporality. 
       sition to that of time as 
measured by external objects. Time as thought of by Augustine is different from later 
contemporary interpretations of time as experienced (Husserl and Heidegger); it is 
deeply connected with the theological problem of eternity. Eternity is heterogeneous to 
infinite time in that it surpasses all times, it is transcendental to it. While eternity is 
synonym of plenitude for Augustine, infinitude is pure indefiniteness and present time, 
a mere moment, something to be snatched. The result is that in the context of his 
philosophy, time and eternity must be interpreted as immeasurable. 
       What is of interest here, from the point of view of the structure, is that the 
theological interpretation of time separated from antique views in that it had to mark a 
moment of creation as well as one of final judgement. In the context of religious 
thought, eternity-in-time could not be accepted. How could creation be possible? God 
created the world in eternity; world was created with time, and that is why it has an 
origin. Augustine also maintained the idea that no identical lapses of time could ever be 
possible. This means he thought about the irreversibility of time series. These aspects 
define linearity and work as opposite to a circular view of time. 
       For Christianity, history has a beginning, a development consisting of infinite 
possibilities from which men choose one determined path to follow in the election of 
their actions, and a final open eschatological end. Temporal logic could help at the 
moment of deciphering a certain conception of time in Augustine. In offering a clear 
range of ontologies of time, temporal logic facilitates discerning whether Augustine is 
speaking about linear or branching, finite or infinite time; a time whose individuals are 
considered points, intervals, or events, be it dense or discrete time. 
       Confessions,481 begins with the question: How can we 
construct time from temporal moments which seem to refuse this direction? The past no 
longer exists, the present exists in order to disappear, and the future does not exist yet. 
                                                 
480 A complete critical exposition found in Licentiate thesis, El problema del tiempo en la música, 2003. 
481 Confessions, XI, xiii xxviii. 
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482 Now, in this present of the mind is where the measurement of time takes place. 
      He then improves the solution of the first stage according to which the measure of 
time is operated from the present. Duration is measured not in a present-instant, that has 
no extension, but in accordance with a time interval. We measure the trace that the 
event leaves on the immediate memory and not the present itself.  
      Augustine mentions here the case of the first verse of a hymn comprising short and 
long syllables. To measure at all, one has to enlarge the past in conformity with the 
advance of the singing and reduce the future.483 He finally arrives to his overall concept 
484 And he gives precisely the example of a 
liturgical hymn.485  
      Augustine adds an extra reflection, that the future is fully written and that the 
experience of time consists in foreseeing it and in picking up the progress towards the 
past. However, predestination, which recalls the stoic fate according to which, the whole 
history is fixed and repeats from cycle to cycle, is in opposition to the Christian 
conception of time. The biblical God is not successively present in the universal 
movement of time, even when he knows everything in eternity. 
      This view of time could be connected also with the internal time of the interpreter 
over the notated, measured time provided by the score, i.e. the internal time that 
provokes those known fluctuations between performances. And specific to music 
er, as 
well as with expressive resources such as rubato.  
      Considering methodological approaches for inquiring into musical time, 
phenomenological musical time is concerned with this distension in respect to our 
486 (the inclusion of future into the present) deepens the Augustinian vision 
of time.  
       Secondly, having defined the other method of investigating musical time, the 
-time 
investigating musical time. This is in the sense that they will try to place attention on 
                                                 
482 Ibid., xx. 
483 Ibid., xxvii. 
484 Ibid., xxviii.  
485 Id. 
486 The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 1928, Sec. 2. 
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formalising time as inhabited by the user of that time, the time as it is internally 
perceived.  
      Karol Berger487 recalls Augustinian thoughts on time but supports an apparently 
philosophy as having impact on early music up to the appearance of the, precisely, 
linear time-inspired music which came later on. The present thesis, which departs from 
Augustine as the onset of a linear conception of time, although recognising the 
importance of the basal idea of Christian eternity in his thoughts, considers his 
philosophy as the departure for the configuration of an image of time that straightened 
the circle of the antique philosophers into an arrow that would reach its historical 
climax in modernity, around late 17th century. 
      A concept that also deserves attention when speaking about linear time and music is 
clock time. Raymond Monelle, in his essay on musical temporality, described its 
cycl 488 
      A basal constructivist (mathematical) definition for a clock is illustrative here:489 For 
a clock to be possible you must have three conditions solved: 1) The existence of a 
pulse generator. 2) Given a class of pulse generators, whenever I put two generators, 
they must remain isochronous. 3) The isochrony must be kept for any possible phase 
delay. When these three conditions are obtained, we say that we have a clock. However, 
for the constructivist, this is impossible to verify in experience because one cannot 
consume an infinite time. In consequence, one only knows what a clock is for the sole 
reason of having the rules for its construction. 
        time. Although the shape 
or structure of time as conceived by Aristotle is going to be treated in the next section of 
this chapter, i.e. circular time, I will address here some ideas about his conception of an 
ective in the sense that it is measured by an 
external generator (in opposition to an internal one, as it was for Augustine). For him, it 
is the movement of heavenly bodies and the First Unmoved Mover that works as a 
pattern for the rest of the movements.490 The circular movement of the sky is to be 
reproduced by the clock, for it to generate a pattern of measuring, through which 
identical times could be compared. 
                                                 
487 Berger, 2007, p. 165 67. 
488 Monelle, 2000, p. 93. 
489 Janich, Peter, Protophysics of Time: Constructive Foundation and History of Time Measurement, 
1985, p. 152. Also Lorenzen, Paul, Constructive Philosophy, 1987, pp. 195 197. 
490 Metaphysics, XII. 
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       In contemporary views stemming from interdisciplinary research on time, Fraser 
defined cl
unchanging laws. Clocks are, therefore, simplified images of our views of change and 
491 According to Fraser, there a
cosmological, astronomical, gravitational, atomic clocks, thermo dynamical, biological, 
and psychological. Also there are time- -term 
 
      Edward Hall, when tracing a European anthropology, describes Europeans as 
492 Jacques Le Goff investigated the cultural change when clock time was 
incorporated alongside lived and sacred times, i.e., the passing from sacred time to 
secular time in the Renaissance. Mechanical clock was put in use around 1380 1450. 
Given this situation: 
[I]n a condition of complex wholeness, the west changed at the time of the Renaissance to a place 
where temporal wholeness had to be struggled for, a place where culture divorced people from 
time, and semiosis had to participate in the effort to regain a sense of duration.493         
      According to Monelle, based on George Poulet, culture was once polychronic but 
switched from a harmonic state between the various species of time to a later dramatic 
outcome.  
[In medieval time] the different times, times of creation, succession, action, history, were folded 
into one another and sustained each other. Because the medieval experience was chiefly a feeling 
of permanence, people did not feel any discontinuity between their existence within the changes of 
history and their being in the present moment. 494 
      As stated, this polychronic, harmonic state collapsed in the Renaissance:  
Instead of permanence underlying the changes of life and history, people saw nothing but change 
and vicissitude; God was no longer the external force who preserved his creatures in their own 
continuing temporalities, but an inner force which helped them combat the unpredictable shifts of 
life.495 
      
music understood as harmony began to flourish again. Karol Berger notes this moment 
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 (1607) as a figuration 
of the dispute between the antique (chromatic, mimetic) music and the modern 
(diatonic, harmonic) one.496 From the Renaissance itself to the eighteenth century there 
were changes too. The eighteenth century discovered that in the midst of mere change 
and vicissitude there was memory
497 How all this affected the 
music is connected with the birth of sonata form and the will of narrating through music 
mentioned below. 
      Monelle, in turn, enlightens an aspect connected to clock time, that is, its association 
498 , in spite 
499  
      
movement in Physics, could be associated with the musical metrical patterns and 
resources such as the tempo giusto. Monelle remarks, regarding this kind of 
associations, that there is more than the aspect of the signifier (the level of the sign): 
there is the signified (the interpretation of this sign and its context). Thus, the 
association clock-time/meter is merely abstract and dissociated from a contextualised 
interpretation of clock time as the time which suggests that music wanted urgently to 
meaning the indivisible time of the melody.  
      Clock time is, historically and according to Monelle, connected to the idea of 
progress. He opposes the linearity associated with this clock time to the continuity of 
uniform, homogeneous, easily confused with clock time, but in contrast to clock time 
the time of dance is cyclical, non-progressive. Clock time, on the contrary, is associated 
with progress and history. 
 
The theories growing in physics about the origin and fate of the universe, as well as the 
discussion on the arrow of time, came later to propel this linear view. This view was 
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supported earlier by a theological credo and reinforced by the creation of the clock. A 
theological view would in principle accommodate with physics if one interprets the 
origin and fate of the universe according to the standard big bang and big crunch 
theories of the universe. In addition, it would coincide with the seemingly successive, 
irreversible order of the moments of time. A slightly modified theory was however the 
one mentioned by Stephen Hawking in his famous book of 1981, where he doubted that 
-time was finite but had no boundary, which means that it 
500  
       
defends the idea that the expansion of the universe is in proportion to a parallel cooling 
state.  
At very high temperatures, particles would be moving around so fast that they could escape any 
attraction toward each other due to nuclear or electromagnetic forces, but as they cooled off one 
would expect particles that attract each other to start to clump together.501 
      
insuperably hot. According to Hawking, this theory was formulated by scientists George 
Gamow and Ralph Alpher in 1948. This work included a prediction about radiation, as 
an effect of those hot stages. The direction of the expansion, it was believed, was at the 
same time the cause of the subsequent re-collapse:  
The universe as a whole would have continued expanding and cooling, but in regions that were 
slightly denser than average, the expansion would have been slowed down by extra gravitational 
attraction. This would eventually stop expansion in some regions and cause them to start to 
recollapse.502 
      The theory explained how both rotating and elliptical galaxies were born. With time, 
gradual changes in the atmosphere allowed for the variety of life we find nowadays. 
These ideas are found amenable to be interpreted alongside with the biologic theory of 
evolution, Darwinism, since according to this theory, previous errors (i.e. replication 
and hazard) occur until determined forms of life came to surface (adaptation).503  
      The scientific hypothesis summarised here was not convincing for Hawking. The 
reason for his scepticism was firstly, the question about why the universe was so hot at 
the beginning. In addition, it is not clear why the universe is so uniform that temperature 
is the same all around even nowadays. There must be a reason why the universe started 
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at the same temperature at every distant region. Furthermore, why the universe 
expanded at this critical rate that makes possible re-collapse and its parallel expanding 
capacity, the same which continues until today, is an extra difficult obstacle for 
considered a minimum modification of this rate of expansion, the universe would have 
already re-collapsed before reaching the present form. Finally, why would such 
homogeneous universe? 
      While not a distant extrapolation, the relevance for music of presenting physical 
hypotheses and their testing out along the recent years seems apparently non-existent. 
However, the philosophical concerns about the structure and way in which time is 
perceived by human minds is directly linked to music practice both in its syntactic 
organisation as well as in further semantic and pragmatical sides of it. It is the main 
point of this thesis to reconnect these levels of reality, which seemingly do not have any 
connection; however affinities reach the surface when examined more closely paying 
deeper attention. 
      Works of music contemporary to the above mentioned discussions in physics, such 
as those by Morton Feldman (1926 1987), present infinite density as an idea of time 
behind them, which was foreign to previous music eras.504 However the old ideas of 
beginning and fate of the universe (and of time) as well as of the direction of time, were 
crucial in the development of most of the repertory of classical art music that we 
consume. Temporal ideas permeate music production in several ways as it will be 
shown specifically in the section below on musical analyses. 
       [s]pace-time 
would have a boundary 505 This means that no theory can 
be certain about the beginning or creation of the universe since no effects provide an 
explanation of the exact conditions for its apparition. What we know is what we can see, 
but they are not the reasons for the world becoming as it is. 
The whole history of science has been the gradual realisation that events do not happen in an 
arbitrary manner, but that they reflect a certain underlying order, which may or may not be 
divinely inspired. It would be only natural to suppose that this order should apply not only to the 
laws, but also to the conditions at the boundary of space-time that specify the initial state of the 
universe.506 
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      From now on, connected development on theories of randomness as a hypothesis for 
explaining the beginning of the universe connects with the later treatment of branching 
time and music. 
      Physical theories, dealing with the problem of the origin and fate of the universe, 
considered the problem of the scope of time. These theories also explain the arrow of 
time, which touches the logical problem of the order of time (whether finite, infinite, or 
unbounded). 
      The consequence that ideas on time such as the passing from the idea of the 
absolute time to that of the relative time at the beginning of the 20th century have had 
in the production of the post War music could in principle illustrate Witold 
in his String Quartet (1964), instead of presenting them in a synchronous manner as had 
been traditionally done. All this does not mean that we are certain of an actual 
connection between any idea of time and certain music, or that they were made explicit 
by the composers, but there is evidence and justifications that a theoretical linking 
would not be arbitrary. 
 
The following idea that feeds the argument of linearity is the conception of the arrow of 
time. It is linked with what physics calls an increase of entropy or disorder. There are 
tion 
507 
      For musical repercussions it is interesting to associate this image of time as an arrow 
from the point of view of the methodological decisions that it promoted. The 
ontologic
review,508 is fond of this vision of time as an arrow. This thesis concentrates in the 
treatment, about a comprehensive view of the time of music, at moments fails to 
convince. Music ultimately pinpoints something other than its physical arrangement, 
and traces different temporal meanings upon the literal arrangement of the arrow. 
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Evans- f the Nuer, Nilotic people of Sudan, an anthropological theory 
investigating time conception in preliterate societies divides the study into two 
temporalities: 
In describing Nuer concepts of time we may distinguish between those that are mainly reflections 
of their relations to environment, which we call oecological time, and those that are reflections of 
their relations to one another in the social structure, which we call structural time.509 
      As Monelle clearly explains, these times are conceived from the basis of the 
conditions, or rather in social life and its crucial moments. The structural time Evans-
Pritchard mentions is the historical time as opposed to the repetitive, oecological time. It 
is a time whose events are unrepeatable and irreversible, contrary to the other cyclical 
temporalities differ somewhat from those of non-literat  510 
      The bichronic exposition of temporality in Westerners by Monelle and others should 
be revisited and expanded. But an actual trichronic vision from the West should be 
examined first. This consideration however, will appear clearer at the end of the chapter. 
Bichronicity is extended to trichronicity here in a sense which is inspired by 
philosophical and literary sources.  
 
In aesthetic studies, since the beginning of a theory of arts with Aristotle, the idea of a 
linear arrangement of a plot was predominant. The idea of forms with a tripartite 
configuration (introduction development conclusion) is already found in Aristotle. In 
Poetics, Aristotle defines the form that plots or fables must have:  
We  have  laid  it  down  that  a  tragedy  is  an  imitation  of  an  action  that  is  complete  in  itself,  as  a  
whole of some magnitude; for a whole may be of no magnitude to speak of. Now a whole is that 
which has beginning, middle, and end. A beginning is that which is not itself necessarily after 
anything else, and which has naturally something else after it; an end is that which is naturally 
after something itself, either as its necessary or usual consequent, and with nothing else after it; 
and a middle, that which is by nature after one thing and has also another after it. A well-
constructed plot, therefore, cannot either begin or end at any point one likes; beginning and end in 
it must be of the forms just described.511       
      This classical idea of completion is going to be decisive for the way music is also 
structured and specially, for the history of the classical musical forms. Linearity is 
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regularly accompanied by a strong sense of opening and closure; meanwhile the cyclic 
elaborates the beginning and the closing by giving a sense of smooth apparition and 
dissolution, without any exact onset and explicit final gesture. That is why the emphasis 
on time beginning and ending is associated with a linear conception of time.  
      In music, there are specific devices expressing a linear conception. These are for 
example gestures of beginning. Rowell512 analysed those gestures in an article finding 
 
       Something about extension should also be mentioned, which has to do with other 
aspects of musical temporality. Aristotle writes that the extension of a work cannot be 
endless, unless the plot requires it, but the larger the work, the more beautiful and 
harmonic it will be.513 Inversely, it cannot be tiny, because it would lack of development 
or extension for presenting the argument.514 
      In musical semiotics, specifically in semantic approaches, music is considered to 
display a narrative form, a similar structure as in literature, a story-telling. In this line, 
Eero Tarasti has been studying how music inherited the structure of myths.515 Actions 
and actors are described in this context. The music of the first Viennese school has been 
associated with plot-centeredness. The theory of topoi Classic 
Music,516 demonstrates this. 
 
Regarding the study of temporality, Monelle explains there was a sense of permanence 
changing to an idea of progressive time in music that paralleled the shif
temporal experience. This incipient linearity, is not primarily defined by its being 
initial-medium-conclusive in the sense of consequence in the internal form but by the 
simple sense of forward process implicit within the work. 
      The historical perspective, highly important for tracing the moment when changes 
from a temporal model to another was effectuated, is however going to be considered a 
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sideline. The point is describing temporalities working together in a same period, but 
functioning in a cumulative way, i.e. altogether, since they are not anymore exclusive of 
an historical period in music.  
      Music before 1750 was probably not at all proposing a progressive time (or only in a 
chance) multiple times. This happened later, at around the 1950s, when philosophical, 
physical, logical, and literary views began to incorporate the idea of branching. 
However, how can we explain cyclical ideas of time after 1750, or linear ideas of time 
after 1950? There are philosophical reasons, which independent of their historical onset 
still deserve to be analysed. It can be called a philosophical primacy, for later delving 
into concrete historical analyses.  
      A similar point is found when Rowell, explaining that changes in temporal modes 
are not exclusive of 20th centu
Don Govanni Parsifal.517 
The work of Stravinsky appears amenable to this cumulative way of understanding 
temporalities in music.518 This last consideration suggests that even diverse temporal 
decisions can be traced through the production of a single author. 
      Karol Berger comments on the transition that took place around 1750, from an idea 
of cyclical time to the time conceived in the form of an arrow, and consequently, how 
this had an impact on the music of the epoch. Berger situates the birth of Modernity not 
in the Renaissance but in the later time of the Industrial Revolution, with its idea of 
progress. He judges this moment to be more decisive, permeating music with an 
analogue sense of time. In turn, according to Berger, modern music should be situated 
in the same period in the history of music, contrary to the common restricted vision of 
musical modernity as twentieth-century modernism.519  
      Berger agrees with E.T.A. Hoffman (1776 1822); the latter had attached his sense 
was not the renovation of compositional means but the new aims that these means were 
520What defines new music is its separation from language and hence 
from the mimesis of anything definite, anything in particular. 
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subject-
ecise feel 521 
      In the following paragraphs of his book, Berger develops his own proposal in 
 
Although I think that Hoffmann put his finger on a centrally important point here, I shall not make 
this the focus of my investigation. Instead I would like to concentrate on a change in the shape of 
musical time, on the demotion of what might be called, now with a nod to Stephen Jay Gould, 
 522 
      The assumption which is relevant for the present thesis is, simply, that in music of 
the period he describes, i.e. from 1750 onwards, the temporal order in which events 
occur always matters. 
The disposition of events in a sonata (or string quartet, symphony, concerto), the temporal order in 
which they appear, is essential: to tamper with it is to drastically change, or destroy, the meaning 
of the work. The temporal positions of the main and second subjects, or of exposition and 
recapitulation, cannot be swapped at will. To experience such works with understanding one has to 
register, however dimly, that the material being developed has earlier been exposed, or that what is 
now being recapitulated has already, in some form, been heard before. The interpolation of the 
scherzo material in the Finale of the Fifth Symphony does not make much sense unless one is 
aware of its having appeared earlier.  
This much is obvious. What is less obvious is that not all music works this way [...]. [...F]or music 
written a mere half century before the Viennese classics this assumption of the primacy of the 
temporal disposition of events is invalid.523  
      Here Berger refers to a very common understanding of linearity in music, which 
Kramer, emphasises this temporal election in connection with a broader cultural 
m
speaks in terms not of plot sequence but of a more basic idea of progression or 
movement forward of the music. 
      Berger focuses on intellectual images of the epoch, figures such as Don Giovanni 
524 In this way, linear time appears in the sense of a time of 
human autonomy discovered by the period, disengaged from eternity, characteristic of 
the previous era. How this already changes with Beethoven, and how the heroic men 
                                                 
521 Ibid., p. 6.  
522 Ibid., p. 7. Italics by the author. 
523 Ibid., pp. 7 8. 
524 Ibid., p. 9. 
Ideas of Time in Music 
 
 
 
194 
permanent images of time in music as a way of escaping from this world, is also a post-
topic addressed by Berger. 
The Beethovenian abstraction out of time is the obverse of the Beethovenian heroic quest and its 
than it 
timelessness.525 
      
Passion Well-Tempered Keyboard, and Mozar
Don Giovanni and The Magic Flute. When listening to the former, he thinks, there is no 
need to keep track of the moment where we are in the piece in order to understand it. It 
is not possible to signal a certain moment as the end, in fact, many ritornelli can appear 
fugue or in a concerto, it is not a question of genre. But this works differently with the 
classical style. We assume there is certain order, we expect certain things and we are 
quite sure about the moment when the piece reaches the end.  
      
with a change in ideas about time: 
[T]hat in the later eighteenth century European art music began to take seriously the flow of time 
from past to future. Until then music was s events had somehow 
mattered little to the way the music was experienced and understood. From that point on music 
longer be experienced with understanding unless one recognized the temporal ordering of 
events.526 
      The shift in the perception of time does not necessarily have to be understood as a 
straightforward, causal thesis for the shift in musical perception: 
Rather than worrying about the causes of the change, I simply register the structural homology 
between the shapes of the historical and musical times, and note its consequences [...]. New 
musical means [...] are adopted to realise new aims. But whether these new musical means were 
specifically developed to realise the new aims or whether evolving independently of these 
aims which seems more likely they later adapted to them remains an open question.527 
      In the same vein, Raymond Monelle suggests that one should not put music and 
time ideas in association straight away, unless taking a critical position: 
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It would, perhaps, be wrong to look in music for the cultural and social temporalities described by 
Poulet or any other writer. Attempts to transfer anthropological and philosophical accounts to 
music have generally led to confusion and special pleading.528 
      However, Monelle also admits a connection, although not a straightforward one. His 
writing as a whole adheres to the association of a time-in-general and the time of music, 
which is confirmed by these passages: 
western music. Far from reflecting clock time, music, through its complicity in cultural semiosis, 
is devoted to recovering western man from the abyss of clock time.529 
Apparently, the detachment of the mind from its thoughts, the alienation of experience from 
cerebration, led to a progressivizing of lyric time as musicians felt a need to place lyric unities in a 
context of discourse.530 
      Monelle follows a similar thesis then, but supports it in a slightly different way than 
Berger. The pairs of oppositions with which he works to reach his main argument are 
cyclical  vs. historical  time in Anthropology and clock time  vs. duration  in the 
West, to finally arrive at the distinction of a lyric  vs. progressive  time in music. This 
last one is his main distinction for placing the change effectuated within the musical 
domain at about the same historical period as Berger, the second half of the eighteenth 
century.  
      The first distinction of clock vs. duration time elaborated by Monelle, involves 
logically speaking about a problem of texture, i.e. of discontinuous vs. continuous time. 
This distinction is superimposed to the original search about the shape of time (i.e. 
around this. He describes the change from a medieval to a modern experience of time, 
placing the music of Bach in this context as well, and the birth of the sonata form.531       
     In his reflection about music as linked to time ideas, Berger quotes an important 
Aesthetics, 
function of art, as embodying philosophical and religious ideas, although via its proper 
medium, which are the senses. Berger concludes from Hegel: [Likewise, m]odern 
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vehicle for bringing to contemporary minds some of their deepest interests. 532 
      This passage from Hegel is significant. However one could continue in this context 
to defend an even stronger argument than that of art merely reflecting ideas: that of the 
cognitive importance of music. 
      Temporal conceptions are still charged of individual, social, and even political 
meaning: Definitive of modernity are narratives of secular universal history, whether 
conceived in liberal terms of progressive continuity or in egalitarian terms of 
revolutionary breakthrough. 533       
      The case that will illustrate at this point our analysis of linear time belongs to the 
Latin American national modernism.534 
deals with topics of colonization, mixtures, hybridization, transculturality, and multiple 
identities. In this context, goals are interpreted as arrivals to a sense of emancipation and 
fraternity. In this case, linearity will have a unique arrangement, but what underlies this 
work will still be linear time.  
      The Magic Flute reveals a progress from darkness (minor) to clarity 
(major) as allegoric of the recent events of 1790 in France.535 
piano traces a path from indigenous to creoles, as a result of the mixture of races that 
took place in the colonisation, finally noting the acquisition of a national character, the 
obstinacy and bravery of the gauchos. In different contexts and with different aims, both 
works represent a similar time. 
      Traces of linearity are not rare before 1750, although they are not established:  
[...M]y choice in no way implies that Bach was unaware of the possibilities of projecting linear 
even, more generally, that he was not aware of up-to-date trends in the music of his time or eager 
to exploit them.536 
      For example, Richard occata in F (BWV 540, 
1708 1717), reveals a cadential preparation detached from its resolution. Taruskin 
associates this forward propulsion effect in music as having a psychological import. 
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This means, emotional and dramatic capacities in music had already found a place to be 
amply expressed.  
Thanks to this newly psychologized deployment of harmonic functions in which harmonic goals 
are at once identified and postponed, and in which harmonic goals are at once directed and 
delayed
compelling emotional force than any previously envisioned.537 
      Berger gives an account of how the exploitation of the circle of fifths influenced the 
Italian instrumental ensemble music for creating this sense of forward propulsion in 
music. According to Taruskin, Arcangelo Corelli (1653 1713) was the responsible for 
theorising the harmonic motion and used it in practice for the first time. However, 
Berger thinks that having had this resource's possible origins in the Rome of 1680s, it 
was however fully developed in the Vienna of 1780s.538 
The idea, in essence, consisted in relating all the scale degrees within a key, as well as all the keys 
within a movement, to a single tonal center, and measuring the distance of a degree or key from 
the center by chains of fifths. [...] Whether on the local level of a single phrase, or on the global 
level of the whole movement, the establishment of a tonal center, the deviation from it, and the 
resulting drive to regain it, gave their music unprecedented forward propulsion and goal-directed 
momentum.539 
      These data, of a music with the above mentioned characteristics, are established and 
studied enough. What is not obvious for the perspective of this thesis, as it was 
mentioned also by Berger, is why this is so. The philosophico-logical grounds for these 
preferences about time order serves to make an explicit explanation of what is usually 
implicit or tacit. 
      
could be the case with the music of Johannes Ockeghem (1410 1497). This is because 
his idea of time was supported by the Augustinian idea of theological eternity.  
Like his church, he was fully aware of the linear unfolding of human biographical and historical 
time, and, also like his church, he believed this time to be enveloped by God
subordinated to it, made relative by its absoluteness. In a number of central instances, I shall argue 
here, his music displays a double temporality, developing unquestionably up-to-date goal-directed 
momentum but relativizing and subordinating its forward propulsion to a sense of cyclical or 
entirely timeless stasis worthy of his medieval predecessors.540 
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       A similar map could be traced in philosophy, as Berger did for music from Corelli 
to Mozart. It is not until the secular idea of directionality of time in Kant,541 supported in 
the classical Newtonian physics, that linear music had its parallel in the philosophical 
sphere.  
       
no disruption between being and continuing to be. Duration was included in eternity. A 
change was effectuated in the 16th and 17th centuries, when actions and thoughts 
the 18th century, this situation appeared described as a mere succession of feelings and 
sensations. The bichrony in this moment is found between secular intensified present 
and past memories.  
       As Monelle describes in relation to the 18th century, referring to Étienne Bonnot de 
Condillac (1715 1780): 
Condillacian being is not only a succession of instants of consciousness; it is a consciousness 
whose interior progress constitutes a life and a history. Each new moment of awareness reveals 
two distinct features: not only the new sensation which is the kernel of the moment, but also the 
ensemble of sensations already lived, whose resonances prolong themselves within it and surround 
it with their nebula.542 
      The ideas of Berger and Taruskin about Corelli and Bach as major figures in the 
transition from non-progressive to progressive music is also found in Monelle with 
reference to the study of Noske. Noske dedicated his analysis instead to the music of 
Jan Pieterzsoon Sweelinck (1562 1621).543  
     
particular emphasis 544 This has the consequence of 
highlighting a later point of inflection for linearity in Classical music than the former 
authors. Time becomes approachable through music as a process, and the process 
character, which in Beeth
manifests itself in the development of a theme or a thematic contrast.545 
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      Dahlhaus clarifies, l
but rather, these thematic processes are seized by the teleological pull imposed by the 
form. Development or unfolding of a theme takes place whenever something is 
implicated, as in Schubertian sonata, whereby a theme is seen from various angles; or in  
, where is defined ins  movement rather 
t -directed If the goal-directed process leaves the past behind, this 
memory in which the past impinges on the present. 546 
 
Regarding logical descriptions of linearity, the logic of time served from the beginning 
to elucidate temporal issues in metaphysics but immediately proved useful in the field 
on time within the logic 
community, motivated in part by artificial intelligence (reasoning about sequences of 
547 Particularly, this thesis does 
not focus on artificial intelligence-linked developments but on its former philosophico-
logical aspects. 
      Logic remains useful in providing musicologists and musicians with a theoretical 
tool whenever time is a perspective they want to investigate in their respective analyses 
or when they want to master it in their creative work as composers. The question of 
research on musical time. Although it could find application in the evaluation of 
systems of representation for computers, as it was presented here in relation to 
Temporal logic then is assumed as it brings the outlines of structures, which are going 
to be interpreted not as an abstract or realist conception of time in music but in its 
musical presentations and within its musical intentions.  
      Marsden associates linear logic to point and to period temporal logic respectively 
because his main goal is to represent the irreversible temporal succession, i.e. not the 
musical, metaphorical, but the literal temporal line. On the other hand, when he 
associates branching logic with a logic of events, he thinks of the idea that two 
superposed events are never identical (unless they are the same), contrary to points or 
periods that measure over time instants or intervals. Strictly, events keep their identities 
when they are superposed, forming ramification. It is in this sense he is going to speak 
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about a branching order of the time of events, meanwhile point and period ontologies 
work easily with linear (rarely also with circular) ontology.  
      According to Edward Lippman, there are three forms of linearity:548 progressive (a), 
syntactic (b), and sheer linearity (c). The first one was described by Monelle also as the 
most significant for the change effectuated between the 17th and 18th centuries in time 
perception, and as responsible of the birth of the sonata form. Syntactic linearity, in 
turn, is the most widespread; it recalls the idea of consequence, the one associated with 
so the tonal 
directed linearity of Kramer. Dahlhaus added a nuance to this discussion, analysing in 
the context of syntactic linearity, teleological linearity as either dramatic circular or 
exegetical goal directed. The last linearity proposed by Lippman is generally taken as 
an extreme whose perceptual effects, however, are not of linearity but instead cause 
stasis and appeared lately in recent experimental music. This last is associated with 
what was described as total or pervasive linearity by Kramer.549 
      Linear logic of time is defined by properties of transitivity and connexity. The first 
 distinction to 
represent the cases a, b, and c of musical linearity. It looks trivial and innocuous. 
the antecedent and the other the consequent, irrestrictive of what of 
are differences between cases a, b and c. Connexity carries the idea of consequence. In 
the case of linearity, at (a) still the goal oriented time is in embryo, there is a process to 
be represented but it is yet not fully consequent; at (b), a structural necessity is 
envisaged; and at (c), there is an emphasised, strong consequence, although its effect is 
to be perceived as motionless. Summing up, although linear time logically speaking can 
give a very general account of linearity in terms of transitivity and connexity it does not 
prove sufficient or it does not have the capacity for expressing with accuracy, for 
modelling the different nuances appearing in music in this present formulation. 
       The following axioms operate in the Linear system CL of temporal logic presented 
by Cochiarella in 1966:550 
A1. FFA  FA. Transitivity: if an event is followed by two events, and if it is true 
 
                                                 
548 Progressive Temporality in Music  The Journal of Musicology, 1984, pp. 121 141. 
549 Kramer, 1988, p. 63. 
550 See McArthur R. P., Tense Logic, 1976, p. 25.  
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A2. (FA  FB)  (F (A  B)   (F (A  FB)   F (FA   B))). Linearity to the right: 
then they are identical, given at the same moment in the future, or one of them 
occurs in a posterior future with respect to the other. 
A3.  (PA  PB)  (P (A  B)  (P (A  PB)  P (PA   B))). Linearity to the left: if 
they are identical, given at the same time in the past, or one of them occurs in an 
anterior past with respect to the other. 
Then, the principal semantic properties belonging to the axioms: 
( x)  ( y)  ( z) ((R (x,y)  R (y,z))  R (x,z)). This is the semantic property of 
 
( x)  ( y)  ( z) ((R (x,y)  R (x,z))  ((z y)   (R(y,z)  R(z,y))). The semantic 
respect to the other.  
 ( x)  ( y)  ( z) ((R (y,x)  R (z,x))  (y=z)   (R(z,y)  R(y,z))). The semantic 
the other. 
      The following amendments should receive the axiom for linearity (applied just to 
linearity to the right) if it should describe the different qualitative linear times in music: 
Progressive linearity: 
(FA  FB)  (F (A  B)   (F (A  FB)   F (FA   B))) 
This is interpreted as  
 
Syntactic linearity: 
(FA  FB)  (F (A  B)   (N (F (A  FB)   F (FA   B)))) 
Here, necessity should be incorporated. 
Sheer or total linearity: 
(FA  FB)  (F (A  B)   (N (F (A  N FB)   F (N FA   B)))) 
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consequent in a logic of consecution, here musical events must be unrepeatable.  
      Musical temporality could only be very generally approached by the logical one. A 
first possibility appears in the antecedent work of Marsden, but as established, from a 
more comprehensive philosophical point of view it leaves important things aside. In 
music, linearity implies more interpretations than the ontological, literal one: there are 
progressive, syntactic or tonal-consequent, with its dramatic and exegetical varieties, 
also atonal linearities can be included whose necessary connections are qualitatively 
different from the pitch ones  and finally, total or pervasive linearities. 
      This hybrid position defended here describes linear time in music not just as 
sequences of literal arrangements of time periods or events, but also includes the 
musical sense in its many nuances, for example: progressive time as musically 
recreated; teleological exegetical time concerning the fulfilment of an idea gradually 
announced, which inaugurates future, reveals at the end; or teleological dramatic time, 
in that implies a thematic process ultimately seized by the musical form, a hidden plan 
that is actualized in the progress of the work, linearity which is dependent on the past. It 
also covers cases of non-tonal linearity, up to extreme cases of total linearity as in the 
latest extremes in contemporary music, where linear procedures become pervasive. 
Moreover, those musical linear times have a cultural history tied to them, which 
connects although not always straightforwardly with analogue time ideas current in 
the period when this music was born. Logical representations are, again, meagre for 
inquiring about all these nuances, although they provide a solid starting point.  
      Alfonso Padilla describes this general situation in the following passage:  
In an absolute sense, objective, time is one-directional, linear, flows continuously, goes forward, is 
irreversible, one-dimensional. According to this situation all music is linear, directional, 
continuous. This means, it does not exist no-linearity, no-directionality, discontinuity, static, 
return, repetition. This, under an ontological and absolute point of view. Whether things were so 
simple, discussion ends here. As music is not a natural but cultural phenomenon, a human form of 
communication, and it is art, there are other things to be taken into account. Time, as a human 
being perceives it, is not independent of its experience. On the other hand, musical discourse, 
narrativity, drama, work with other categories than those of the objective and absolute of the exact 
sciences or formal logic. Art is, essentially, fiction, a symbolic form of representation. In that is 
fiction, music has the right of jumping the ropes of formal logic and the definitions of the natural 
sciences.551 
      Extra divergences with the sole logical approach would be in reproducing temporal 
processes in music that open new questions, such as how to represent multiple 
                                                 
551 Padilla, 1995, p. 115. . 
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temporalities in one, i.e. linear over cyclical, which may work in parallel. These would 
be contradictory for logical representations, which must choose one ontology.  
      If one would opt for an exclusively ontological perspective, so just as with 
philosophical discourse, one would miss the richer phenomena found in music in 
addition to the important connection between music with time ideas. If, on the contrary, 
one opted for the idea of a musical time without taking into consideration questions of 
abstract form or temporal logic, related to other domains where time arranges reality, 
music would stay separate from the rest of the temporal phenomena, which it 
paradoxically tries to represent, in the sense of being permeable to them. Temporal logic 
schemes put music in connection with time outside music; this should not necessarily 
imply reducing musical temporal connotations to abstract models that still cannot 
represent them. 
 
5.1.1. Musical Analytical Framework 
There are two temporal levels for music: the real uninterrupted time and the conceptual 
at 
is essential is not the concrete uninterrupted time in which the action takes place but 
552  
      This conceptual time, which is the most important here, can be externally described; 
this means that its shapes, the diverse notions of time different from the chronological, 
can be labelled. Also it can further be internally described; this means that the various 
phenomena of expressive timing, pacing, proportions, etc. added to this overall external 
shape also deserve an analysis. Those internal decisions over the external shape 
concretise the temporal configuration of a work in a sense that it was already suggested 
 
      For a conceptual and external way of looking at the time of music, a first 
introduced above. Syntactic linearity -
at the differences in the configuration of direction and 
referring to whether the music is tonal or atonal.  
      The above mentioned main categories correspond to three different moments in the 
understanding of linearity. The first one, described by Monelle, is the musical linearity 
that coincides with the moment in the 1750s when a profane understanding of time was 
                                                 
552 Music as a Temporal Form  The Journal of Philosophy, 1964, p. 265.  
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born. The second, as described by Dahlhaus, Kramer, and Berger, is a product of the 
consolidation of a way of experiencing time, as the utopic conquest of a freer humanity 
in cultural history. The last type of linearity, shows a last extreme: vacuous, devoid of 
meaning, automatic, and compulsive linearity; perhaps a desperate, negative side of the 
experience of progress.  
      Progressive linear time illustrated with the music of Sweelinck by the Dutch scholar 
- -
that 553 
      
Corelli and Antonio Vivaldi (1678-1741). Later, with Bach, appears a polychronicity, 
i.e., a conjugation of lyric and progressive times. 
time can be manipulated to move variably and to diversify in the moment. There are lyric times, 
retardation and acceleration, times of variable lapse, temporal simultaneities, and stabilized time. 
Directioned, goal-oriented time is embryonic.554 
      Monelle presents examples showing the way lyric time is extended into progressive 
time in Bach. The simple addenda of redundant phrases in a passage where the music 
goes at the end finally to the dominant, would lead to a progressive, goal-oriented time, 
Monelle adds, the sense of progression was 
ve to 
another, or of resolving any conflict. As Monelle explains, the importance of transition 
(gang) in this passage from lyric to progressive time is essential.  
      Another perspective was developed by Kramer. As mentioned, he presents linearity 
in a -
both predictable and non-predictable.555  
      Predictable t
String Quartet No. 7 in F Major, op. 59. Since Western music created the sophisticated 
and even pieces that end with keys other than the tonic depend on the denial of this 
expectation as an expressive effect, according to Kramer. Composers play on the 
expectation of a recapitulation as a structural downbeat, and the process of choosing 
                                                 
553 Monelle, 2000, p. 97. 
554 Ibid., p. 99. 
555 Kramer, 1988, pp. 25 40. 
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when and how to undercut the recapitulation downbeat depends on implications set up 
earlier in the piece. 
      Let  us  refer  s st 
movement. After the development the composer presents a sequence of five attempts to 
reach the recapitulation. He shapes the recapitulation in this particular way because of 
implications suggested at the beginning of the piece: an unstable harmony that could 
never serve as a clear point of arrival at the beginning of the recapitulation. As Kramer 
explains, this situation defines the essence of tonality: the wait for the explanation of 
what one heard in the beginning. It is to some degree logically predictable. 
      
linear music from Ginastera Allegro marcato from the Piano Sonata No. 1, 
op. 22, consists of melodic and rhythmic variations growing from the opening theme. Its 
presented 
from the onset. 
      Illogical or unpredictable events can also occur inside goal directed linearity. 
Kramer  uses  the  1st o. 15, op. 132, in A 
minor, as an example of this. Following a progression, which seems to go to a cadence 
in C minor, there is an interrupting silence in m. 92, followed by surprisingly recitative-
like material. It is an unrelated interruption without precedent and motivic outcome. In 
this context, according to Kramer, it is still possible to perceive linear consequences 
when listening to it. What we experience is that any subsequent continuity may be 
shattered, so this proceeding is based on the subversion of linear expectations as an 
expressive effect. 
      a 
priori goal definition, faced the challenge of creating cadences contextually. Non-pitch 
parameters, traditionally treated as secondary support of harmonic, rhythmic and linear 
motion of tonal music, began to have a structural function, in order to compensate for 
the absence of tonal, unequivocal goal definitions. Goals are defined either by rhythmic 
and textural factors, or in context, by previous reiteration and emphasis.556 In 
consequence, one may not distinguish a cadential harmony until it actually arrives; it is 
unpredictable, different from tonal drives towards cadences. 
                                                 
556 Ibid, p. 408, n. 26. 
Ideas of Time in Music 
 
 
 
206 
      Kammerkonzert (1925), the first phrase (excluding the introductory 
motto) ends in m. 7. There are pitch factors indicating this measure as cadential. The 
final E C is the goal, given a preceding E in the oboe and the stepwise motion to C in 
two voices. E and G define a harmonic area in mm. 1 6. The voices move linearly 
towards the goal. The cadence is however principally made by non-pitch parameters, 
which promotes the stepwise pitch motion to a goal defining status. Cadences provoked 
by non-pitch parameters can be elaborated by slowing tempo, lengthening note 
durations, thinning texture, decreasing dynamics, downward motion after an 
overabundance of rising figures, less frequent change of instrumental colours, or the 
freshness of subsequent music. 
      On the other hand, atonal composers can also attempt to create predictable goals 
contextually by means of reiteration or emphasis. The example by Kramer is 
 4 (1937) where he creates levels of goal transposition. 
In this work (similarly to tonal music) the goal is predictable and known in advance.557 
      As a consequence, the cadence is a result of pitched and non-pitched procedures. 
Whereas non-pitched support of cadences is also common in tonal music, there the pitch 
carries the weight of the cadence. According to Dahlhaus, this carries a contradiction: 
atonal procedures make efforts of teleology within the wrong medium. The 
contradiction would be in overcoming tonal language but continuing to achieve the 
same effects.558 
      Kramer explains that the disintegration of linearity began with its intensification. 
Tonal vocabulary became richer in chromaticisms towards the end of the 19th century 
-directedness increased. Later romantic music, explains 
Intermezzo in E Minor, op. 116, No. 5 (1892), is always searching 
for goals that only occasionally materialize. This music seems to consist mainly of 
structural upbeats. Progressions are defined in the foreground more by voice-leading of 
moving harmonies than by tonal harmonies that are restricted to large articulations in 
the background; previously, harmonic root progressions in the background had 
functioned as the primary support of large scale harmonic movements.  
      The atonal idiom of the early music of Schoenberg (Sechs kleine Klavierstücke, op. 
19, 1911) resulted from the disappearance of background tonal harmonies. The stepwise 
motion in the foreground is retained to achieve continuity of melodic lines but the 
definition of large scale goals for this motion becomes problematic. Consistencies of set 
types underlie much of this music; the number of set types is limited to create pitch or 
                                                 
557 Ibid., p. 408, n. 28. 
558 Dahlhaus, 1988, p. 292. 
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interval class invariances that ensure consistent contexts. Set analyses have uncovered 
nonlinear rather than linear means of progression.559 
      
Kramer tackles the music of the 50s and 60s that approached the extremes of total 
linearity and nonlinearity. Linearity and non-linearity as compositional procedures do 
not guarantee linearity or nonlinearity of musical time. He uses Lejaren Hiller and 
Illiac Suite, for string quartet (1957) as example.560 Here, the 
intention of total nonlinearity does not guarantee the perception of such a time. On the 
contrary, linear intention leads to nonlinear perception in Elliot 
Concerto I (1977). The extremely linear processes of this music present nonlinear 
(b. 1938) Les Moutons (1969).  This 
new music is not only experimental, it offers deeply felt responses to new meanings of 
time in 20th century Western culture. 
 
5.1.2. Linear Time in Ginaste 1/I 
(1952) 
Alberto Ginastera (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1916  Geneva, Switzerland, 1983), 
mastered a compositional language in the delicate encounter between the modern 
European techniques and the Argentinian traditions. Argentine folk songs and dances 
inspired his music, whether in direct reference (the 
adopted 12-tone techniques and avant-
ultimately reaching a synthesis of traditional and postserial elements in his last 
561 A first periodization of his output was prepared early in his career 
by Ginastera himself; more recently, Malena Kuss and Antonietta Sottile presented 
objections to the periodization of a trajectory of a unique aesthetic search that was 
continuous and constant.562  
      Some of the most renowned scholars that have dedicated themselves to the study of 
his music are Pola Suárez Urtubey, Melanie Plesch, Malena Kuss, Guillermo Scarabino, 
and Deborah Schwartz-Kates, among others. Recently, works by Antonieta Sottile and 
                                                 
559 Kramer, 1988, p. 408, N. 25.  
560 Ibid., p. 411, n. 64.  
561 Schwartz-Kates, Deborah, "Ginastera, Alberto." Grove Music Online. 
562 Alberto Ginastera: A Complete Catalogue, Introduction, 
(1916  1983), 2005. 
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Erik Carballo updated and expanded this corpus of research. From a political point of 
view, studies by Omar Corrado and Esteban Buch, open a new front of analysis in the 
context of music and politics.563  
only artistic but politically situated in the dialectic nationalism-universalism, which they 
read under the dialectic fascism-  
      
atonal) a
the folkloric to the pure, a constant dialectic between each other. This section will 
investigate linea  circular 
time in his mythical-inspired music, and branching time in his modern music. These 
connections are supported by other studies  Carballo, Julio Ogas, and Dante Grela,564 
.  
      Ginastera wrote the first Sonata for Piano for the occasion of the Pittsburgh 
International Contemporary Music Festival of 1952. The work was commissioned by 
the Carnegie Institute and the Pennsylvania College for Women.565 It was later chosen to 
be performed at the 17th Festival of the International Society for Contemporary Music in 
Oslo, 1953. 
      
interpretative point of views. For this sonata, the analyses of Wallace,566 for its 
syntactical approach, and Ogas, for its semiotic points of view, are considered.  
      As Ogas explains in the introduction to the Sonatas for piano, Ginastera composed 
the first in a traditional scheme of introduction, development, and conclusion. For 
Ginastera, composing this first sonata was a step towards consolidating his nationalist 
language in large-scale formal structures, i.e. sonata form. The sonata belongs to his 
subjective nationalist period, coinciding with his maturation as composer, summarized 
by Ginastera as follows:  
A style that, without abandoning Argentine tradition, had become wider or with a more universal 
amplification. It was not as in the early period linked to genuinely creole themes or rhythms, but 
                                                 
563 Corrado, Omar, Música y Modernidad en Buenos Aires. 1920 1940, 2010; Buch. Esteban, The 
Bomarzo Affair, Ópera, perversión y dictadura,  Adriana Hidalgo ed., 2003. 
564 Carballo, Erick, De la Pampa al Cielo: The Development of Tonality in the Compositional Language 
of Alberto Ginastera, 2007, and El tiempo latinoamer , 1996, pp. 146
174; Las sonatas para piano de Alberto Ginastera como textos neomit , 
Resonancias, 2002, pp. 33 74; Identidad cultural y creación musical en Latinoamérica: La 
Cantata para América Mágica , Revista del Instituto Superior de Música, 2001, pp. 
85 99. 
565 Alberto Ginastera, Sonata para piano, Buenos Aires, Barry, 1954; reprinted by permission of Boosey 
and Hawkes, Inc., sole agents. 
566 Wallace, David E., Alberto Ginastera: An Analysis of his Style and Techniques of Composition, 1964. 
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the Argentine feeling was created through an atmosphere full of symbols. The Sonata for piano, 
for example, or the Variaciones concertantes do not have a single popular tune and have, 
nevertheless, a language recognised as typically Argentine.567 
      The 1st movement of this first sonata for piano is characterised by a constant 
movement of thirds moving forward. This type of propulsive linearity defines tonal 
centers although the sonata is composed using a polytonal language. Progressive, 
propulsive time is defined not only by harmonic, but also by melodic, metric, and 
rhythmic resources that contribute to this interpretation. 
      Temporal consequence can be found in melody and rhythm working on variations 
from the first theme. The whole movement also displays syntactic linearity since it is a 
consequence of the first eight measures of music. Concerning the contrast between 
thematic motives, measures 7 and 8 of theme A are the basis for the construction of 
theme B. According to the systematic semiotic analysis by Ogas, both display the 
creole folkloric species from the Pampa region, the Cuyo region, and the Central-North 
of Argentina. The second, the native theme, is inspired by dances and songs based on 
pentatonic scales (in this case, a hybridization of pentatonic and heptatonic scales) of 
Inca lineage. See Example 2: (a) b (c) d e f# g#. 
 
Example 1. Sonata op. 22, Allegro marcato, mm. 1 8 
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Example 2. Sonata op. 22, Allegro marcato, mm. 50 65 
      Contrasting themes implying narratives of creolism and indigenism (themes A and 
B) add evidence also for the idea of a logic of consecution; reaching final obstinacy, 
they have the purpose of defining the product of that mix. It is by this hidden topic that 
the sonatas for piano of Alberto Ginastera are examples, according to Ogas, of what Juri 
Lotman (1922 1993) called the neomitological (musical) discourses in the 20th 
century.568 
      , propulsive linearity and also 
as showing both the exegetical  types of teleological linearity in the 
sense of Dahlhaus. The syntactic (also called here teleological) linearity in this sonata 
has a complex duality. It is partially exegetical, generating harmonic, metric, rhythmic 
 mould, interpreted from the 
thematic contrasts but founded in similarities. In consequence, the present, at the same 
time that goes backward to the past, inserts a progress towards the future. As if getting 
back to the roots would propel a life (and a country in this case) ahead. The work as a 
whole is ultimately read as having links with wind as its primary element, remembering 
its vehement impulse, impetus, and obstinacy. 
      Another observation is about the general character of lively movements of 
hope, while slow movements relate to contemplative feelings. Strong and obsessive 
rhythms convey masculine dances; the contemplative is associated with the calm 
atmosphere of the Argentinian Pampas or the silent night of the Andean Puna. 
      The structure of the first movement, Allegro Marcato implies an Introduction: 
measure 1 to 53 (theme A), and measures 53 83 (theme B); measures 84 101 develops 
                                                 
568 Ogas, 2002, p. 34. 
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themes A and B; recapitulation from measure 138 in the form of A (B) A. Regarding the 
departure tonality and following tonalities, there is always a tonal center, in this case C. 
      A first aspect to note is that of metrical variation leading to a progressive linear 
time. There is a profuse variety of metrical signatures in measures 84 88. For example: 
9/8, 3/4, 6/8, 5/8, 3/4, elaborated in the form of quick changes. Secondly, the rhythmical 
aspect is constructed by rapid shifts among eighth note, quarter-note, and dotted-quarter 
note units causing the mentioned fluid rhythmic quality.  
      Linearity of more concise moments, abridged, condensed, in expressive gestures, 
jointly with an accelerated pacing, are vestiges of particularity. Something to consider 
also is the immediate dispatch of the theme A and in its brief construction in two 
measures.569 
      The position of a logico-philosophico perspective aims to gain a contextual 
interpretation of linearity, in this case within the particular context of the music of 
Ginastera. At the same time a vocabulary from which to make the comparison with 
other forms of linearity, to localize the temporal ideas in a broader context beyond 
music, linking it with cultural and philosophical ideas on temporality. It rests on the 
idea of a logic which is exclusively musical although inspired by speech models. 
      
 the latter the 
Sonata was composed, with the imminent death of its author.570 
      A second consideration is that of a political situated time. This time evoked by 
Ginastera intuits later forms such as that recently reinvigorated in Latin American 
politics in general. 
seen within the context of the Argentinian partidism (as it can be found in Corrad
perspective), but in a more amply vision of pan Americanism: 
, he avoids the 
musical characterisation of the Argentinian at international level, i.e. the tango, and puts emphasis 
in the national folkloric elements that share characteristic traces with the majority of the Latin 
American folkloric species.571   
                                                 
569 For  social  time  in  general,  Levine  R.,  A geography of time: the temporal misadventures of a social 
psychologist, or how every culture keeps time just a little bit different, 1997.  
570 Ogas, 2002, pp. 65 66. 
571  
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5.2. Music and Cyclical Time 
572 
spontaneously described. The problem of time would be essential in that we cannot 
negate it while we have consciousness; something different seems to happen with space. 
In other words, we cannot negate succession: our consciousness is all the time passing 
from one state to another.  
      His pessimism begins to show through, when he notices that there were no big 
advances in the solution of the problem of time. Rather, we still continue wondering 
escends two times to the 
 
      Other perplexities ascribed to time as a philosophical problem, Borges develops 
573 
direction of time, in that it is uncertain if it comes from the past or from the future; also 
the synchronization of personal time with mathematical one; finally, the fact by which 
movement has been already refuted by the Eleatic.  
      
Timeus is one of them. This solution appears to 
Borges 
Plotinus (205 270 AC), who in his Enneads also deduces time from eternity, at least a 
model of it. 
Enneads V. There, Plotinus presents a list of pieces compounding eternity: difference, 
equality, motion, quietness, being.574 
 
      
Christian period, whose bible would be now the XI book of Saint 
Confessions. According to the Christian doctrine, the Verb by the Father, 
and the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Verb, were generated. Gnostics inferred from 
these operations that the Father was former than the Verb, and these two, before the 
                                                                                                                                               
composer uses a tango rhythm. 
572 Borges, 1978.  
573 Borges, 1936. en other is mentioned. 
574 Ibid., p. 27. 
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Holy Spirit. This inference would dissolve the mystery of the trinity. Bishop Ireneo 
(130 202 AC) clarified that this double process had not happened in time, but in 
eternity, that joints past, present and future. Such clarification became dogma, and the 
idea of eternity was born. Finally, this notion of eternity was inseparable of the idea of 
the trinity as we have seen before, and the trinity had to be kept in order to explain the 
direct sending of God to the humans and his sacrifice of having been revealed as a 
human and having died, crucified.  
      The notion of eternity as divine attribute can be explained in comparison with our 
capacities. We perceive the real facts and imagine the possible ones; in God there is no 
such a distinction, which belongs to ignorance and time. His eternity registers at one 
time not only all the instants of this world, but also the impossible ones. His eternity 
would be much more copious than the universe. This eternity, based on omniscience, 
575 
      Contrary to the above-mentioned tradition, that of the Greek and the Christian, 
576 But we have to stop here and explain first why 
Borges infers such a conclusion, which reverses the previous ones. 
       
speaking about individuals as belonging to a general species comprehending them. On 
the contrary, Borges ascribes to the nominalist doctrine. And although he is going to 
conced 577 he 
believes that what exists is the material, not the form, and that the universal is simply a 
name.578 
      od, and 
579 It was formulated in El 
idioma de los argentinos (The Language of the Argentinians), from 1928. The piece 
 (Feeling in death e of 
eternity one night while he was walking in the suburbs of Buenos Aires and suddenly he 
contemplated a rose-coloured boundary wall. Afterwards, the fragment:  
                                                 
575 Borges, 1941. 
576 Borges, 1936,  p. 44. 
577 Ibid., p. 25. 
578 
Jorge Luis Borges: Ciencia y 
Filosofía, 2007, pp. 125 128. 
579 1936, p. 44. 
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I kept looking at this simplicity. I thought, surely out loud: This is the same as thirty 
conjectured the date: a recent time in other countries but now quite remote in this changeable part 
of the world. Perhaps a bird was singing and for it I felt a tiny affection, the same size as the bird; 
but the most certain thing was that in this now vertiginous silence there was no other sound than 
-  to be a few 
approximate words and was deepened into reality. I felt dead, I felt as an abstract spectator of the 
world: an indefinite fear imbued with science, which is the best clarity of metaphysics. I did not 
think that I had returned upstream on the supposed waters of Time; rather I suspected that I was 
the possessor of a reticent or absent sense of the inconceivable word eternity.  Only later was I able 
to define that imagination. 
I write it now as follows: That pure representation of homogeneous objects the night in serenity, 
a limpid little wall, the provincial scent of the honeysuckle, the elemental earth  is not merely 
identical to the one present at that corner so many years ago; it is, without resemblances or 
repetitions, the very same. Time, if we can intuitively grasp such an identity, is a delusion: the 
difference and inseparability of one moment belonging to its apparent past from another belonging 
to its apparent present is sufficient to disintegrate it.580  
      Returning to the discussion of the solutions given in the history of philosophy, it is 
clear how the problem of time has not been yet solved. To explain its nature through 
eternity did not convince Borges, principally, because eternity was made of time. We 
time in its three versions: linear, circular, which is the main objective in this section, 
and branching.  
      581 Borges develops a speculative philosophical 
argument about the nature of time. The novelty of this essay is in applying George 
 (1685 1753) tools (his esse es percipi) but now to time. In this context, the 
writer quotes the masters of the idealism Berkeley and David Hume (1711 1776) 
saying:  
Berkeley negated that an object exists behind the impressions of the sense; David Hume, that a 
subject exists behind the perception of changes. The first has negated the material, the second the 
spirit; the first did not want that we add to the succession of impressions the metaphysical notion 
of Material, the second did not want that we add to the succession of mental states the 
metaphysical notion of Subject.582  
      Borges continues towards his goal, that is, the refutation of time via these same 
Out of every perception (actual or conjectural) it does not exist, the 
                                                 
580 Ibid., pp. 46 47. English translation from Labyrinths. Selected Stories and other Writings, Yates, 
Donald A. and Irby, James E., 1962, pp. 226 227. 
581 Borges, 1947. 
582 Ibid., pp. 767 768. 
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material; out of every mental state it does not exist, the spirit; neither time would exist 
out of the present instant. 583  
      Borges has extended with this argument the tools of idealism to the problem of time, 
resulting from this application the negation of the idea of a temporal succession beyond 
 
      The refutation of the linear succession of time implies also another refutation, that 
the successive; I negate, in a number of elevated cases t 584.  
The negation of the contemporaneous means that every state is absolute and 
autonomous, that what really exists is every moment that we live without sharing time 
with a set of contemporaneous events.  
      But it is interesting 
time does not exist as linear succession:  
Let us consider a life in whose course there is an abundance . I suspect, however, 
that the number of circumstantial variants is not infinite: we can postulate in the mind of an 
, two identical moments. Once this identity is postulated, one may ask: Are not 
these identical moments the same? Is it not one single repeated term sufficient to break down and 
confuse the series of time?585  
      At this time Borges remembers his own version of eternity described whereas he 
walked around the suburbs of Buenos Aires and suddenly contemplated the rose-
coloured boundary wall. The arguments of idealism now had left him one more time in 
 
      The incipient idea Borges is trying to convey is that formulated in natural 
philosophy as the thesis of presentism.586 Rowell spoke of presentism for example in 
ures in Jap
the enjoyment of the uniqueness of things, the individual sound, the hook that is a 
587 
      Circular time, or a time made of repetitions instead of successive passages is going 
588 
etzsche 
                                                 
583 Ibid., p. 768. 
584 Ibid., p. 762.  
585 Ibid., p. 769. English translation from Labyrinths, 1962, pp. 223 224 
586 Markosian, Ned, "Time", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
 
587 Rowell, 1983, p. 196. 
588 Borges, 1934 and 1943. 
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presented it under the figure of the eternal return. This doctrine believes that given a 
finite number of atoms in an infinite time, the number of possible permutations of them 
has to be reached and repeated once and again.589 Nietzsche, by the way, had spoken 
about energy instead of atoms.  
      According to Borges, a refutation of such doctrine could be found in the set theory 
presented by George Cantor.590 The mathematician affirmed the perfect infinity of the 
number of points in the universe, contrary to the belief of a finite number of them. His 
approach was essentially to adopt the idea of one to one correspondence (bijection) as 
a standard for comparing the size of sets, and to reject the view of Galileo (which 
derived from Euclid) that the whole cannot be the same size as the part. An infinite set 
can simply be defined as one having the same size as one of its parts. According to 
Borges, the resultant proposition is that if the world has an infinite number of terms, as 
stated by Cantor, it is cap
refuted. 
      Borges continues discussing a second argument against the eternal return. For 
instance, the fact by which the remembrance would be a novelty in the usual sensation 
the defenders of the eternal return. This argument negates the essence of the argument 
of the eternal return, in that remembrance itself would be an unexpected added 
experience.  
      A third  its appealing to energy. Borges 
remembers: the second law of thermodynamic declares that there are irreversible 
of the eternal return. Borges concludes here: 
are but 
agglomerated in one. Is it sufficient the mere succession, not verified by anyone else? Lacking a 
special archangel who takes the account, what does it mean the fact that we pass through the cycle 
thirteen thousand, five hundred and fourteen and not the first of the series or the number three 
hundred and twenty two with the exponent two thousand? Nothing, for the practice which does 
not harm thought. Nothing, for the intelligence which is serious.591 
      It is clear now that Borges admits the existence of similar moments that can be 
described as the same moment, as in the case of the ecstatic experience in the suburbs. 
                                                 
589 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science (1882) and Thus Spoke Zarathustra  
590 See Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 
591 Borges, 1934, p. 113. 
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But it is a delusion for him to speak about several times in which the same is lived, as 
Nietzsche thought.  
      
Accordingly, he begins with Plato, especially with his statement in Timeus 39 that the 
planets having equilibrated speeds will return to the initial point of departure. This 
argument was afterwards modified by the astrologers of that time: if the planetary 
periods are cyclical, also the universal history will be. Having ended a platonic year, all 
the individuals will be born again and will fulfil the same destiny. Historically 
conceived then, the first apparition of the eternal return is of an astrological kind. 
      Continuing in history, Borges mentions again 
of the same. Borges quotes however in this opportunity an observation made by 
Bertrand Russell. It consists in the following thesis: the posterior state is numerically 
identical to the anterior; we cannot say that this state occurs two times, in that this 
would postulate a chronological order that the thesis prohibits.  
The hypothesis that the history is cyclical can be formulated in this way: let us form the set of all 
the contemporaneous circumstances of a determined circumstance; in certain cases all the set is 
earlier to itself. 592  
      Russell is here speaking about the structure of circular time as the formal theory of 
time or temporal logic conceives it, as a reflexive and symmetrical structure. 
      As a third interpretation of the doctrine of cyclical time, Borges presents his own 
conception of similar, not identical cycles. He notices an infinite list of sources 
ascribing to this thesis, but he chooses to cite Marco Aurelio in a passage where the 
orator negates both the reality of past and future for claiming the present (remember 
the conclusion would be: If all destinies are the same destiny, the universal history is 
that of one man. But Marco Aurelio affirms the analogy not the identity of individual 
destinies. So, whatever lapses, they have integrally the history. The number of 
perceptions, of emotions, of thoughts, of human vicissitudes is limited, and before death 
we are going to exhaust them.593 
      This adherence, to a no more plain than modest vision of time, is the product of 
afterwards, we are going to see a much more broadened image of time, the branching; 
                                                 
592 Russell, Bertrand, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, 1940; See Borges, 1943, pp. 120 121. 
593 Marco Aurelio, Meditations, Book II, 14. 
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this last pregnant image is however only given through words, mere literary fictions; it 
is not given to our intelligence, but only to our intuition. 
      Until now for Borges, time is neither succession, nor the eternal return of the same, 
although of the similar. Finally, it seems to be a labyrinth of possible paths of whom we 
would be only conscious of the current ones. For the classification of cyclicity in music, 
all the models presented through the previous discussions: presentness, circularity (with 
the same events) and cyclical time (with similar events) are going to be analysed.  
 
For a nearer vision of cyclicity in the music of Alberto Ginastera, it is interesting to 
concentrate for a while on the cyclic conception of space and time in the pre-hispanic 
Andean world.594 The aim is to consider these conceptions in the actual Andes; this 
introduction shows the way temporal ideas get flesh in determined regions and 
communities and expand in the music that is produced around these centers.  
     A term relevant in the context of Latin American mythological conceptions is Pacha. 
Pacha means the world, the universe, space and time. The Andeans conceived space as 
having defined regions. The upper and the lower plus a centrum which are called 
respectively: Hanan Pacha (upper), Urin Pacha (lower), Tiksi Muyu Pacha Chawpi 
Ukun (center). Hanan Pacha and Urin Pacha have four divisions each, Chincha, Colli, 
Anti y Kunti, belonging to North, South, East, and West. 
      The lower world has a center, which is Cuzco. The same divisions, plus some extra, 
are applied to this habitational space, modelled in the bigger map of the universe. Cuzco 
has its center, the Koricancha temple and its lower and upper spaces.  
        Present 
time is going to generate past and future for being replaced by the earlier past that is at 
the same time immediate future.  595 
      Wayma Pacha or Soqa Pacha (antique time or past 
which is also the mediate future), Wayma Pacha Kay Pacha (the immediate future 
which is also the most antique past), and Kay Pacha (present time, generates the 
immediate past and the mediate future). 
      Wayma Pacha or Soqa Pacha is at the same time divided into two: the immediate 
(nearest to present) and the mediate (farthest) past. As a consequence Pacha as time is 
divided: 
                                                 
594 La concepción del mundo o cosmovisión en la civilización an , in 
Steger Hanns-Albert (Ed.), La concepción de tiempo y espacio en el mundo andino, 1991, pp. 43 67. 
595 Ibid., p. 48. 
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- into two: Wayma Pacha (past and future) and Kay Pacha (present).  
- into three: Wayma Pacha (immediate and mediate past), Wayma Pacha Kay Pacha 
(the most antique past and immediate future), Kay Pacha (present). 
- into four: Wayma Pacha I (immediate past), Wayma Pacha II (mediate past and 
mediate future), Wayma Pacha Kay Pacha (the most antique past and immediate 
future), Kay Pacha (the present). 
      Summing up, this cyclical view of time works as follow: 
The man in his unit Being-Existence (to be on time and history within a framework of to be in a 
specific geographical space), moves from one space-time X to X' to X'' to X''' then X to restart 
cycle by keeping its unity of Being-Existence and within the time-space X. The passage of man 
from one cycle to another involves a qualitative jump. The unit humanity/time space moves in a 
circular form from Z to Z ' to Z'' to Z''' to return to Z and continue the cycle but within Z.596 
      Each of the fourth periods of Andean time has a thousand years. Each is divided into 
five hundread years, the great unity comprising four thousand years. The qualitative 
jumps are every five hundread, every thousand and finally, every four thousand years, 
which is the complete qualitative change. 
      Finally, the year of 365 days is a thousandth of Kay Pacha (present time) and it is 
also divided: 
- into two: Chiraw Pacha, drying times and Paray Pacha, rainy times. 
- into four: defined by solstices and equinoxes  
- into twelve months of thirty days or three weeks of ten days each. 
      In temporal logic, the axioms that express circular time are (See Figure 7): 
 A, It 
will always be the case that A, then A). 
The property of reflexivity means temporally that an e
relation is reflexive when an entity has a relation with itself, i.e. to be identical to). 
(( x), R (x,x)); for all x, x is identical to itself. 
e in the 
past. (GA  HA, It will always be the case that A, then it has always been the case that 
A). 
                                                 
596  
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before y and y is before x. (A relation is symmetrical when if x has the relation with y, y 
has it with x, i.e. to be cousin of). (( x) ( y) (R (x,y)  R (y,x)); for all x, for all y, if x 
is earlier than y, y is earlier than x. 
 
 
Figure 7 
      As shown by Marsden, it is still possible to give certain notion of direction to the 
binary relation in circular time defined by non-transitivity, applied to discrete texture) 
x immediately precedes y and y 
immediately precedes z, then x cannot immediately precede z
y is in between x and z ), then z is in between y and x ) and x is 
between z and y ), coming back to the first situation of y being in between x and 
z -like shape involving both circularity and linearity was designed for 
imperfect circular music and a notion of a lead-in point amidst circularity, for 
representing actual beginnings. 
      As happened with linearity as a logical representation for music, being too 
restricted, circularity follows the same drawback. It seemed to work well at the moment 
of delineating music either with the same or similar events, as the type that is found in 
the next section. Strict circularity (that represented by the theory of the eternal return) 
and broad cyclicity (by Borges, and earlier by Marco Aurelio) are represented whether 
the logic is circular or helical. Still, that aspect of presentness, so exploited in 
contemporary Western music defined by particularist moments, and extracted from 
Oriental music, is impossible to be described in these terms. Finally, no treatment of 
possible temporal meanings behind these shapes is relevant to logical descriptions and 
this is the moment precisely when they fall short. 
      When Marsden decides to use circular systems for analysing representations for 
music he does it on the basis of conciseness for representation: 
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By representing the music as circular referring to the work done by Pachet F., Ramalho G. & 
Carrive J.
Journal of New Music Research, 25, pp. 252 75 , their analysis algorithm is able to correctly 
identify the key of a piece when the relation between the end of the sequence and its beginning is 
Blues for Alice ... .  In this case,  the same effect  could 
have been achieved by using a simple finite linear representation and writing an algorithm so that 
it considered relations between the end and the beginning as well as relations within the sequence 
... . However, the complexity of considering relations between the end and the beginning as well 
as relations within the sequence would have to be added to every analysis algorithm to be applied 
to this music, so there is a considerable advantage in putting the complexity of circularity once and 
for all into the representation system and allowing algorithms to be designed more simply. 597 
      does not enter into cultural analyses that explain why it is not only 
for reasons of conciseness, but instead for ideologically grounded reasons that this 
linear time does not explain all the meanings of temporality in music. 
 
5.2.1. Musical Analytical Framework 
Kramer described the cases of (strict) circularity and (broad) cyclicity in music in terms 
of a extreme he called vertical time  non-linearity . Presentism in music was 
not explored as a case by Kramer, although it could be partially analogue with his 
 
      All music exhibits, according to this author, both linearity and nonlinearity. An 
unchanging context of textural consistency would be an example of nonlinearity in tonal 
music. The example he provides in this context are Bach
first volume of The Well-Tempered Clavier (1722), and Robert (1810
1856) Stückchen from The Album of the Young (1848). However, it is still possible to be 
surprised by an unexpected change in the pattern; another example is found in 
Gretchen am Spinnrade (1814).598  
      Apart from textural consistency, formal proportions can be regarded as nonlinear 
large sectional balances that work according to controlled durations and balances of 
total durations spent in various tonal areas contribute to create non-linear sense. 
-flat Major, K. 282, 1774.599  
                                                 
597 Marsden, 2000, p. 27. 
598 Kramer, 1988, pp. 40 41. 
599 See Kramer, p. 42. 
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      Two among many other aspects of nonlinearity in tonal music were discussed. The 
less tonal the music the less linear it became. This situation obeys the influence of non-
Western music and the impact of recording technology. In composers like Debussy and 
Stravinsky we first encounter true harmonic stasis, segments of musical time that are 
stationary and have no implication to move ahead. It was an impact on Debussy by the 
Javanese gamelan orchestra that he heard in 1889 at the Paris Exhibition, when he was 
looking for an alternative from Wagnerian harmonies. According to Kramer, D
music is the first in Western music that contains extended moments of pure sonority, 
events appreciated more for themselves than for their role in linear progressions.600  
      In 1900, at the second visit to the Exhibition in Paris, Mahler (1860 1911) also 
heard and was affected by this music. He later composed, in 1908 Das Lied von der 
Erde, the final song in which an Oriental time is displayed against Western linearity. On 
the contrary, German composers tried to retain its linear heritage until nonlinear music 
music. In America, Charles Ives (1874 1954) felt no allegiance to European linearity, 
his music had a nondirected time sense.601 
      Since new temporalities appeared, discontinuities became common. Although 
discontinuity does not necessarily entail nonlinearity, pervasive discontinuity can 
destroy linear progression. This influence was more technological than sociological. 
Tape can be spliced; events recorded at different times can be made adjacent. Not only 
this situation, but the time sense of the inner thought processes influences much 
twentieth-century music. According to Kramer, art has moved from a logic that reflects 
the goal-oriented linearity of external life to an irrationality that reflects our personal 
internal lives. In his opinion, a culture obsessed with time produces art obsessed with 
time and time obsessed books and articles about art.602 
      -
fundamental linearity and is markedly discontinuous. Whereas a multiply-directed linear 
piece usually has a clear beginning (or several unmistakable beginnings), which may or 
may not occur at the start of the work, a nonlinear composition in moment time does not 
really begin. A multiply-directed time can have one or several final cadences, not 
necessarily at the end of the piece, whereas the moment form starts, rather than begins, 
and ceases, rather than ends. It seems a series of minimally connected sections or 
                                                 
600 Ibid., p. 44. 
601 Kramer, id. 
602 Ibid., pp. 45 46. 
Ideas of Time in Music 
 
 
 
223 
moments that form a segment of an eternal continuum. The moments may be related but 
not connected by transition. Moments are heard more for themselves than for their 
participation in the progression of the music. Moments are defined more by stasis than 
process.  
      The extreme of moment form in which the order of moments does not seem but 
actually is arbitrary, is mobile form: the composer indicates that the sections of the 
piece may be put together in any of a number of possible orderings from one 
performance to the next, perhaps with certain restraints. What such pieces lack in linear 
logic, they regain in a nonlinear logic of consistency (for example, similarity of texture 
or timbre). According to Kramer, examples of these extreme moment form called 
mobile forms are found in (1926 2000) Music for Cello (1964), Earle 
(1926 2002) Available Forms I (1961 Momente (1961 72), 
and Mixtur (1964).603 In this study, the extreme of moment form, mobile forms, are 
going to be considered as branching forms in a potential sense and studied in section 
5.3. 
      Kramer addresses an intermediate possibility
forms in multiply-directed as well as in moment time, since the linearity in multiply-
directed should be susceptible of various reorderings. 604 An example is in 
Stockhausen  Zyklus (1959). Another case of mobile form in multiply-directed time 
was conceived by the composer as several directional processes initiated in one section, 
but each of them completed in a different section. Only one of these different sections 
can immediately follow the initial section in a given performance. These experiments 
however sound as moment forms because of the fragility of nontonal linearity.  
It becomes moment time, if the resulting sections see self-contained, that is, if their goals cannot 
be unequivocally implied in an atonal idiom. It becomes multiply-directed if either the direction(s) 
of motion is (are) clear despite the atonality, or else the profiles of beginnings, endings, climaxes, 
transitions, and so on are conventionalized strongly enough for their functional implications to 
remain even when they are subjected to apparent reordering.605 
      Early and impure examples of moment time are illustrated by Kramer through 
Symphonies of Wind Instruments (1920), Oliver Messiaen (1908 1992) 
Oiseaux exotiques, (1955), the second movement of Anton (1883 1945) 
Symphony (1928 1994) String Quartet (1964), and the third 
                                                 
603 Ibid., pp. 46 52. 
604 Ibid., p. 50. 
605 Ibid., p. 51. 
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(b. 1927) string quartet Un vieux souvenir (1985). The 
form of these pieces comes from nonlinear principles of proportion and consistency.  
      As Lu , is also going to be treated in the next section on 
interpreted here as an incomplete picture of the work. 
      Kramer acknowledges that proportions become a major determinant of formal 
coherence, for music in which nonlinearity is a dominant structural force. The author 
examined proportions in a number of -time 
discontinuities. The most complex system of proportional balances is found in 
Agon (1954 57). There, moment groups, moments, and submoments, 
represent three distinct hierarchically adjacent levels of structure. Proportional lengths 
extend beyond moment durations to total lengths of moment groups and to the duration 
of the entire piece. One can experience it through cumulative listening.  
      Non-linearity is understood here as inspired in broad cyclical time, based on 
repetition of similar moments as its principal resource. 
 
In the twentieth century, some pieces seem to adopt the requirements for moments (self-
containment via stasis or process) as their entire essence:  
When the moment becomes the piece, discontinuity disappears in favor of total, possibly 
all Western music, even multiply-directed 
and moment forms: phrases are the last remnant of linearity. But some new works demonstrate that 
phrases are 
606  
      Kramer explains that lack of phrases is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for 
(1922 2001) Bohor I (1962), lacks internal phrase 
differentiation and the sense of time that it exhibits is vertical. However, other examples 
like Larr (b. 1930) Caritas (1969)  (b. 1935) A Rainbow in 
Curved Air (1969), contain phrases but no sense of hierarchy is distinguished between 
them, no sense of cadence. 
      A vertical piece does not begin, merely starts, explains Kramer. It does not build to 
a climax, does not propose internal expectations, does not build or release tension, and 
does not end but simply ceases. No event depends on other event; the whole piece is a 
large event.  Once we have entered into a vertical piece we must accept its conditions. 
                                                 
606 Ibid., p. 55. 
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Variations V (1965), we approach the infinite ideal where anything can 
happen without upsetting the verticality of the time structure.  
      Vertical compositions themselves are not usually unstructured. Rather, their 
temporal continuum is unstructured. For example, From the Fourteenth 
On (1973), and Ca 1994) HPSCHD (1969), where the 
form consists for the most part of unchanging relationships between ever present layers 
of the dense-sound world. 
      Listening to a vertical piece is like seeing a sculpture, where we determine for 
ourselves the pacing of our experience. Like moments in moment time, vertical music 
may be defined by process as well as stasis. Examples of process music are seen in 
(b. 1936) Come Out (1966) Les Moutons de 
Panurge, (1969). These pieces are constantly in motion, towards a goal or towards 
infinity.  
      Vertical music is the most radical of the new temporalities, where nonlinearity 
predominates. The context of this music allows the listener to make contact with his/her 
own subjective temporality. 
circular time. 607 An example of what is meant here by strict circularity, based on 
repetition of same moments Come Out. This 
type of music was called alternatively pulse music, phase music, beat music, pattern 
music and finally, minimalism. Come Out is the resultant of superposing two tape loops 
out of synch. A single loop is recorded on both channels. First the loop is in unison with 
itself. As it begins to go out of phase a slowly increasing reverberation is heard. This 
gradually passes into a canon or round for two voices, then four voices and finally eight. 
      The third categorisation introduced by this thesis is inspired in presentism. 
Particularist music is one obtained from unconnected material, chaotic, but that itself 
produces moments of stasis by singularity or uniqueness. Here the repetition model is 
replaced by the resonance of single moments that give the appearance that time has 
stopped.  
      (1931 2008) String 
Quartet I (1965) 
 
      Although philosophically speaking circularity is impossible in its strict sense, there 
is still certain phenomenological sense of it, which is musical, to be found in Bach, in 
many world musics, and in avant-garde music. 
                                                 
607  Kramer, 1988, pp. 54 57. 
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      Terminological modifications are not only in name but also in the efficacy of its 
more comprehensive explanation, contemplating philosophical interpretations of time 
outside music. 
 
Norteña, from Tres piezas para 
piano op. 6 (1940) 
As 20th century European and North American music have been analysed enough in 
previous literature, here examples from Latin American music were chosen. They 
608 and are given below.  
 
Example 3 
      In musical Example 3 Tres piezas para piano609 
610 inside the musical triptych of Argentinean romantic 
baguala as a more general, inspiring genre and the multileveled structure of the piece as 
a whole. For this aim, the use of circular time machinery and formalisation of the piece 
is necessary. Finally, the connection of this music with the circular mythological time 
conception of the Andeans is concretised. 
      ian A) 
presented in bichords, in inverted fourths, alternating 3/8 and 3/4 meters (it could also 
                                                 
608 A tentative insight into temporality as represented in Latin American music of the 20th century is 
found seminal in Carballo, 1996. 
609 Buenos Aires, Ricordi Americana, 1941. 
found in Wallace, David E., Alberto Ginastera: An Analysis of his Style and Techniques of Composition, 
1964. 
610 espread in the region of the Pampas and Northwest 
of Argentina.  in Las canciones folklóricas de la Argentina (Antología), 
1969 (available online).  
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be seen as superposing two pentatonic scales of D and A, creating parallel fifths). 
Harmonically, the original baguala is structured around the triton: I III V; the same 
III V. In the original baguala, the repetitive model is present in the pattern performed 
611 This is accompanied by the lyrics, most of the time improvised between 
take this role, developing a melodic line. Contrary to the a b c b form original of the 
baguala, the whole piece shows the form A B A. A linear melody is exhibited in the 
central part, belonging to modal mixolidian C (with Bb). The relations established 
between melody and harmony mattress is thus polymodal (there is a superposition of the 
ostinato in Am natural or eolian and the melodic line in C mixolidian). The central part 
of the piece, with full triads in left and right hand working in contrary movement, create 
a polychordal effect, somewhat resembling the superposition of the different registers in 
the original sung baguala, creating a whole dissonant result. One interesting role is the 
sudden arpeggio that interrupts, bridging the main parts of the piece. It is constructed 
from two chords, G#M and Em. The effect is that of punctuation with impressionistic 
flavour. 
        All this shows the multileveled structure of the piece. It does not have one 
distinguishing a predominant temporal mode in each piece. Polytonality and 
polychordal effects can be analysed as branching time, the C modal melody as linear, 
and the ostinato as exhibiting circular time. However, circular time with same events 
could be advocated as the predominant mode since the reiterative atmosphere that is 
created has a strong effect in our perception of the piece as a whole, annulling for 
moments the idea of a true succession. This is also supported by the continuous 
presence of the round echo of the original baguala throughout the piece, by means of the 
ostinato device. 
 
                                                 
611  constructed from two drumheads and played by a drumstick, typically 
used by the singer for accompanying the baguala.  
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Example 4 
 
      Example 4 is Heitor Villa- 1959) Study No. 11 for guitar from Douze 
Etudes.612 This analysis focuses on the middle (campanella) section of the piece. It 
showcases percussive basses performed by the thumb that resemble the sounds of a 
berimbau.613 The overlapping beginnings and endings, of an afro nature, blur the sense 
of linearity.614 615 and with circularity in 
African music and religion. 
      Villa-  piece begins in Em. The form is A B
expressive melody with contrasting, seemingly percussive entrances. The particular 
transitions from Lent to Piú mosso resemble African overlapping transitions, typical in 
rounds with soloist and chorus, where the alternating participation is superimposed, 
blurring past and future times to provide an effect of circularity.616 An arpeggio in C 
resembles the sounds of a harp, suddenly disrupting the movement created by the 
melody in bichords, and a scale of Db Eb F G is superposed to the bichords (G/B) of 
textural consistency created by the pedal is broken by the melodic line developed in 
double basses. The multileveled structure appears in this piece as a consequence of the 
juxtaposition of linear and circular music between the A and B sections. Villa-Lobos 
also superimposes linear and circular music in the B section (as Ginastera did in 
                                                 
612 Paris, Max Eschig, 1929. 
613 Single-string percussion instrument of African origin, made from a bow and a pumpkin.  
614 Guestrin Néstor, La guitarra en la música sudamericana, available as PDF online book in: 
http://sudamer.nestorguestrin.cjb.net/ 
615 African religions coming with slavery to Brazil.  
616 Ekwueme Structural Levels of Rhythm and Form in African Music (with particular 
R  in African Music Society Journal, pp. 32 33. 
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predominant in the central section. 
      A point still to be considered here is the election of the examples. Kramer dealt with 
a continuum from isolated discontinuities in a piece (tonal/non-tonal non-linearity and 
moment time) to discontinuities that were the scheme for the whole piece (vertical time 
and total non-linearity). That is, from weaker to stronger cases of circularity. The two 
above-mentioned examples from the Latin American repertory dealt rather with 
distinctive circular features (i.e. an ostinato, a campanella) that produce just that 
still not colouring the whole form, as can also be the case with most minimalist music. 
      Musical examples 3 and 4 both exhibit strict617 circular time with direction.618 In 
addition, the configuration is based on same events (in 3, from the repetition of the same 
pattern in the ostinato figure and in 4, from the continuous repetition of the E sound, 
working as pedal on the tonic on an open string). Example 3 may be interpreted as if it 
does not have a lead-in point, timidly coming to surface from a piano; example 4 should 
be considered as having a clear, strong circular beginning through the insistent accented 
basses in double strings bien rythmé.  
      Strict circularity with similar events, instead of same events, can be found in 
Malambo op. 7 for piano and Villa-
cases have a different circular structure from that of the pieces analysed above: they are 
helix-like (a combination of circularity and linearity) and conceived as spiral-structured 
music. As an aside, both examples exhibit harmonic progressions accompanying 
repetitive rhythmical patterns, which create an altogether different sense of cyclicity. 
      
be analysed: 
M usic cast in vertical time can scarcely be analyzed, in the usual sense of the term, since our 
normal analytic methods are products of left-hemispheric thinking ... . It is essentially pointless to 
explicate a holistic, timeless experience in terms of sequential logic. Thus most discussions of 
nonteleological music are more descriptive or prescriptive than analytic.619 
                                                 
617 
strictly speaking (which is interpreted logically as an impossible case). Instead, it means that it is more 
strict in 
similar events.  
618 
although applied to different music is maintained for operative reasons. 
619 Kramer, 1988, p. 388. 
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      Again, something different is  from 
an ontological point of view, in consideration to the analysis of the continuum: 
Apparently a more debatable presupposition of this logical approach is that even a continuum of 
Time is represented as a po
Nevertheless, in reality, this analytical decomposition still allows for the most diverse explications 
of our vague intuitive notions of continuity and discreteness. Indeed, as so often in philosophy one 
has to be an analyst the more to appreciate the whole.620 
      Finally, neither ontological nor phenomenological views enter into the discussion of 
the philosophical distinctions between the circular, the cyclical and presentism and their 
relationship with music intra (and eventually linked to anthropological and social) 
temporal meaning.  
 
5.3. Music and Branching Time  
      Branching time has its origin around the problem of the contingent futures in 
Aristotle621 or in the image of the best of all possible worlds,622 just  in  a  sense  of  a  
potential branching time, i.e. modelling possible options in action and reality of which 
one must be the outcome. Philosophy however, has presented also ideas of actual 
branching, as found in the proposal of a 623 Actual branching time is 
presented in accordance with ideas about parallel, independent worlds in philosophy, 
but also in anthropology, literature, and physics.  
      624 Borges recreates 
traditional conceptions of time in philosophy, arriving not only at a literary version of 
them, but also at an intuition in advance of problems of contemporary physics.  
       and prolific 
fictions in the work of J. L. Borges. It begins by presenting the spy Yu Tsun, who works 
for the German army during the First World War. Pursued by the English, he concocts a 
risky plan: to kill a man who has the same name as the French city, 
the Germans of where the British are through the news. After reading the telephone 
                                                 
620 Van Benthem, 1983, xii. 
621 On Interpretation, Chapter IX. 
622 Leibniz, Gottfried W., Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom on Man and the Origin 
of Evil [1710], Part 1: 8, 9 and 10. The Monadology and other philosophical writings [1714], paragraphs 
53 and 54. 
623 Lewis, David, On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986. 
624 Borges, The Garden of Forking Paths, 1941. 
Ideas of Time in Music 
 
 
 
231 
directory, the spy decides to take the first train to the home of a fellow named Stephen 
Albert. At the same time, this person is the one who had been recommended to decipher 
of Yunnan in China, who left instructions to construct a labyrinth and to write a book. 
However, the novel he had left had apparently made no sense because of its 
contradictions; for instance, some dead characters were alive in following chapters. In 
addition, the place of his labyrinth had never been discovered. 
       Borges creates his image of branching time in this context. Stephen Albert reveals 
to Yu Tsun that apparently the book and the labyrinth were the same. The contradiction 
words: 
In contrast to Newton and Schopenhauer, your ancestor did not believe in a uniform, absolute 
time. He believed in an infinite series of times, in a growing, dizzying net of divergent, convergent 
and parallel times. This network of times which approached one another, forked, broke off, or 
were unaware of one another for centuries, embraces all possibilities of time. We do not exist in 
the majority of these times; in some you exist, and not I; in others I, and not you; in others, both of 
us. In the present one, which a favorable fate has granted me, you have arrived at my house; in 
another, while crossing the garden, you found me dead; in still another, I utter these same words, 
but I am a mistake, a ghost.625 
      Borges attempts to recreate a classic problem in philosophy, that of possibility and 
time. In the history of philosophy, Leibniz had given a solution to the problem of 
contingency: An event can have many outcomes but only one will occur. For Leibniz, 
there may be infinite variations but what is real is the world in which we live now, the 
best of all possible ones.  
      Borges, on the other hand, postulates the existence of all the alternatives at the same 
time: 
In all fictional works, each time a man is confronted with several alternatives, he chooses one and 
 simultaneously all of them. He 
creates, in this way, diverse futures, diverse times which they also proliferate and fork. 626 
      According to a critical study by Zulma Mateos,627 
other Borgesian fictitious worlds. It does not remain inside fiction but it bursts into 
-consistency of 
                                                 
625 Ibid., pp. 99 100. English translation from Labyrinths: selected stories and other writings, New York, 
New Directions Book, 1964, p. 28. 
626 Borges, 1941. 
627 La filosofía en la obra de Jorge Luis Borges, 1998, pp. 79 97. 
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nature.628 According to Rescher, this fictional world would be supported by the scientific 
hypothesis of the many worlds in contemporaneous advanced physics. 
      Rescher explains that there are two cases of inconsistency: the first implies lack of 
the strong sense  is the self-
contradiction of logicians, which says that given contradictory statements it is necessary 
for one or the other to be true or false. 
      To imagine an inconsistent world is to imagine a world which violates the strong 
sense of consistency. Rescher arrives at the conclusion that consistency is not a feature 
of nature but a regulative or conceptual feature, not of reality as such but of our 
procedures for its conceptualization, according with our conception of it.  
       The inconsistent world wou
situation are realised; note that here we speak about physical, instead of logical 
possibility. For Rescher, 
between possibility and reality disappear, because all possibilities are real. Now, this 
would be accepted in the case of fiction, but not as a model for describing our real 
world. However, contemporary quantum physics, precisely, the theory of many 
worlds in opposition to the Aristotelian traditional view presented by Everett in 
1957 describes our world as a Borgesian world. 
      The theory of the multiverse, as found in contemporary physics, is the hypothesis of 
multiple universes parallel to the one in which we live and it was formulated by Hugh 
Everett in 1957. Theories of parallel universes can be found under the name of 
-worlds interpretation (MWI) is formulated also as the 
relative state formulation or theory of the universal wavefunction.629 
      At
to location in space: dogs do not have horns in this local world, but somewhere within 
an infinite space there is a world in which dogs have horns. Accordingly, Borges' saving 
of consistency is possible, in that he creates a difference of respect in relation to time. 
                                                 
628 The Primacy of Practice. Essays towards a pragmatically Kantian theory of empirical knowledge, 
1973, Ch. V, pp. 88 106.  
629 Vaidman, Lev, "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics," The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 
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nching. This 
would save consistency, because all possibilities are given but in different branches. 
      This interpretation of time reveals a particular interpretation of the universe. Facts 
would not be ordered according to a determined telos, as the Christian metaphysics 
believes, but arranged at random. The labyrinth is not constructed by human laws and 
that is why it is not decipherable. Borges attempts to design only a conjecture for the 
nterested in scientific or 
metaphysical developments. This is the result of thinking of the world as a writing of 
God, a hieroglyphic for humans. Finally, his pessimist view about our capacity for 
comprehending the world is saved by the fictional conjecture that everything is ordered 
at least in the divine plan.630 
      Here, the formal approach to the theory of time in temporal logic could serve to 
clarify an interpretation. A basic branching system frees two events from the law of 
connexity (linear system). The law of connexity demands that, given two events, one of 
them must happen before the other, resulting in a successive linear order of events in 
time. Without this law two events (or more) can occur at the same time, producing 
branches. There are two more refined versions of this basic system. The first one states 
that given several branches only one will happen, resulting at the end in linear time. For 
the second, one of the branches will materialize but we do not know which. This version 
rinth 
conceived by an infinite omniscient mind jointly with the idea that on the contrary we, 
humans, only can know the present things.  
      As it was mentioned, in temporal logic there are different variations for the 
branching system:631 
 
Basic branching system (CR, Cochiarella, 1966) 
A.1. (See the above-mentioned axiom of transitivity). This system is defined on the one 
hand negatively, as a non-linear system (in the sense of being multi-linear), and on the 
other hand as a system that possesses an order that allows branches, because it is not 
prohibited for two different moments to happen at the same time, forming branches. It 
allows branches to the future as to the past (this last idea being intuitively stranger for 
us, since the past is commonly considered closed). (See Figure 1.) 
                                                 
630 Mateos, 1998, p. 97. 
631 McArthur, 1976, p. 37. 
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Branching linear system to the past  
The most important characteristic of this sort of system is the impossibility of the 
 symmetrical; in 
fact, the past is interpreted as linear (see the above-mentioned A.3 of linearity to the 
left), whereas the future is branching. In this system a new formulation of the operators 
possible that it will be the ca Necessarily 
incorporated into the definition of the temporal operators. However, the problem with 
this system is that it is not able to explain why the chosen branch to the future will 
finally change into a simple line, resulting in a linear system after all.  
Branching modal system to the future OT, Mc Arthur, 1975) 
This third type of branching system makes possible the expression of both a linear 
temporal future and a branching temporal modal one with the same system of temporal 
logic. This system, being linear to the past as Kb
construct a 
branching model, understanding it as a set of partial linear models would lead to a linear 
conception of time; however, this system avoids this situation arbitrarily choosing a 
future branch to be the prima facie future branch of the actual moment. As a 
consequence, one of the future branches from the origin will be the actual, but the 
question is that one cannot know previously which of them it will be. And this is 
precisely the situation that leads to the notion of potential branching. 
      Øhrstrøm, unlike other authors appearing in the literature on temporal logic, 
concerning the branching conception. Borges expresses in literary terms what branching 
systems of temporal logic put into formal language, avoiding obscurities.  
Borges new idea about time is represented in a literary figure, and therefore it is no wonder that a 
number of philosophical and logical problems remain unanswered. In particular, the question 
about the branching towards the past is conspicuous. How can Borges accept an idea about 
branching past?632 
      Several interpretations adopt the idea of counterfactual possible futures, among 
which one is realised. Øhrstrøm thinks Rescher is, for example, against the idea of 
branching time as such, but that he instead defends that of branching in time. The 
controversy of these two ways of understanding branching is nevertheless found in 
                                                 
632 Øhrstrøm, 1995, p. 187.  
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633 
(one option will be forever true in this seeming branching; see above system Kb) and 
now. 
634 (the present as a 
decisive point for humans, at which history is open and going to be written). The first 
picture depicts determinism; the other, free-will in action. 
      Notice that the above mentioned branching systems support:  
1. F(1)p  F(1) p is true (corresponding to the basic branching system). 
2. F(1)p  F(1) p is true, supposing that the second branch is taken, which 
negated that an event happened (corresponding to Kb). 
3. From the perspective of the Ockhamist model, we would conclude that the 
expression in point 2. above cannot be known in advance, but only prima facie. 
      Other than the basic branching system CR OT system, 
(1839 1914) model of the 
branching, and it says: there is no future yet, just possibilities. So, following the 
enumeration above, we would have: 
4. Neither F(1)p nor F(1)~p are true, on this interpretation. 
      Finally a fifth interpretation is from Hirozaku Nishimura. Nishimura consideres not 
only times but histories as linear subsets of the set of times. Nis
is the union of disjoint histories. Tenses are relative to a history. Here: 
5. F(1)p is true respect H1 (history 1) and F(1)~p is true respect H2 (history 2). 
      t involves 
some relation of identity of histories. This, in order to explain the fact that for example 
H1 and H2 may be identical up to the moment when F(1)p is true at H1 and false at H2. 
In order to achieve this identity, future statements are disregarded. This pre-definition of 
histories is interpreted by Øhrstrøm as a similarity with Leibniz. 
      
same time, in contrast with Leibniz, who conceived one history as the possible, the best 
to all these interpretations of branching: they are all happening, Borges says referring to 
635 and more, 
                                                 
633 Borges, 1941, p. 100. 
634 Ibid., p. 88. 
635 Ibid., p. 97 
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seemed to me that the humid garden that surrounded the house was infinitely saturated 
with invisible persons. Those persons were Albert and I, secret, busy and multiform in 
636  
      An interesting discussion is raised about the problems of identity, degree of reality, 
and communication between the several worlds.637 Regarding the first one, Rescher 
thinks about a transmundane identity; whereas other authors such as David Lewis 
other. 
      In sum, there is a difference between the branching and the branched. One has to do 
with a potential sense, while the other has an actual interpretation. One reinforces the 
idea of the outcome and irrevocable linear past, the other the idea of self-consistent 
multiple lines or histories. Images from physics, anthropology, and literature can be 
ordered behind the second interpretation. Psychological and social times offer branched 
interpretations. One is coincident with the conception of time in philosophy as internal, 
psychological, and untransferable; the other is found in the more recent idea of social, 
geographical time, as a time differently perceived according to each culture. 
      In its turn, Anthony Seeger, in his Why Suyá Sing, A Musical Anthropology of an 
Amazonian People, describes the plural experience of time from a tribe in Matto 
Grosso, Brazil.  
Different individuals or groups 
unison singing of the adult men, but also the sound of a young solo-shout song singer and the 
falsetto cries of an old man. In another house a woman was crying over the memory of a dead 
relative who liked that ceremony especially, and in yet another a group of men was singing. Since 
thatch walls are not barriers to sound, sounds can be produced simultaneously in a number of 
different places and still contribute to the whole.  638 
      The experience of time as a plurality is, curiously, musically reproduced by the Suyá 
people. The simultaneity with which these people perform their music is a replica in 
musical terms of the experience Kramer notes about multiple times in the West. 
      Alejo Carpentier reveals a peculiar sense of branching in a Latin American 
conception of time. According to him it is possible to find in Latin America different 
                                                 
636 Ibid., p. 100. 
637 Gutiérrez, Edgardo, Borges y los senderos de la filosofía, 2001 and Nuño, Juan, La filosofía en Borges, 
2005. 
638 Seeger, -creation of 
social relationships, p. 74. 
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temporal strata of human history. The phases, usually successive, coexist in Latin 
America, they are simultaneous: 
In Latin America we have [...] men from the 19th century that live in concrete buildings, buildings 
that already belong to the 20th century. The man of 1975, the futurologist that already lives in 1980 
interacts daily, in Mexico, over the Andes, with people that speak languages from before the 
Conquest. The dominical markets of Juchitán, near Oaxaca, are the same described by Bernal Díaz 
del Castillo when he spoke about the magnanimous City of Mexico that his eyes contemplated for 
first time ...  The Latin American of today, lives with an illiterate mass, coexists with a mass that 
culturally belongs to the European Medieval Era. Some landowners  have the mentality of 
feudalists of the 18th century; our great bourgeois although dressed in a different manner the 
one from the Second French Empire.639 
      Manipulation of time has been a constant in Latin American literature. Jorge Luis 
d images of time that are fruitful for musical 
comparisons. In both cases the story implies, or the characters get involved in, series of 
outcomes, all perfectly possible. 
      According to Carballo, Carpentier alludes to heterogeneous and multiple times: 
Latin American music reflects inevitably this pluritemporal condition. he composers of 
nationalist trend in Latin America concentrate their attention in their own popular cultures in 
search  of  raw  material  to  be  used  for  their  compositions.  As  these  cultures  coexist,  situated  in  
different periods of human history and each period has its own temporal framework the music 
created from them reflects these particular temporal dimensions.640 
      The heterogeneity of temporal strata is going to be a starting point for analysing 
temporality in the Cantata para América Mágica op. 27 (1960). In it, we can find 
polyrhythms and superposition of continuous/discontinuous time, also of the Latin 
American/European conceptions of time, and superposition of musical languages for 
example, pentatonic scales over dodecaphonic series within the same work alluding to 
al and 
the classical European languages. The idea of multiple times is charged with a historical 
sense in Carpentier comparing to the abstract version by Borges. 
      The anthropologist Edward Hall conceived a seeming but not exactly same 
phenomenon when describing polychronic cultures.641 Polychronic cultures can handle 
different activities simultaneously at the same time. On the contrary, monochronic 
                                                 
639 Problemática del tiempo y el idioma en la moderna novela latinoamericana Obras completas de 
Alejo Carpentier, 1983, pp. 214 215. . 
640 Carballo, p. 156.  
641  
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cultures do tasks sequentially, one by one. Monochronics tend to think of time as being 
linear, doing one thing at a time, and not tolerating unpunctuality or disruptions. 
Polychronic cultures are associated with a sense of time as being cyclical. For them, 
punctuality is not a virtue, and it seems understandable to be interrupted.  
      In social psychology, Robert Levine has developed a peculiar notion of 
multitemporality that although having far resonances with the precedent development, 
interestingly promotes the management of various times ultimately as a key attitude for 
personal success. Multitemporal societies and persons require a double competence: 
they must follow both steady as well as quick times. Music also resembles these cases 
of multiplicity in time.642 
      The branching models can be considered at the moment of approaching special ways 
of structuring music at macrolevels. A first model can be labelled branching to the right. 
Momente (1962 64) is an 
example of it among many others. 
      The second model is branching to the left. It is the less frequent one, but it is not 
unusual.643 Roetti offered three interpretations for understanding this ontology. The 
23), refers to the idea of those past things not having effects in the 
present, seeming to belong to the domain of possibility. The second, coming from 
history, which is related to the rational reconstruction of the possible pasts compatible 
with the present. This idea is present in literature. Borges wrote that the expiry of 
memory and the influence of the imagination give place to an alteration of our personal 
past. In music, this system could apply to the case of several potential events that finally 
end establishing one of the possible outcomes. 
      The third situation allows branching in between a single beginning and a single 
interpreted along the branched performance of each instrumentalist playing without 
coordinating with each other, could be read through this model.  
      The fourth possibility involves branches fanning out to the past and to the future. 
Cantata, analysed below, can be considered a musical expression of an 
actual parallel branching time. In Figure 1, the basic branching system CR 
                                                 
642 Levine, Robert, A Geography of Time: the temporal misadventures of a social psychologist, or how 
every culture keeps time just a little bit different, 1997. 
643 Roetti, 1984, pp. 70 71. 
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arrangements of the branching.644 
      The last case of branching fanning out to the left and to the future is interpreted as 
contemporary physics and finally, read through some anthropological and psychological 
(analogical) versions. Alan Marsden omits all these precedents, mentioning only a later 
645 None of them extracted the philosophical consequences in order to 
enrich with theoretical approaches of branching time the field of musical analysis. 
      According to Marsden, it is easier to interpret these above-mentioned cases as 
branching instead of linear with disjunction because conjunctions (given among the 
branches in branching time) are readable by computers. However, for logical 
proceeding, linearity with disjunction representations uses fewer logical constants.646 It 
is, then, hard to decide on the basis of simplicity (economy in the representation) for the 
branching model.  
      More important is the consideration that not all types of branches at branching 
of an ossia section to perform, and the notes of the other version simply do not exist in 
the performance. 647 Thus, linearity plus disjunction would be a more sensitive model 
for expressing these cases. However, things are more complicated from the point of 
view of computer processing:  
...R epresentation in this manner linear with disjunction  does not rule out the possibility of a 
performer playing both versions of an ossia at once. To do so would require adding more clauses 
to the representation explicitly preventing this, and so considerably complicate the representation. 
It is therefore in situations where this must be prevented or where one wishes to reason about the 
events in alternative sequences together that a representation in branching time has a clear 
advantage.648 
      The branching time logic applied to music representation mentioned in Marsden do 
not contemplate ideas growing in philosophy, literature, physics, anthropology, and 
social psychology; for Kramer this temporality was associated mainly to the 
development of technology applied to music.  
                                                 
644 Extended version in Calleja, 2005.  
645 London, Cape, 1969, quotation in Marsden, 2000, p. 28. See also Kramer, 1988 , p. 13. 
646 Marsden, 2000, pp. 29 30.  
647 Ibid., p. 30. 
648 Ibid., p. 31. 
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      In the case of branching, when exactly all this had repercussions for music would be 
hard to assure, but hypothetically some first works could be mentioned. The hypothesis 
on the transition from linearity to branching time is not found explicitly in 
musicological literature, contrary as it was found from circularity (founded in Christian 
eternity) to linearity in Berger, and from linearity to non-linearity (founded in modern 
experiences with time and exchange with Oriental cultures) in Kramer.  
       Branching time in music is configured on the basis of a special sort of 
pentatonic scales over atonal scales, or of the music of the Andes over the language of 
contemporary European art music, and finally many internal times working together 
without a precise common tempo. These cases are all musical expressions of this last 
temporal mode. 
      The actual branched is uncovered through the whole organisation of a piece of 
music conceived with parallel lines of heterogeneous material, for example, in Alois 
Requiem, a multitextual work, or in , 
which presents temporal modulation along superposed, character-contrasting levels.  
 
5.3.1. Musical Analytical Framework 
The idea of time as branching off into different directions in relation to music is already 
present in Kramer. In his opinion, it is connected to our contemporary Western 
understanding of temporality, typically represented in computer-like thinking, where it 
branch off, ret .649 
      - 650 He explains the 
fact that there are pieces whose direction of motion is frequently interrupted by 
discontinuities, which make the music go so often to unexpected places that goal-
directed linearity, though still a potent structural force seems reordered.  
      However, what in this thesis is understood by a branching model of composition 
is in one of its senses closer to what Kramer calls as the extreme of moment time.651 
Mobile forms, in which the order of moments is arbitrary, represent this extreme 
situation. Here the composer indicates that the sections of the piece may be put together 
                                                 
649 Kramer, 1988, pp. 13 14. 
650 Ibid., pp. 46 49.  
651 
discontinuous. Ibid. pp. 50 52. 
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in any of a number of possible orderings from one performance to the next, perhaps 
Momente, 
1961 72. 
      
constant characteristics of register, dynamic, tempo, and so on; a transition 
accomplished between moments can be slow or abrupt.652 The moment-forming is the 
act of composing a certain degree of change that can vary from zero to a defined 
maximum. In the work Momente, there are three principal groups of moments: the M-
moments (melodic, heterophonic, represented by a speaking soprano and brass 
instruments). Then there is a second group: the K-moments (from the German word 
Klang: sound quality), characterised by timbre and homophony and represented by male 
voices and percussion. Finally, the third group is represented by the D-moments (from 
the German Dauer: duration), that are characterized by durations, silence, and 
polyphony, and represented by singing female voices and electric organs. In addition 
there are moments further from these pure centers, which share more or less elements 
with the others. For instance, an M (k) moment is an M-moment with a precise 
component of K.  
      What defines a mobile form is the idea of controlled randomness (mobility of the 
form) that the work presents. Mobility functions as follow: the K-moments must always 
be at the center of the work in the performance. However, the conductor may decide on 
the order of the other moments for a particular performance. This means that D and M- 
moments, which are on either side of K, can be interchanged. The same occurs within 
each subsequent group raised from each branch. This procedure makes the work like a 
mobile, a large number of possibilities of combining these musical moments into a fixed 
version for a particular performance. 
      Branching systems can contribute to clarify this kind of procedure. Here it is 
variety of orders in the disposition of the moments appear at the same time in different 
branches to the performers as possibilities (for instance at the beginning: M K D or D
K
type of branching system is known that past performers only have a simple line as a 
resultant of their selections, although the future affords several possibilities. For 
instance, in the Europe Version of Momente recorded in 1972, the actualised version 
was D K M, and in each moment group K D M, M K D, and D M K respectively. 
                                                 
652 Stockhausen, Karl, Stockhausen on Music, Robin Maconie (comp.), Lectures and Interviews, 1989, pp. 
63 -  
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      ll 
q, r, s
moment of structuring a composition, some events are regarded as still not having any 
consequences, so in the past appearing as mere possibilities, whereas the future is open 
to possible options as well (although not unlimited). 
      -mentioned Momente, as 
well as for B Third Sonata for piano (1955) inspired in the same procedures, is 
the second type of branching time (Kb system)
possibility, which emphasises one possibility as real, these mobile works are finally 
perceived as simple lines. 
      The second type of branching system, by which we can express the idea of 
branching becoming a line at the end is well applied to mobile forms (and in popular 
music to traditional jazz, also to Hindu classical music, non-spontaneous improvisation, 
where paths are pre-indicated). A greater sense of uncertainty was expressed by the 
third branching system OT, selecting a prima facie branch to be the actual future 
branch. The uncertainty of not knowing what branch exactly will happen can be applied 
to counterfactual reasoning modelling of the process of composition and also to free 
jazz (total) improvisation. 
      Finally, music working with actual parallel or branched times is much closer to 
Borgesian branching time and expressible through the basic branching system CR. (See 
Figure 1). , 
Requiem. 
      To conclude, the branching structure of time can be applied to the study of musical 
time on several axes: the level of composition (counterfactual process), the level of free 
improvisation, written music with controlled random or mobile forms (also non-
spontaneous traditional jazz improvisation), and finally, the level of the musical form 
inspired in parellel worlds fully written. 
      The first case of Elliot Carter's (1908 2012) music is special in that it questions the 
that of a simple common denominator, to which a limited set of proportionally related 
durations must conform, to that of a continuum of variable yet interconnected 
proportions, allowing for a virtually limitless range of durational fluctuations (a 
technique called tempo).  
      Carter fixes parallel times with a rigorous writing in the score, contrasting with 
Lutoslawski, whose writing is free. However, Lutoslawski's branching time in his String 
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Quartet (1964) is much more perceptible than the chaotic effect that results from 
Carter's quartet. At this point, we can divide the formal level (the conceptual idea of the 
work), or score level, and the phenomenological (the perceptible result). 
      Elliot Carter's String Quartet no. 3 has a two-dimensional structure. Even it presents 
physical separation of the duos, positioned at different places in the space and 
stereophonic sound in case of recordings. The idea of opposition between parts is 
carried to its extreme, treating each instrument as a separate entity but pairing them into 
duos, which continually present contrasting material movements throughout the 
course of the composition. Among its six movements, Duo II (2nd violin and viola) is 
characterized by rhythmic regularity (tempo giusto) while the four movements of Duo I 
are presented in a freer tempo rubato. The two duos hardly ever play together 
rhythmically and usually confront one another in highly complex polyrhythms and 
different tempi. According to Carter, there are actually two separate sets of pieces from 
beginning to end. In addition, he assigns differences in speed, intervals, dynamics, 
es in this work is 
to introduce eight solo movements, firstly to lighten the texture, but secondly to aid in 
the recognition of the opposite characters. The giusto meccanico of Duo II and the 
giocoso of Duo I superposed, provide the most colourful episode in the piece in mm 90
96. There are frequent superpositions of the more rapid movements, such as scorrevole, 
leggerissimo, and the slow, quiet movements, such as largo tranquilo or andante 
espressivo.  
      In the second case of branched music, Witold Lutoslawski's (1913 1994) String 
Quartet (1964), the four instruments are written as if they were playing alone, a reaction 
against the image of the dialogic music the string quartet represent par excellence. 
Generally, the voices go their own ways, though frequent ostinatos reduce the 
complication this might imply.  
      The third case is in Bernd-Alois Zimmermann (1918 70)'s Requiem for a young 
poet (1967 69). A work that has language as center of the work for speaker, soprano, 
basso, 3 choirs, electric sounds, orchestra, jazz-combo, and organ. Here texts are used 
for contrasting. The distinctive diversity of material lives in various layers of times and 
events. He wanted to represent time in all aspects: cultural, historical, linguistic, and 
intellectual situation of Europe during the period between 1920 and 1970. Resonances 
Cantata. The piece has  five 
movements: Prolog; Requiem I; Requiem II & Ricercar; Rappresentazione, Elegia, 
Tratto & Lamento; and Dona nobis pacem. 
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      The texts used are: I. from Christian liturgy (requiem-liturgy, revelation of John, 
book of Salomo); II. literary texts (Joyce, Ezra Pound, W.Majakowskij, Sandor Weöres 
and others); III. philosophical texts (Wittgenstein, Mao Tse Tung, constitution); and 
Chamberlain, obituary of Sergej Jessenin by Majakowskij). 
      Polytemporality is not exclusive of Western music, or of contemporary academic 
music. Heterophonic music of Bali (gamelan) is an example.653 It exhibits a temporal 
flexibility that can be recognised as a case of branching time music. In gamelan music, 
some instruments participate through variations along a common pulse, and there are 
melodies of large scale proportions which develop freely over this mattress of common 
pulsation.  
      The polyphonic music of the Renaissance also provides examples of branching 
music. Motets and madrigals without the exact measured notation developed later, can 
be recognised as another antecedent example for branching time. Classic and Romantic 
examples were provided by Rowell.654 
      Branching time is not exclusively music with lines with same notes at different 
simultaneous tempi,655 it is generally music founded in temporal multiplicity. 
are all presenting branching time. Also other resources 
-   
 
Cantata para América Mágica op. 
27 (1960), I- - 
  
Composed in 1960, the Cantata is one of the first works of Gina
period. It was premiered at the Second Interamerican Music Festival in Washington, 
D.C., in 1961. It is a large work for dramatic soprano, percussion, orchestra, and two 
pianos. It mixes folklore elements, indigenous instruments and pre-Columbian-inspired 
                                                 
653 Lindsay, Jennifer, Javanese Gamelan, 1992. 
654 Rowell, 1983, p. 264, note 72. 
655 Greschak, John , http://polytempomusic.blogspot.fi/2007/09/word-polytempo.html 
I am indebted for this distinction to El politempo en la música del s. XX. 
Problemas de notación y ejecución, Department of Musicology, University of Helsinki, (in process). 
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poems by Mercedes de Toro,656 
devices common to the Second Viennese School, particularly, multiserialism, 
politonality, and quarter tones.  
      The Cantata belongs to the last neoexp
was famously described by Pola Suárez Urtubey: 
It is hardly possible to find reminiscences of rhythmic or melodic cells from folk music. Neither it 
is to find those symbolic elements that appear in the second period. However, there are constants 
that continue to feed the style: strong and obsessive rhythms, contemplative adagios, magic 
657 
      The work was a success in North America as well as in his own country. Irving 
 
Because it is music that undoubtedly belongs to the Americas. It is bold, free, magnific, a music 
written by a man that is proud of his heritage and that is sufficiently dared for walking by his own 
and lonely path.658 
      In Buenos Aires, its reception had the same connotations; according to Suárez 
Urtubey, Leopoldo Hurtado from La Prensa, wrote in 29th October, 1961 that the novel 
techniques explored by Ginastera helped him to adventure into the pre-Columbian 
América. Hurtado believed that the language used by the composer was based on one of 
the principal elements of the native animistic expression: rhythm, and that the avoidance 
of common moulds of Western music such as melody, harmony, counterpoint, and 
regular, symmetric forms, collaborated in this sense. 
      On the other hand, the use of multiserialism, pitch, intensity, timbre, sonorous 
densities, does not preclude from a language that is powerfully communicative and 
exciting. The atomization and submission under abstract structures, diluent and 
undifferentiated, proper of the multiserialists, is not a feature in Ginastera, according to 
Suárez Urtubey.659 
      The six movements that constitute the piece describe the epic drama by which a 
civilization passed from its outstanding magnificence to its unfortunate destruction. 
description of each poem. The exception is the fourth movement, which is a purely 
                                                 
656 The texts are adaptations of collected drafts found by Christian priests from the Inca, Maya, and Aztec 
cultures of the time previous to colonization. Pola Suárez Urtubey, 1972, p. 61. The author also has an 
article particularly dedicated to the work: Pola Suarez Urtubey, Revista musical chilena
. 84, 1963. 
657 Ibid., p. 58. . 
658 Ibid., p. 61. 
659 Ibid., p. 62. 
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instrumental interlude, a fleet and shimmering toccata that gradually adds instruments 
within a constant pianissimo range, reaching a climax on a tremolo, 12-note chord, and 
receding in reverse order.  In the vocal movements, the voice is characterised by an 
his following operas. Intervals of 11th, high-pitched pedals, and abrupt starts are some of 
the resources comfortably used by the composer. 
      Suárez Urtubey mentions an aspect that becomes substantial from the Latin 
American perspective: 
[T]hose proceedings, although modern in the vocal writing of a contemporary composer, are 
inseparable of the singing of infinity of non-western cultures, among them, the Amerindians. 
Think about our bagualas (tritonic song book), that, sung with kenko (something like singing with 
swing) uses all kinds of vocal devices such as portamentos or quick inflections from a sound to the 
other of the scale, particular timbre, etc. Having brought the West to one of its climaxes, it begins 
to drink from the sources of other more spontaneous cultures. Music is not at the margins. That is 
why a symbiosis of modern proceedings with the stylistic authenticity of the indigenous singing 
can be found in Ginastera.660 
      This double aspect, the modern and the ancestral, become essential in the 
interpretation of the philosophical idea behind, that of parallel worlds or times in terms 
aspects that 
were introduced as peculiar of treatment of time: at moments concise, 
 
      There is a remarkable aspect that brings a variety of possibilities and is of special 
interest in the study of temporality: the superposition of rhythmic formulae that prompt 
us to randomness in the last movement. 
Beside passages of rational rhythm, there is a predominance of multirhythm by the simultaneous 
use of irrational values. Even inside irrational values, new formulae, also irrational, are incrusted, 
as in the passages at the end where the performance arrives to randomness.661  
      Michelle Ta
parallel although not fused, glued, historic times in the cantata. Indeed, Tabor feeds the 
work.662 A 
belongs, is a stage of mixture and superposition although still not synthetic in its proper 
sense; and the last, his synthetic stage. 
                                                 
660 Ibid., p. 64.  
661 Ibid., p. 62. 
662 Tabor  Latin American Music Review, 
Spring/Summer 1994. 
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      Tabor concentrates in the least studied period in the work of Alberto Ginastera and 
his String Quartet no. 2, op. 26 and finishes in 1982 with Sonata no. 3, op. 55, into three 
stages:  
Contrary to existing evaluations, the analyses presented in this article demonstrate that three 
directions or trends are evident within the late works and that two of those directions include 
nationalistic elements [...].  
One direction explored by Ginastera after 1957 comprises a group of compositions that are 
abstract, contain no references to nationalism, and exhibit few traces of traditional tonality [...]. 
The second direction comprises four works that have nationalistic titles: Cantata para América 
Mágica (1960), [...] Puneña N1 (1973) [...]; Popol Vuh, The Creation of the Maya World (1975
83) [...]; and Puneña N 2 (1976) [...]. The compositions reveal a unique approach to the ideals of 
nationalism evoked in contemporary idiom. While preserving the spirit of and emphasis on 
nationalism, the framework of traditional tonality, supporting traditional melodies and rhythms 
dissapears. The compositions within this trend, therefore, constitute a synthesis of nationalism with 
the techniques of the avant-garde. 
(1976), Sonata for cello and piano (1979), and the second and third Sonatas for piano (1981 and 
1982, respectively) [...]. [T] his group of works presents perhaps the best examples of the synthesis 
of the avant-garde with tradition, together with the incorporation of nationalist elements.663 
      To sum up, there are various strata from which the idea of parallel times can be 
extracted: modern proceedings superposed with the style of indigenous chants, as 
described by Suárez Urtubey; complex textures; rhythmic superposition of rational over 
irrational and of irrational over irrational formulae; and timbral superpositions. As we 
will soon see, a more detailed analysis of the first movement brings concrete examples 
of the superpositions in terms of rhythms, vocal resources, and timbres. 
      The first movement, Prelude and Song of Dawn is a chant of expectation and 
angst.664The form of this first movement is ternary, introducing the voice at the end of 
the first macroformal unit, until the end of the piece:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
663 Ibid., pp. 3 however as not fully developed, in 
the sense of parallel languages or superposition still
synthesis is the last synthetic period properly. 
664 See Appendix. 
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                                                  1                             33         34                           65         66                            77 
 
 
 
 
      A first aspect of parallelism is found in the prevalence of rhythmic simultaneities, or 
complex textures created from the superposition of various rhythms and timbres. 
Multirhythm is caused by the superposition of irrational values. 16th 
the kettledrums over quintuplets on the bass drum I, nontuplets on bass drum II, and 
triplets on the bongos (I, m. 19). 
     There are diverse punctual rhythmical pulses in the drums (parches), with 
subdivision of the pulse in different numbers, this over repeated pulsation with variable 
pulse made by xilophone, marimba, glockenspiel and pianos, finally over quick 
surrounding ostinatos made by celesta and pianos (pianos having a double function in 
texture). (I, mm. 65 66, Example 5). 
voice 
Figure 8 
instruments
31 
(drums) (drums)
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Example 5 
  
    A second parallelism is the use of the voice. There is a simultaneity between serial 
organization, in a chromatic-atonal context (first original hexacord: F #  G  D #  C  
B  F, and second hexacord, by retrogradation at an interval of an ascending major 
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second: Ab  D  Eb  E  Bb  A) and the use of acciacaturas, typical of the inflections 
of aboriginal music (I, mm. 49 63, Example 6). 
 
Example 6 
      
including ostinatos and arpeggios at the end, which provide a feeling of a tonal center.  
      Timbral simultaneities are obtained by the superposition of strata of the different 
instruments used. Ginastera includes a group of Latin American percussion instruments: 
cajas, tambores, chocalho, sistro, and güiro. On the other hand, he uses pianos in 
marginal functions in comparison with traditional ones, as percussive instrument or for 
a transient function. In general, the wide range of the percussion, goes from two grand 
pianos to a pair of rocks struck together. (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9 
 
      This section has concentrated on pointing out these resources in the first movement 
of the cantata but similar situations can be detected in the other movements. For 
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example, in the sixth movement, Ginastera returns to integral polirhythm  
polyrhythm 
665 Still, in 
this last movement there is a passage of free rhythm, where the rational divisions seem 
to disappear (VI, 110 114, Example 7).666  
      Mariano Etkin calls the musical resource, employed since Ives and later exploited 
by composers such as Feldman and Cage 667 The 
destabilization obtained by Ginastera, of any certain pulse (firstly by multirhythm in 
movement I and now by irrational aleatoric procedures) arrives at its climax in 
movement VI. Etkin interprets this way of using rhythm as pure duration, emancipated 
 
Is it perhaps here a parallel between this type of non-pulse rhythm that yields, without doubts, to 
think about the type of rhythm of serialist and punctillist trends of the European music, and the 
strong pulse rhythm that could be associated with an important part of ethnic music of Latin 
America?668 
      Starting at m. 128, movement VI, a pulse rhythm is imposed. Grela suggests there is 
a superposition in this last movement of ornamental discontinuous rhythm and pulse 
rhythm, as happened at the beginning of the work.  
 
 
                                                 
665 Grela, 2001, p. 92. 
666 Suárez Urtubey, 1963, p. 29.  
667 Sobre el contar y la notación en Ives y Feldman Revista del Instituto Superior de Música, 2002. 
668 Grela, 2001, p. 96. 
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Example 7 
 
      Modalities of time as categorised here do not function as sharp or pure species but 
working amid the different temporalities that a same work can exhibit. In reference to 
the example analysed at the end, the VI movement of the Cantata shows obstinate, 
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repetitive rhythms (as it happens with Tam-Tam, mm. 1 127) however, it is hardly a 
substantial resource for the overall interpretation of the movement as exhibiting the 
main characteristics of a branched time. In the same vein, the stability obtained by the 
soprano from the use of acacciaturas plus a reference point (different in effect from the 
angst and expectancy atmosphere of the beginning), creates the sensation of lineal 
discourse. However, this direction in the voice does not private the whole message as 
having parallel times, significantly because it is the unique movement of the whole 
piece where random parts in rhythm are superposed. 
      It is time to emphasise the more general factors of cultural identity, integration, and 
coexistence on which these parallel times reflect upon. In fact, Ginastera composes this 
work in an atmosphere different from the one surrounding him during the earlier, 
 
The Cantata para América Mágica presents as a type of work in which the composer plays 
refer directly to the contributions of the European musical culture of the 1950s and others that go 
back to the ethnic musics of Latin America (particularly those with aboriginal roots).669 
      Grela descri
which the interaction between multidirectional processes work simultaneously in the 
interior of a sonorous form. 670 This interaction is the one which receives here the 
interpretation of multiple or parallel times in music. 
[I] believe that a work as this becomes highly significant of what our Latin American reality is in 
the sense of culture, which is based on mixture, diversity, coexistence of situations that have 
nothing to do with utopic purisms. Meanwhile, if we do not become aware of this situation and 
continue feeling either an extension of the Eurpean culture, of an aboriginal Latin-Americanism, or 
of the typical representatives 
something that we deeply know we are not.671 
                                                 
669 Ibid., pp. 87 88. 
670 La consideración de las tendencias múltiples (asociativas-disoc , La 
música en el tiempo, 1992. 
671 Grela, 2001, p. 98. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The relevance of discussing the topic of time and music is underlined by the double fact 
that time is a central concept we have to deal with in our practical and scientific worlds 
and on the other hand, music is such a vital company for our everyday lives that we can 
hardly obviate a philosophical reflection about its value and its meaning. From this 
point of view, music not only teaches us how to manage with time in terms of counting, 
or proportions, but in the further sense of reflecting with sounds about time, and in this 
sense becoming a source of knowledge. 
      The existance of a time of music was conceived neither as an exclusive 
-subjectified 
way. A co-operative, hybrid view of the problem is defended, with the accent in its 
aesthetic dimension. The fusion or hybridization of rival theories yields to a deeper 
question about the result of that mix. Is it a more comprehensive theory than either the 
phenomenological or the ontological taken separately, or it amplifies, in the sense of 
saying new things? One important sense behind any philosophical debate is that 
philosophy orders partial knowledge; philosophy cannot be reduced to close boundaries, 
which are fortunately the terrain for particular disciplines, in this case musicology and 
its internal divisions, but its main task is to spur different voices to talk and converge, 
arriving at a better picture of the problem. Yet it cannot be said that a philosophico-
logical approach surpasses any of the answers from phenomenology or ontology 
presented here, but its aim is to show they can coexist in an explanation about the topic 
of time in music, which is more integral.  
      The methodological use of analogy between time in general and musical time relates 
to the question of verosimilitude. Verosimilitude is not understood as inferior truth here 
but as a genre different and of different origin from truth as certainty. Verosimilitude in 
this sense, not involved in a division between truth and error, consists of an 
amplification of contexts and possibilities, a factory of possible worlds, which is by the 
way the core of aesthetic experience.672 
      The context of the discussion originates in the structural homology that presents 
diverse theories of time and musical forms. The analogy involves notions of general 
time theories and the time of music. Analogy as a resource for explanation is not totally 
equal here to its logical sense, i.e., as a probable reasoning. Neither is it equal to a 
                                                 
672 
2001. 
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metaphorical description that is used in order to strengthen an argument, as we know 
rtunity, the use of analogy is associated with 
explanations that amplify argumentation. In this case, it can be identified under a 
relational syllogism: if a then b and if b then c, as a result, if a then c. Where a is:  a  
theory of time; b: logical forms that express this theory; c: musical form that exhibits 
this shape. We deduce that if a theory of time, such as for example branching time, is 
related to the logical formulation of it, and this logical shape is at the same time proved 
to work in a determined musical form, then the above mentioned theory of time relates 
to the musical piece explaining a fundamental part of its meaning. 
      The analogy time in general-time in music made it possible to deepen an installed 
thesis coming from musical formalism according to which the sense of music does not 
arabesque. By the analogy here tested, music, on the contrary, is seen as a highly 
significative form; not empty, it becomes a true temporal reflection made through a 
sonorous medium. Music represents by means of its distinct elements something 
internal to itself, potentially linked with time ideas and using these elements in certain 
conventional ways, displaying different temporal meanings. The different chapters have 
dealt with musical temporal constitution, musical reflection of time conceptions, 
musical organisation in time, and finally with the provision of a broad analysis showing 
a plurality of connections. 
      The category of circularity, with can be seen as 
analogue to the and its interpretation 
suggested reflections linked to theories of the eternal return of the same or similar 
cycles in philosophy. Within circularity as a broad concept, the important conception of 
presentism was also introduced.  
      alhough not exactly 
corresponding to -  However,  a 
philosophical account of these temporalities in music tried to show the linking 
connections of musical structures which have become common for the artistic music of 
the XX and XXI centuries, with old metaphysical inquiries around determinism and free 
will, and finally with theories of modal realism and multiple worlds. 
      The linear-directed time levels in music, were here  
(antecedent-
temporal form having the seeds at the beginning of the progression, so it must be 
understood at the end as a complex case of non-progressive at the same time that it is 
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-
consequent relationships). The distinctions presented here for linear time are profoundly 
intertwined with philosophical developments that conceive time in terms of this shape 
and the sense of time reinforced by the apparison of the clock and modern societies in 
the Western world. The importance of this translation is that it is not merely a change of 
names but it aims to give an insight into philosophical ideas of time appearing in music. 
      Time however is not an homogeneous concept but depends on different 
perspectives. It is a crucial part of the understanding of time that there must be 
understood from an anthropological point of view. faces us with a 
particular perception of time. This thesis provided a general framework from which 
external global conceptions of time were presented but it also suggested necessary a 
deeper inquiry into internal particular interpretations of time in music. Latin American 
times suggest a sense of direction in time which is complex, so both teleological 
ned by the 
similar cycles proper of the Andean understanding of time; a branched structure finally 
which is particularly depicted by the image of the garden of forking paths and musically 
developed by the confluence of several languages and times coexisting. 
      As a conclusion, resorting to the analogy time-in-general/time-in-music brings a 
more complete view of art objects, and claims for them ultimately a legitimate cognitive 
status. The purpose of the whole research ends justifying an idea that is found in 
Aesthetics 673 
although for the first, clearly, we accomplish it through the senses.  
      It must finally be discerned what philosophies of time can be said to be the basis of 
this whole inquiry. Dahlhaus based his article in the Aristotelian notion of time. 
about time. A tacit connection with a Kantian sense of time is exhibited by this thesis in 
that time is here conceived as condition of possibility not for knowledge in general but 
for the possibility of music. Still, a plurality of philosophies of time could be considered 
substantial to this thesis in general, since one or the other has served for reflecting about 
the musical temporal modes. 
            Particularly, the history of metaphysics about time has been read through the 
glasses of essays by Jorge Luis Borges. The election was natural since the writer 
chooses one or the other classic theory of time without putting emphasis on any of them 
(and sometimes contradicting himself), just employing them as an aesthetic pretext. He 
was entertained by them, playing with them as colours to be dismantled. This task is 
                                                 
673 Ch. 1, Sec. 1, 3.  
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basically the same reproduced by composers who decide one or the other time structure 
on time but free of definitive results. Borges once 
reflected about time ideas as 674. 
            Topics such as cognition and time in music, the role of music in teaching 
something about time beyond discoursive reflections, and the general question of 
creativity and imagination in the borderlines of rationality and its fundamentals, are 
future interests of research that can departure from this basic inquiry. Inside the general 
perspective of revaluating the aesthetic dimension for cognitive purposes, this study of 
time in music suggests the line of a metaphysical open path of profound links between 
being and time, which is a limit for the present inquiry. 
 
 
                                                 
674 Borges, 1936, p. 14. 
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